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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Assembly Transportation Committee met in Oakland on Tuesday, November 20, 2001, to
explore the state's preparedness to prevent and respond to terrorist threats against California's
transportation facilities and services. The hearing was held in response to Assembly Speaker
Robert Hertzberg's request that certain policy committees review the readiness of the sectors they
oversee in light of the events of September 11. Over three dozen witnesses from state, federal,
and local agencies, transit operators, railroad companies, airports, industry associations, and
labor unions offered testimony regarding their respective programs and the security measures
they have taken before and since September 11. They also laid out their needs for further action.
The hearing assigned each of the witnesses to one or more of eight separate panels: Bridges,
Tunnels, and other Highway Facilities; Airports; Rail and Transit; Seaports; Freight- Highways;
Freight -Rail; DMV Documents; and Emergency Response. Witnesses were asked to address
three basic questions: What have you done to enhance the security of your customers? What
more needs to be done? What can the Legislature do to assist you?
Testimony revealed certain common themes to be prevalent among transportation providers and
public safety agencies:

+ Preparedness and response programs must be based upon extensive communication and
cooperation within and among affected agencies.

+ Security efforts undertaken since September 11 are not sustainable at their current levels
without significant increases in staffing and funding.

+ The multibillion deficit in the state's General Fund makes it imperative that federal assistance
be forthcoming to help finance anti-terror measures.

+ California's transportation providers have been able to draw upon their prior experiences
dealing with natural disasters and other extraordinary events as the basis for addressing new
security concerns.

+ It is important not to overreact to real or perceived terror threats. Security measures should
be well thought out and balanced so as not to overly burden travel or commerce.

+ Although most agencies have been able to perform risk assessments, others believe the state
should help define and identify the threats against which they need to protect themselves.

+ Much of the information offered at the hearing was positive: extensive preparations have
been taken and security has been enhanced. This information needs to be disseminated to the
public.
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Recommendations emanating from the panels were fairly straightforward and mostly revolved
around funding issues: pursuing federal financial assistance, providing resources for DMV to
develop biometric identifiers for drivers' licenses, protecting local governments from further
reductions in their state allocations, and augmenting the staffing of CHP and other agencies so
that they can continue their newly-acquired efforts without cutting back on their routine
activities. Other suggestions included expanding the authority of the Public Utilities
Commission and providing greater safeguards in the issuance of drivers' licenses and hazardous
materials endorsements.
In reviewing the information presented at the hearing, the Chairman determined that the
enormity of expenditures that state and local agencies will need to sustain in order to provide an
adequate level of security to transportation users will necessarily require the assistance of the
federal government. Inasmuch as national security is a federal responsibility, it is the duty of the
federal government, in a situation that is akin to war, to assume this burden. Nevertheless, until
such assistance is forthcoming, the state must take whatever steps are necessary, and expend
whatever resources are needed, in order to assure that Californians are reasonably safe when
using transportation facilities. Furthermore, the state must take the lead in assessing where the
security risks lie and in identifying the appropriate measures to mitigate those risks.
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Opening Statement

CHAIRMAN'S OPENING STATEMENT
ASSEMBLY TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE HEARING
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ISSUES
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA NOVEMBER 20, 2001

I'd like to welcome everyone to this special hearing ofthe Assembly Transportation Committee.
We are here today at the request of Assembly Speaker Robert Hertzberg who has asked several
of the Assembly's policy committees to explore the state's readiness to avert and respond to
potential terrorist attacks on the state's infrastructure and resources. We will hear testimony from
representatives of various state and local entities that provide transportation services to
California's citizens as to what steps they have taken, and what assistance they may need from
the Legislature, to protect their assets and their customers from terrorism. Additionally, public
safety agencies and emergency response providers will tell us how they are preparing to deal
with incidents that may occur within our transportation facilities.

Even before September 11, we knew that transportation clients depend upon our vigilance for
their physical security while they are patronizing our facilities. This responsibility is
complicated by the nature of so many of our transportation facilities- airports, transit stations,
bridges, and tunnels- that involve large numbers of people or vehicles congregated within small
or enclosed spaces. The challenge we face is to mitigate, reduce, or eliminate the vulnerabilities
that inevitably spring from this environment.

At all times during today's proceedings, we will be cognizant and respectful of the fact that not
everything that is being done to protect Californians from attack is suitable for public disclosure.
With that proviso, I will remind each of our witnesses of the three basic questions we noted in
our invitations: what steps have you taken to reduce the risk of terrorism in your segment of the
transportation industry, what more needs to be done, and how can the Legislature assist you. In
consideration of our crowded agenda, I will ask that most presentations be limited to 2 to 5
minutes.
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The hearing will be divided into 4 major segments. Respectively, they will deal with
transportation infrastructure; freight movement; misuse of DMV documents; and emergency
response. Within each of the four segments, we will have panel discussions with representatives
from the appropriate agencies. We will also provide time for comments from the public.

Thank you all for attending. We are now prepared to proceed.
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Press Coverage
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A S S E M B L V M E M B E R

JoHN A. DUTRA
Press Release . . . . . . 20 TH Assembly District
For more information, call
Lisa Gardiner at (916) 319-2020
Or by cell phone (916) 838-0714

For immediate release
November 16, 2001

DUTRA TO HOLD HEARING ON
TERRORISM AND TRANSPORTATION
Legislative solutions will be proposed to increase security in the
state following the September 11 attack
OAKLAND_ Assemblymember John Dutra (D-Fremont), chair of the Assembly
Transportation Committee, will conduct a hearing on terrorism and transportation
security on Tuesday, November 20 in Oakland.
Entitled "The Impact of Terrorism on State Transportation Services and
Facilities," it will be held from 9 a.m. to 3:30p.m. in the Elihu Harris State Building
auditorium, 1515 Clay Street, Oakland. It is open to the public and will include time for
public comment.
At the hearing, transportation officials from more than two dozen agencies will
address the safety of the state's bridges, tunnels, highways, airports, seaports, rail and
transit lines and propose legislative solutions where improvements are warranted.
"The tragic events of September 11 underscore the urgency of making our
transportation systems safe,'' said Assemblymember Dutra. "Obviously, we don't want
to succumb to unnecessary alarm. But we have a responsibility to take a close look at
how we can ensure public safety. It is my hope that this hearing will help set the course
for work we will undertake in Sacramento on this issue."
Representatives and topics to be covered include: the Department of Motor
Vehicles on drivers' licenses and identity fraud issues; Officials from SEIU on the
training of airport security personnel; California Highway Patrol Commissioner D.O.
"Spike" Helmick on the safety of bridges, tunnels and airports; Brigadier General Ezell
Ware of the California National Guard on bridge and airport security; Staff from the
Oakland Airport and the Port of Oakland on airport and seaport safety; Rail and highway
officials on freight movement.
Also present will be officials from BART, the Office of Emergency Services, the
Golden Gate Bridge, the L.A. County Metropolitan Transit Authority, AC Transit, Union
Pacific, Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railroad Company, the Santa Clara Valley
Transportation Authority, the California Trucking Association, Alameda County Fire and
the cities of San Jose and Fremont, among others.
###

Capitol Office: State Capitol• P.O. Box 942849 • Sacramento, California 94249-0001 • (916) 319-2020 • FAX: (916) 319-2120
District Office: 39510 Paseo Padre Parkway, #360 • Fremont, California 94538 • (510) 440-9030 • FAX: (510) 440-9035

Going for Broke on Extra Security
Finances: State agencies warn legislators they'll need lots more
money to keep their guards up.
By TIM REITERMAN
TIMES STAFF WRITER
Los Angeles Times, November 21 2001
OAKLAND-- California, already beset by a projected $12-billion budget deficit,
cannot sustain massive security upgrades to help deter terrorism on the state's
bridges, roadways and waterfronts without spending many more millions of
dollars, lawmakers were warned on Tuesday.
Agencies ranging from the Highway Patrol and National Guard to bridge districts
and mass transit systems told a legislative hearing here that their resources are
rapidly being sapped by security measures following the Sept. 11 attacks. Some
said their staffs are putting in long days, retirees and reservists are being
pressed into service, and money is being poured into fencing, security cameras
and lighting.
The Highway Patrol alone said its anti-terrorism effort already has cost more than
$12 million and is projected to top $40 million this fiscal year. The total tab for
heightened security on the transportation network so vital to the state's economy
and lifestyle could be as much as $1 billion this year, according to Assemblyman
John Dutra (D-Fremont), who headed a Transportation Committee hearing on the
problem.
"We have to find the money," Dutra said in an interview. "The need is there ....
This security is going to be a wartime necessity, but it's not going to be easy" for
the governor and lawmakers to make the big budget cuts necessary to pay for it.
Many of the emergency security measures taken recently to protect the Golden
Gate Bridge, one of the country's potential targets for terrorism, are not
sustainable for the long run, said Kary Witt, deputy general manager of the
Golden Gate Bridge District. Noting that staffers are putting in 12-hour shifts and
vacations have been canceled, he said, "You can only work people so long."
The bridge district, which also runs a ferry system, needs $13.5 million in capital
improvements such as construction, security cameras and lighting, Witt said. But
it needs almost that much annually to expand and maintain its security force.
"You need people to watch the cameras and respond to what the cameras see,"
he said.

Most of the extra cost to the Highway Patrol, said CHP Commissioner Spike
Helmick, is for overtime for patrol officers working 12-hour shifts and fuel for
increased air patrols. To help save money, he said, the CHP has stopped training
programs and nonessential construction.
Caltrans officials said they already have spent almost $40 million on lighting,
security cameras and other hardware such as fencing and razor wire installed
around vulnerable locations on the Bay Bridge. Labor costs for security
improvements are expected to run many times that much.
The cost also is rising rapidly for more than 1,000 National Guard troops
stationed at 29 airports and other locations throughout the state. Officials said the
federal government is expected to help with the airport duty, which already has
cost $36 million.
Major ports, transit systems and airports have been spending increasing
amounts on security too. Officials said they have been preparing for innumerable
terrorist scenarios but can only afford to focus on a limited number in the future.
The Port of Los Angeles reported that it had spent $1 million in overtime to date,
but needs 15 more port police officersat a cost of $1 million to maintain the high
level of security.
Many asked the legislators to help secure some federal assistance or to help
provide state funding.
But Dutra was not encouraging: "Where do we find the money to pay for this?"

Peace of mind takes steep toll on state costs
Additional $335,00 spent daily on CHP
By Sean Holstege
STAFF WRITER
Oakland Tribune, November 21, 2001
With wartime security becoming a new way of life, the escalating price for
peace of mind began to sink in at a state hearing in Oakland on Tuesday.
How high the costs might ultimately climb remains unclear, but already talk is
floating around the state capital about asking voters to pitch in.
It's easy to see why.
The California Highway Patrol spends an extra $335,000 each day paying
officers to work 12-hour shifts to be on full alert. Added security since Sept.
11 has cost the state $12 million and is projected to top $40 million by June.
CHP Commissioner D.O. "Spike" Helmick said the money hasn't weakened
traditional law enforcement yet, but he did say there is "very, very little
training right now," and building and car maintenance must wait.
Posting National Guard troops on four California bridges costs the state
$420,000 a month, on top of the $36 million the federal government spends
to patrol airports.
At the height of its alert, BART spent an extra $100,000 a week patrolling
trains.
U.S. Coast Guard Lt. Cmdr. Richard Teubner said the Coast Guard has
brought in 2,600 reservists, who have been working 70-hour weeks for the
last two months. It's a common story at the California National Guard, the
CHP and others charged with safety.
"The question isn't what more can we do, but can we continue doing what we
are doing? We cannot operate at this rate indefinitely. This is way beyond our
budget," Teubner said.
Assembly Transportation Committee Chairman John Dutra, D-Fremont,
asked a wide array of law enforcement, emergency, airport, transit, military,
rail and union officials to explain what they've been doing to improve security
since Sept. 11 and what more they could do.

The answers pointed directly to the next crisis in the state capital:
skyrocketing and unfunded security costs amid a $12 billion state budget
shortfall.
"Funding is going to be a serious, serious problem," Dutra observed. "We've
identified $125 million in one-time costs, and we've only gotten through the
first panel."
"My sense today is this will end up being a staggering amount of money,"
Dutra said. "Most people really feel this is a federal issue. This is a wartime
circumstance."
Currently three ideas are circulating the capital on how to pay for homeland
security. One involves a bond measure for anywhere between $4 billion and
$16 billion, which could go to California voters next fall. Another source of
money could be a quarter-cent sales tax surcharge, also put to voters next
fall. Or surcharges on transit tickets.
Ticket surcharges got a cool reception on Tuesday.
Although much of the talk focused on the growing costs of security, Dutra
walked away with legislative ideas, after soliciting testimony from 40
transportation security experts.
One security highlight was mandating biometric thumbprints on all new
drivers' licenses so that digital prints can be compared by computer with
actual prints.
Another idea was requiring state-administered background checks on all
truck drivers who deliver hazardous materials or gasoline.
The Transportation Committee will report to the Assembly Speaker's office
on Dec. 7 with recommendations.
The good news is that most panelists said California is better prepared than
just about anywhere.
"This is not new to you folks. You've been doing this for a number of years.
The public should be very comforted." Dutra said.

Panel weighs the costs of keeping safe
Law enforcement, transportation firms, bridge operators
and labor discuss the toll on finances, manpower
By Guy Ashley
CONTRA COSTA TIMES
November 21, 2001
OAKLAND -- Unprecedented levels of commitment and circumspection are
keeping the Bay Area transportation system well-guarded from terrorist attacks.
But a panel of law enforcement and public transit officials wondered aloud
Tuesday just how long the monumental effort can be sustained before personnel
burn out and money dries up.
"I don't think the question is what more can we do, but how long can we do it,"
Coast Guard Lt. Cmdr. Richard Teubner told state Assembly panel gathered to
discuss the impacts of terrorism on transportation.
Coast Guard reservists and active duty personnel have been guarding Bay Area
ports and water-bound transportation structures around the clock since the Sept.
11 attacks.
The Coast Guard has activated a nimble and effective security force, Teubner
said, but the demands are exacting a toll on officers who frequently are asked to
work 18-hour days.
"We can't operate at this pace continually," he said.
The hearing was called by Assemblyman John Dutra, D-Fremont, who sought a
discussion of security measures needed to guard long-term the state's
transportation infrastructure.
CHP Commissioner Dwight "Spike" Helmick said his agency has spent $12
million on additional security measures since Sept. 11, and that figure will bulge
to more than $40 million if it is sustained through the current fiscal year, he said.
The CHP has been monitoring bridges and other key transportation facilities, as
well as serving as the key security component in state buildings deemed
possible terrorist targets.
The new responsibilities have come at a cost, Helmick said, as CHP officers
have had to curtail their more traditional enforcement duties, such as monitoring
speeds on freeways and operating truck scales to ensure that big rigs are

operated safely.
With the state projecting a $12.4 billion deficit over the next two years, Dutra said
it is also necessary to ask questions that may be politically unpopular, including
whether current security measures are an overreaction to the potential threat.
More than three dozen officials spoke before Dutra's committee at the daylong
hearing, representing law enforcement, transportation, airports, bridge operators
and organized labor. They told of unprecedented efforts to keep their interests
safe, and to take part in a larger effort to guard the transportation system as a
whole.
Dutra encouraged officials to brainstorm ideas for how to pay for increased
security needs. One, he said, could be surcharges similar to those imposed on
airline tickets to pay for airport security.
Some transportation officials balked at the idea, however. Gil Mallory, president
of Amtrak West, told the panel that surcharges of $1 0 may not seem much to
passengers paying several hundred dollars for an air ticket. But adding that cost
to tickets for other, lower-priced modes of transportation could have a drastic
impact on who decides to ride the bus or take the train.

Wednesday, November 21, 2001
Breaking News Section of the San Francisco Chronicle
website
(11-21) 06:00 PST-- Representatives from transit
agencies throughout California told a state assembly
committee that the cost of providing enhanced
vigilance after Sept. 11 is taking a toll on their
operating costs.
The State Assembly Transportation Committee held
a hearing in Oakland on Tuesday.
Chaired by Assemblyman John Dutra, D-Fremont,
the hearing allowed transportation officials from
more than 20 agencies to address the safety of
California's bridges, tunnels, highways, airports,
ports, and rail and transit lines.
One constant theme throughout the testimony is that
increased security measures are straining agencies'
budgets.
The California Highway Patrol, for example, has
been spending an average of $335,000 per day
since the attacks to provide security for the state,
said Commissioner Dwight "Spike" Helmick.
So far, the CHP has spent $12 million, and if things
continue as they are, by the end of the fiscal year,
the CHP will have spent $40 million to provide
enhanced security, Helmick said.
Most of the added expenses are the result of beefed
up security and associated overtime costs, as well
as the cost of operating patrol aircraft, Helmick
said.
Helmick added that there are also some one-time
costs that are needed to pay for surveillance
equipment.
Randy Iwasaki, director of Caltrans District 4, said

that one-time cost for increased security measures
including surveillance cameras for bridges, tunnels
and tubes, as well as other equipment, could set the
Department of Transportation back $40 million.
Brig. Gen. Dennis Kneally of the California National
Guard said that patrol of the state's bridges costs
$420,000 a month, for as long as extra security is
needed.
Assemblyman Dutra said such examples only begin
to illustrate the challenge that California lawmakers
face as they prepare for the upcoming legislative
session.
Dutra said it is all going to come down to
reassessing the state's priorities once the reports
from all of the state committees are complete.
"Finding these funds is going to be very difficult,"
Dutra said. "Nevertheless, the security needs are
there, so we're going to have to find the funds."
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BRIDGES HIGHWAYS AND TUNNELS
"As I enter my 33rd year oflaw enforcement, I have never seen
such a large variety of people working together better than they
are right now. And I am referring to local sheriffs, police, and fire
departments, military, bridge staff, and Caltrans. Collectively, a
lot of barriers have been dropped in the last 60 days in order to try
and make to state safer."
Dwight "Spike" Helmick,
Commissioner, California Highway Patrol
For many, highways, bridges and tunnels are the most immediate things that come to
mind when one thinks about protecting California's physical infrastructure. But the list of
agencies that are involved in their protection are not so obvious. Protecting California's
highways, bridges and tunnels from a potential terrorist attack requires the collaboration
of efforts from a cross-section of public works, public safety and military organizations at
the state, local and federal level.
Bridge Security
This has translated into more personnel devoted to security on the bridges. One agency,
the Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transportation District (bridge district), testified
that in addition to dedicating more of their own staff to security, other agencies, have
helped including:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

California Highway Patrol (CHP),
The National Park Service (both ends of the bridge are in National Parks),
US Park Police,
The California National Guard,
The US Coast Guard,
The FBI,
The San Francisco Police Department, and
The Marin County Sheriffs Office

Agencies like the CHP have been working collectively with Caltrans, and the Golden
Gate BH&TD to increase security on these facilities. Targeted facilities include the
Golden Gate Bridge and the Bay Bridge in the San Francisco Bay Area, as well as the
Coronado Bridge in San Diego, and the Vincent Thomas Bridge in the Los Angeles area.
CHP has assigned staff to patrol the bridges on a 24-hour cycle in cooperation with the
US Coast Guard, who are conducting waterside patrols. The National Guard is stationed
at posts on the bridges and the CHP is flying over the bridges and other key infrastructure
facilities on a 24-hour cycle. These agencies have procured new, high-tech equipment to
protect the bridges, including thermal imaging devices and infrared equipment in order to
enhance night patrols.
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Caltrans and the bridge district both reported that they worked very closely with the CHP
to make security improvements based on risk assessments developed by CHP the Office
of Emergency Services (OES) and other public safety agencies. For example, the
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory was enlisted by CHP to help identify vulnerable points
on the bridges. In response, Caltrans and the Golden Gate (BTH&D) have worked
aggressively over the last six weeks to fortify those vulnerable points and eliminate
public access to those locations on the bridge. Lighting has been installed where
appropriate based on input from CHP, Coast Guard and Caltrans personnel.
Fencing has been improved, and hardened perimeters have been established with
detection systems installed to prevent unauthorized trucks and vehicles from entering in
certain areas. Additionally, Caltrans reports that they have issued a $2 million contract to
install a chain-link fence with barbed wire at additional points on the bridge. Caltrans is
also in the process of awarding a $20 million contract to install additional security
cameras and sensors along the bridges.
Personnel and contractors for the bridge agencies are required to carry identification on
site. Temporary facilities, i.e. resident engineer trailers have been moved away from
critical points on the structures so that explosives cannot be near sensitive locations.
Caltrans is also increasing towing service to move disabled vehicles off the bridge.
Contractors are also being asked to register their vehicles, and this information, along
with emergency contact information is being shared with CHP and the US Coast Guard.
CHP is given advance notice of which personnel from the bridge agencies are scheduled
to enter the facility.
Other Key Facilities
With respect to the tunnels, Caltrans reports that the Posey/Webster tube and the
Caldecott Tunnel are two of the primary facilities that have been identified for additional
security. Fencing has been installed to limit access to the air intake system. Personnel
access has also been restricted at these points. The CHP has also increased patrols
through those tubes and tunnels. It is important to note that the additional surveillance
systems will complement equipment that is already in place.
CHP has also been focusing on other major corridors in the state. For example, the I-5
Freeway. The state water system circumvents and flows alongside that freeway. CHP
has increased its aerial patrols from a 48- to a 24-hour cycle, and is also assigning
additional staff and using new equipment to monitor movement in and out of major
tunnels in the state.
Threats on the Highway
Monitoring and securing large trucks continue to be a major concern for the CHP. Two
weeks ago (from Nov. 20th), CHP conducted major spot checks and stopped all trucks
that approached the Golden Gate Bridge to determine what kind of congestion problem
would result from these kind of inspections.
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In addition, CHP staff has been sent into all the terminals that haul hazardous materials.
These types of inspections are usually done on a 25-month cycle, but within the last few
months, all trucks that have been stopped and inspected. Scale facilities have been open
on a 24-hour basis and CHP staff performing much closer inspections of all trucks that
haul hazardous materials.
CHP continues to have strong concerns about the potential theft of a large truck,
especially one that is hauling diesel fuel or some other substance that could be used as an
explosive in a terrorist attack. The CHP Commissioner pointed out that every one of the
terrorist attacks in the US and in other countries has involved a petroleum-based product
as a portion of the explosive substance in their assault. CHP has identified the need to
protect against the risk of someone stealing a gasoline hauler, an aviation fuel truck or a
truck hauling some other combustible material and use it as a weapon on a bridge.
CHP has been working with the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory to develop a device that
would allow a CHP officer to quickly stop a runaway or hijacked large truck. If the
testing of this device is successful, CHP would like to recommend that the federal
government require that these devices be installed on all large trucks.
Concerns were also raised by the CHP regarding containers that are brought in from
overseas through the ports and hauled through the state on trucks. Currently there are
devices that can be used to detect nuclear materials in containers. The Lawrence
Livermore Laboratory has developed a much a smaller version of equipment that can
potentially be installed in strategic locations so that every container can be examined for
nuclear contents.
Budgetary Constraints
"The people are the most expensive part of this security equation. In
contrast to any surveillance and monitoring equipment that may be
purchased, personnel must be hired and trained to operate this
equipment. Personnel is the most significant, ongoing category of
expense."
Kary Witt, Deputy General Manager,
Golden Gate Bride, Highway and Transportation District
All of the agencies that testified before the committee raised concerns regarding their
ability to sustain the emergency security measures over a long period of time. As it has
become clear that the threat of a potential terrorist attack will not subside in the near
future, the panelists testified that they will need help from the state or federal government
if they are to continue providing security at a heightened level.
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The bridge district testified that they would need an additional $70 million per year in
order to develop and implement a bare bones, no-frills, security staffing plan for the
bridge and the district's transit operations. The district also reported that they would need
$4 million in order to retain security services provided by the National Park Service and
CHP. The bridge agencies also noted that one of their long-term security goals is to
minimize the need for additional CHP staff for monitoring by utilizing automation.
Public Access vs. Security
Both bridge agencies reported that they continue to wrestle with the need to secure the
bridges, while not going too far to restrict public access. When discussing security on the
bridge, the district continues to struggle with the need to balance public access against the
need to close security gaps. If public access continues to be restricted, then the bridge
will be in danger of not serving its original purpose. Caltrans pointed out that they
continue to block access to certain locations underneath bridge and highway structures
that are above city streets. This is likely to result in complaints from cities and counties,
as the local traffic pattern may change.
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AIRPORTS
SFO --Peter Nardoza (Deputy Director of Public Policy)
Oakland Airport- Steve Grossman (Director of Aviation)
CHP- Commissioner Dwight ("Spike") Helmick
California National Guard- Brigadier General Dennis Kenneally
Major Mike Wells, Public Affairs

Service Employees International Union- Tom Csekey, Local Pres.
Airborne Express- Allen Tubbs (District Field Service Mgr)
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AIRPORTS
The September 11th attacks had the most profound effect on airport and aviation security.
California is home to two of the largest airports in the nation. No one has forgotten that
all of the flights that were hijacked on September 11th were headed for California. A few
days before the committee's hearing on transportation security, the President signed H.R
3150, the Airport Security Federalization Act 2001. This act has largely shaped the
recent debate on aviation security. However, representatives from the air freight industry
(Airborne Express), Oakland International Airport, San Francisco International Airport
(SFO), law enforcement (CHP) the National Guard and the labor community (SEIU),
reported that state and local officials did not wait for the passage of this measure before
taking action.
Recent Activities
Airport representatives presented testimony regarding the enhanced screening of
passengers. SFO reported that all bags are being opened and that the inspection process
is much slower, and much more thorough. Both airports reported that all trucks are
screened before they enter airfield. All food, delivery trucks and other trucks are sealed
prior to entering. In addition, SFO has also installed "red teams" on the airfield. These
are individuals who move around the airfield checking badges to insure that individuals
working on the field are authorized to be there.
Representatives from the Oakland International Airport testified that they have nearly
doubled the number of staff in the airport security unit of the Oakland Police Department
(from 8.5 officers to 21 ). The Oakland Police Department has security responsibility for
all activities within all buildings the airport. In addition, the Alameda County Sheriff's
Department has assigned 23 deputies to the airport, who are responsible for the security
on the exterior of the facility and on the roadway and parking system. Private security
firms continue to staff the necessary posts at vehicle access gates and parking lots that are
near the terminal.
Short-term parking within 300 feet of the terminal has been closed to prevent a potential
attack by truck or car bomb. Both airports reported that they have implemented a
monitoring program for quality assurance of the new safety commitments.
National Guard
Governor Davis ordered National Guard troops to report to 29 airports across the state.
These airports were identified for deployment of military personnel because of the
volume of passengers and transportation priority. Their mission at the airports is to
provide a military security presence, reinforce local law enforcement, and help restore
confidence in air transportation. Currently, there are 1000 guards stationed at the
selected airports throughout the state.
The National Guard is performing the airport mission under Title 32 of the United State
Code. This means that the personnel remain under the control and authority of the
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Governor, but it also means that these activities receive their funding from the federal
government. Recently the number of personnel stationed at airports was increased by
25%. This level of service will most likely continue through the end of the year.
Long Term Security
Oakland Airport testified that they would work harder over time to reemphasize the role
that each of its employees share in providing increased security. Each employee has a
mandated responsibility to challenge other individuals they may seen on the facility or in
a secure area to make sure that they have the proper credentials. The airport is currently
examining ways to screen all employees that enter or exit the airport facility, and all
materials that come on the airfield. A number of design alternatives are also being
examined for the new terminal complex to direct all employee traffic and deliveries to the
airport through a single or multiple checkpoints.
SFO reported that they would need to improve the screening of passengers. They argued
that this would require a workforce that is better trained, better performing, better paid
and better retained. Both airports highlighted the need to improve baggage screening.
Federal law now requires that all baggage, both international and domestic, be screened
by electronic detection systems. Lastly, all employees that enter the airfield must be
screened everyday as they come to work.
Public Confidence
Although these increased security measures may have caused inconvenience for patrons,
the Oakland Airport testified that they have not received many complaints. The public
appears willing to accept the need for higher security and the attendant inconveniences.
The recent signing of federal airport security legislation will boost the confidence of the
traveling public, sustain higher passenger levels. However, representatives from both
airports testified that the recent federal legislation would present them with some
immediate challenges.
Impact of Federal Legislation
SFO testified that they currently have 12 or 14 CTX machines, which are used to screen
baggage electronically and detect explosives. SFO estimates that they will need to
procure somewhere between 40 and 50 of those machines in order to meet the goals
established for airports in the legislation, at a cost of approximately $1 million each. The
Oakland Airport reports that security costs will increase by at least $7million per year due
to the increased standards for airport security.
The Service Employees International Union (SEIU) testified that they represent
thousands of airport workers; in particular, they represent about 600 screeners at LAX,
500 at SFO and are organizing 100 screeners at Oakland Airport. Concerns were raised
about the requirement that all screeners have US citizenship. The representative from
SEIU noted that one does not have to be a citizen in order to serve in US Armed Forces.
There are currently about 50,000 non-citizens are actually serving in the US Armed
Services. A high percentage of these screeners are immigrants. The current workforce is
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almost completely comprised of low-income workers. As a result, SEIU predicted that
the job dislocation would have most severe impact on the poorest communities in
California.
SEIU asked that the Legislature communicate its concern regarding provisions in the new
airport security act that requires US citizenship for airport screeners. SEIU asked that the
Legislature urge Congress to "correct" that element of the legislation and replace it with
the "Armed Forces Standard" for citizenship status. Lastly, they proposed that the state
work with local government to help those displaced workers find alternate employment.
General Aviation Airports and Small Airstrips
In response to a question from the chair, airport representatives testified that security at
general aviation airports around the country is much less than at air carrier facilities.
These conditions have been authorized by the FAA. However, witnesses predicted that
this condition will likely change in the next 6 to 12 months. The Oakland Airport has
required that each of its fixed based operators submit a detailed security plan.
CHP raised a concern regarding small planes and airstrips in rural parts of the state,
where planes are operated from facilities that are not traditionally identified as airports.
They argue that this increases the risk that the planes will be used for bio-terrorism. CHP
identified areas north of Sacramento where a numerous amount of small planes are used
by the agricultural industry for example. CHP also testified that they have fielded a lot of
requests for bomb searches and "walk-throughs" with bomb-sniffing dogs. These small
planes go largely unscrutinized, and this continues to be a disturbing issue for the CHP.
What Can the Legislature Do to Assist?
Airport representatives reported that the Legislature could help them meet security
challenges by defining the threats that any security measures are to prevent. They argue
that it is extremely difficult for airports to protect passengers and the public without
understanding what they are guarding against. Defining the threat would enable airports
to develop viable solutions and directed efforts to avoid those dangers. Without this
definition, airports are left with a monumental task. Airports would have to formulate an
infinite number of scenarios of potential harm that may be exacted against the public and
then to implement policies to protect against these activities.
SFO asks that Legislators individually and collectively, speak forcefully on behalf of
California's airports to their federal counterparts. Securing the money that is necessary to
make California airports safer is a top priority. SFO requests that Legislators help insure
that as they talk to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the United States
Department of Transportation (US DOT) and to the members of the House and Senate
their interests are preserved.
The CHP reported that state officials had already developed an early draft of a plan that
establishes a uniform protocol for risk assessment. It is not yet in final form, and the
Office of Emergency Services (OES) will be distributing this document in draft form and
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soliciting input from local agencies (everyone from airports to law enforcement) to
provide input before it is formally adopted.
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RAIL AND TRANSIT
California Transit Ass'n- Jeanne Kreig
Eastern Contra Costa Transit Authority- Jeanne Kreig_(GM)
American Public Transportation Ass'n - Pete Cipolla
VTA- Pete Cipolla (General Manager)
AMTRAK - Gil Mallery (President, Amtrak West)
BART- Paul Oversier (Ass't General Mgr)
Commander Clark Lynch (BART Police)
LAMTA - Paul Lennon (Director for System Safety & Security)
AC Transit- Robert Hughes (Head of Security)
Greyhound -Randy Isaacs (State Government Affairs Rep)
Metrolink- Ann Louise Rice (Government Affairs Manager)
United Transportation Union- JP Jones
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RAIL AND TRANSIT

Mass transportation plays a key mobility role in California and throughout the nation. Prior
catastrophic events in the state, such as the Lorna Prieta earthquake in 1989 that shut down the
Bay Bridge for a month, highlighted the need for the continuing viability of alternative modes of
transportation that can move large numbers of commuters and other travelers. Immediately after
the September 11 attacks, when the nation's airports were not operating for a period of three
days, interstate carriers such as Amtrak and Greyhound saw a spike in their passenger volumes.
Upon revelation of a purported threat to California's suspension bridges several weeks later,
BART and other mass transit providers experienced increases in patronage. While transit
agencies offer both an everyday means to transport large numbers of commuters, and a necessary
redundancy in the event of a shutdown of other modes, the nature of mass transportation presents
its own unique set of vulnerabilities in the current environment of international terrorism.
As the largest panel of the November 20 hearing, with representatives from nine different
transportation providers as well as from two industry associations, the Rail and Transit panel
expressed many common concerns and described many common responses to the September 11
incidents. This group discussed security arrangements within the context of a transportation
sector characterized by one participant as an open, high volume system with multiple points of
access. (BART, for instance, has 95 miles oftrack and 39 stations. The LA County MTA has 60
miles of track and 50 stations. In 2000, California's transit operators provided more than 1.3
billion passenger trips.)
Most of the providers noted the high number of passengers they serve as well as the numerous
vehicles and ground facilities that they maintain. (In fact, among the carriers, only Amtrak and
Greyhound are in a position to check passenger names and ID's. Amtrak actually matches the
names of people making reservations against the FBI's watch list on a real-time basis.) Thus, the
points at which security might be breached are varied and numerous. The identification of
security weaknesses and the development of strategies and tools to address those weaknesses
have been facilitated by entities such as the American Public Transportation Association (APTA)
and the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). APTA has convened several task forces and
working groups to develop strategies and share and disseminate information. The FTA has
provided to transit systems training and resources on emergency preparedness, protecting and
responding against chemical and biological attacks, and dealing with bus and rail highjackings.
The materials they have circulated include a Safety and Security Tool Kit containing various
publications on these and related subjects. The FTA has also begun to conduct security
assessments of the 100 largest American transit systems and will be offering free, two-day
security awareness and training workshops at various locations across the country.
As in other transportation sectors, rail and transit operators have had prior experience preparing
for, and dealing with, natural and man-made disasters. The 1995 Tokyo subway nerve gas
attack, for example, brought home the need to learn chemical, biological and nuclear
preparedness. Contingency planning and training for these and other eventualities have been
ongomg.
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In responding since September 11 to their newly-recognized vulnerabilities on an individual
level, California's providers have expended vast amounts of resources that have stretched their
budgets and staffs to the breaking point. Nevertheless, all the participants were able to point to
widespread efforts to coordinate with one another and with public safety agencies in the
development of safety plans and risk assessments. Typical security-enhancing measures taken
thus far include the installation of closed circuit television monitors and intrusion alarms,
increased inspections of facilities, placement of surveillance personnel at critical points,
trimming of landscaping, improvement of lighting, closure of some restrooms, development of
better ID badges and cards, removal of trash receptacles, and relocation of bicycle lockers.
Operators have developed mutual response plans and have practiced and trained with police, fire,
and emergency response agencies. Vehicle operators and mailroom personnel have received
new training for their respective responsibilities. While participants suggested further
innovations such as the development of advanced technologies to automate the detection of
chemical and biological agents, most of their suggestions for additional security actions
essentially call for the funding of more of the same measures as described above.
While acknowledging that the General Fund deficit makes it unlikely that the State will provide
any meaningful financial assistance, the panel was resistant to suggestions that their patrons be
assessed a surcharge in order to fund the increased costs associated with enhanced security
measures. It was noted that the airline ticket surcharge recently adopted by the federal
government exceeds, by itself, the price of most transit tickets. Many providers suggested
looking to the federal government, rather than the state, for monetary assistance. One witness, in
fact, proposed that a federal fuel tax surcharge be established in order to fund security programs.
Whatever the source of funding might be, the consensus, as with most other panels, was that the
current level of effort being put forth by rail and transit agencies could not be sustained very
much longer without additional resources.
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SEAPORTS
Port of Oakland- Tay Yoshitani (Executive Director)
Port of Los Angeles- Noel Cunningham (Director ofQperations)
Captain Ralph Tracy (Port Police)
Port of Long Beach - Gus He in (Director of Government Affairs)
US Coast Guard- Lt. Commander Richard Teubner
International Longshore & Warehouse Union- Joseph Wenzl
(Coast Committee Man)
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SEAPORTS
"California is horne to three of our country's four largest ports. Our ports are a vital asset
to our state and the entire country. Since 95% of all international trade is seaborne, our
ports help drive our state's economy by serving as California's entre to the global
economy and all the economic benefits that come with it. It is critical that we keep our
seaports safe, secure, and operating efficiently and effectively."
Tay Yoshitani, Port of Oakland

Federal legislation to upgrade security at the nation's major ports was actually introduced
prior to the September 11 terrorist attack. The Port, Maritime, and Rail Security Act of
2001 is Senate Bill1214. It was introduced in July of this year and is currently pending
in Congress.
In addition, the MTS (Maritime Transportation System), an initiative to improve the
nation's port facilities, sponsored by MARAD (the U.S. Maritime Administration) and
DOT (U.S. Department of Transportation) has established a national Port Security
Subcommittee structure. These subcommittees are currently assessing security needs and
making recommendations to Congress, based on findings gathered from the country's
major ports. California, because of the sheer size of its port infrastructure, has two MTS
committees (northern and southern California). In addition, the Assembly Select
Committee on California Ports, chaired by Assernblyrnernber Alan Lowenthal, has
developed the California MTS Advisory Committee as a coordinating body for the two
regional bodies.
Senate Bill 1214 hearings found that many seaports have minimum physical, procedural,
and personnel security standards that leave them vulnerable. Therefore, after the
September 11 attacks, several amendments to the bill were introduced. One major
amendment establishes criteria for which ports and ships would be staffed by Sea
Marshals. These Sea Marshals would be made up of members ofthe U.S. Coast Guard,
U.S. Customs, Immigration and Naturalization and civilian port police. Some ports
already have such a program in place, but this new legislation would greatly expand the
effort. The Sea Marshall program requires the boarding of vessels at sea and the
placement of armed personnel in the pilothouse of large commercial vessels prior to port
entry. It prevents terrorists from gaining control of a large commercial vessel that could
potentially be used as an instrument of destruction.
The Committee heard testimony from representatives of the State's three largest ports, as
well as from the Coast Guard and the Longshore & Warehouse Union.
The Coast Guard, for obvious reasons, plays a large role in the effort to secure the
nation's ports. It provides the nation with an existing foundation upon which to build its
maritime homeland security efforts.
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Its security actions focus on three key areas: vessels transiting in and out of ports,
waterside security of ports, and shoreside security of port facilities. These objectives are
accomplished through the Sea Marshal program, vessel escorts, harbor patrols, facility
inspections and Maritime Domain Awareness. The Sea Marshal program, as described
above, builds public confidence and is one of the few security measures that actually
improves the flow of traffic into port. The vessel escorts are used in bringing in
particularly important vessels to protect them against USS COLE type attacks. Harbor
patrols are used to protect waterfront facilities from waterborne attack or sabotage. And
Maritime Domain Awareness is a vigilance effort that has now been enhanced by
requiring 96-hour notification from inbound vessels prior to entering port.
In order to accomplish these enhanced security measures, the Coast Guard has placed its
members on extraordinary 12-hour shifts and has placed 2,600 reservists on active duty.
This is the largest recall since WWII. In addition, auxiliarists who normally conduct
volunteer recreational boating safety inspections are manning Coast Guard active duty
offices.
The Coast Guard cannot maintain this level of security in the long term without federal
and state assistance. The Navy has loaned some patrol vessels and the state Fish and
Game Department has provided boats and crews. However, sustained security efforts
will eventually require additional federal funding. Legislation is currently pending in
Congress that would augment current security related funding. California can help by
requesting that such funding be expedited and that the Coast Guard in California gets its
fair share of these funds. The Coast Guard currently works with OES, the State Strategic
Committee on Terrorism (SSCOTT), State Threat Assessment Committee (STAC), and
the State Lands Commission in the area of oil facility security. The State needs to
continue to coordinate such security activities with the Coast Guard, which will assume
even greater responsibilities once federal maritime security legislation is passed.
California's ports have all instituted security measures, in coordination with the Coast
Guard and other federal and state agencies. The ports have placed fire and police
services on heightened alert and have increased security throughout port facilities. High
visibility patrols are utilized and access to port facilities is more strictly regulated. The
ports are working with both federal and state agencies in conducting facility risk
assessments and are working closely with local and regional authorities in coordinated
security task force efforts. Furthermore, individual terminals within the ports have
instituted their own increased security measures.
Amendments to S. 1214, when passed by Congress, will require background checks of
some port workers. Labor has raised concerns about background checks, specifically the
scope and nature ofthese checks. The Longshore and Warehouse Union argues that
labor should be asked to help in developing security measures, not singled out for
suspicion.
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The panelists suggested that the State can help by providing funding for security
measures, specifically training and surveillance costs. They also suggested that the state
and federal government can help by better defining the threats that seaports face. This
would help to focus security efforts and insure their success.
Finally, it was emphasized that ports need to find new ways to protect against potential
security threats while at the same time making sure that they continue to operate
efficiently and cost-effectively. We cannot let security shut down or severely disrupt the
commercial activities that drive the California economy.
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FREIGHT MOVEMENT- HWYS
CHP- Commissioner Dwight ("Spike) Helmick
California Public Utilities Commission- Trina Homer (Director Rail
Safety and Carrier Division
California Trucking Association- Stephanie Williams
Teamsters Public Affairs Council- Shane Gusman, Legislative
Advocate
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FREIGHT - HIGHWAYS
Representatives from both the California Trucking Association (CTA) and Teamsters Public
Affairs Council (Teamsters) commented on the safety concerns regarding highway freight
movement. One of the main concerns offered by the panel was the security of California's ports
of entry, specifically the seaports and the Mexican border.
Trucks that carry hazardous waste, such as petroleum, chlorine, and ammonia nitrate, frequently
enter the state. According to CTA, 25% of all vehicles crossing the Mexican border could be
carrying hazardous material. To ensure that these drivers are authorized to carry such material,
they suggested an international identification system, similar to the current background checks
conducted on US drivers.
Additionally, once a truck enters California, CTA believes that protection of these trucks from
theft is paramount since the materials they are carrying can be used in terrorist activity. To help
prevent this from occurring, they suggest that the communication between the industry and law
enforcement needs to be enhanced. One particular program, known as the California
Transportation Improvement Program System (CTIP), has developed an improved
communication system between the industry and the CHP and has already proven successful in
circumstances such as stolen vehicles. They believe more funding should be made available for
such programs and a greater effort to improve overall communication.
Regarding freight movement from seaports, a concern was raised about the current security
measures. The trucking industry would like to improve the training of the port personnel and
ensure the proper protocol in responding to a breach of security. One possible breach could
occur during times of peak congestion. The more time a driver remains at a port, the greater the
possibility of stolen cargo or accidental transfer of vital information. To prevent this from
occurring, congestion should be reduced.
CTA suggests that a uniform terminal identification system may also improve the functioning of
seaports. In Los Angeles, for example, there are approximately 12 gates which all have their
own ID systems. This can both complicate and slow the process of the goods movement.
In summary, six suggestions were offered by the industry to improve freight security. They are
as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Evaluate ports of entry to target hazardous material.
Terminate excessive communication between drivers at ports by reducing congestion.
Increase the number of certified and trained gate security personnel and establish
standard protocols for security breaches.
Develop a uniform identification system for drivers.
Establish a task force to evaluate those drivers who may or may not pose a security risk
that warrants denial of a hazardous materials license.
Provide adequate funding for CHP to continue highway safety enhancement actions and
allow new activities to prevent and/or mitigate terrorism activities.
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In addition to the views of the industry, the drivers, represented by Teamsters, expressed their
concerns. Sharing similar views to those of CTA, they have researched potential security
concerns, primarily the potential highjacking of trucks containing hazardous material. In a
coordinated effort with the CHP and DMV, the trucking industry is working to ensure that
drivers are properly trained prior to their transportation of hazardous material. Once they are on
the road, the industry pointed out that every effort has been made to ensure constant
communication between the truckers and the dispatchers.
With the new policies of open trade with Mexico, the state can expect to see a significant
increase in truck traffic across the border. To mitigate possible security problems, Teamsters
hope the CHP will be given sufficient resources to inspect all trucks and ensure that the drivers
have the proper certifications. These inspections will assure that all trucks crossing the border
have the same identification placards as those in the United States.
A final point made by both the industry and the drivers is that the government should not
overreact. They would hope that any legislation to improve background checks on drivers is
sensible and a reasonable response to an actual threat.
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FREIGHT MOVEMENT- RAIL

California Public Utilities Commission- Trina Homer (Director Rail
Safety and Carrier Division
Burlington, Northern, Santa Fe-Juan Acosta
Union Pacific- Captain John Allen (Regional Mgr, RR Police)
United Transportation Union-JP Jones
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers-Tim Smith
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FREIGHT- RAILROADS
Several representatives of the freight rail industry, including Burlington Northern and Santa Fe,
Union Pacific, United Transportation Union, and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, as
well as the Public Utility Commission (PUC), comprised a panel to discuss security of freight
rail.
Overseeing the safety and security of freight rail, the PUC is responsible for over 30 short line
railroads, as well as Amtrak and other commuter rail lines. They work in partnership with the
Federal Transit Association (FTA) to inspect the safety of railroad operating practices, signals,
equipment, and hazardous material. To ensure that the track is adhering to the proper standards,
they make sure that their staff is available at all times for inspection. The staff, who are
responsible for the safety operations of light rail systems, such as BART and the Santa Clara
Valley Transit Authority, are trained to audit those agencies to ensure they are compliant with
the proper safety operations and procedures. They conduct field inspections of accidents to
make certain that they are operating their facilities in a safe way.
Usually concentrating on safety, the PUC's focus has expanded, since September events, to
include more security measures. They are monitoring the rail carriers to ensure that they have an
emergency plan, that they are compliant with the plan, and that their employees know about
them. Additionally, the PUC is working with the industry, the federal government, and other
state agencies to ensure that additional security measures developed by FTA will be
implemented by next summer or sooner.
According to the PUC, agency investigators are in the field 90% of the time to inspect the tracks
and equipment for possible security breaches. If during an inspection an investigator is not asked
for his or her identification by a railroad employee, the PUC states that this is a reason for
concern. They are currently working with the railroads and transit agencies to let them know
about their access to the equipment and the precautions they are taking.
Finally, the PUC hopes to work with the Legislature to ensure that they have adequate access to
the information needed to enforce security. They believe their field investigators can greatly
assist in the rail security measures as long as they are able to access the same information of the
transit agencies as the FTA.
Turning to the railroad industry, Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railroad and Union Pacific
Railroad reacted swiftly to the events of September 11. In the immediate aftermath of the
attacks, railroads tightened security and intensified inspections across their systems. At the
direction of the Association of American Railroads (AAR), major railroads, which maintain their
own police forces to help assure the security of employe.es, property and freight, put enhanced
security plans in place. Access to important rail facilities was restricted and movement of freight
to the New York area was suspended completely until the immediate threat was over.
On October 7, when major U.S. military action was initiated against foreign terrorists, the
railroad industry again instituted precautionary measures, instituting a 72-hour self-imposed "red
alert." This red alert included such actions as restricting and increasing security for some types
of cargo, increasing patrols and security at critical facilities, restricting certain operations near
major public events, tightening security on railroads' web-based information systems, removing
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some data, and severely restricting access to information dealing with shipment of certain
materials.
However, these new security measures have not come without a price. With the halt in freight
movement and the unbudgeted increase in security measures, the cost to the railroad industry
will be significant. Additionally, they are fearful that the threat of terrorism will cause their
insurance premiums to be increased or denied renewal. To alleviate this financial setback, they
are supporting a federal measure that will create a railroad security fund and are supporting
federal action to provide some relief of liability, similar to that granted to airlines, from a
terrorist attack. They have asked the Legislature to support both measures.
The rail industry continues to implement the necessary security measures. These measures
include:
•
•
•
•
•

Employing heightened patrols, inspections and surveillance by railroad police as
deemed appropriate for the security of shipments and facilities.
Modifying certain train operations commensurate with security requirements.
Continuing to operate a 24-hour command center linked to federal national security
personnel and the railroads' 24-hour operations centers.
Continuing to restrict access to its information systems.
Maintaining high awareness and vigilance.

To further address security matters, the AAR Board of Directors has established five critical
action teams, each led by a senior railroad or AAR executive and involving the full participation
of all AAR members. The five critical action teams established by the AAR are Information
Technology and Communications, Physical Infrastructure, Operational Security, Hazardous
Materials, and Military Liaison.
Each of the critical action teams described above is working quickly and carefully to assess
short-term and long-term vulnerabilities in the areas of people, process, and technology and are
developing an array of additional countermeasures. Some of these new countermeasures,
designed to prevent, detect, and mitigate any terrorist attack, have already been deployed. To
assist in this comprehensive effort, AAR has retained a group of former U.S. military and
government security experts who bring a valued perspective to the evaluation. The analyses and
action plans generated will form the basis for additional measures deemed necessary to enhance
the security of the freight rail network.
To help the industry prioritize the protection of particular assets, Union Pacific established a risk
profile. Based on a military model, this profile can be determined by the formula "risk= impact
x vulnerability x threat potential."
While the industry focuses on increased security, they also believe there needs to be a balance.
They hope that any additional security measures will be practical and not unnecessarily impede
vital commerce.
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Representing the contractors and rail yard workers, the United Transportation Union (UTU)
asked that they be included in the web of information sharing within the industry. Since they
deal directly with the system, it is vital that they are aware of what is going on. To emphasize
the importance of communication, UTU noted the different terminology used by railroad
operators. Proper communication is the only way to bridge the "railroad dialogue" with the
"public response dialogue."
To help improve communication and response, the UTU believes that there should be as many
operators on the rails as possible. SB 200 (O'Connell), which failed passage in the Assembly
during the 2000 legislative session, would have mandated two crewmembers on all freight trains
at all times. They believe the Legislature should revisit this issue.
Also in support of revisiting SB 200, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE) agrees
that communication should be enhanced within the entire industry, both by increased personnel
and improved technology. Other suggested improvements include improved lighting at rail
yards and increased security regarding transients. The BLE supports an increase in the number
of PUC inspectors to help enhance rail security and improving the response times of railroad
police.
The BLE hopes that the incident command system will be enhanced so that the operating crews,
the engineers themselves, are kept in the loop regarding certain events. They believe it is
important that the incident commander gamer the information from the engineers since they
might be able to provide the most accurate and immediate information.
Finally, they encouraged increased inspection of cars before departing rail yards. While this may
cause delays, they believe it is vital to ensure the protection of the cargo.
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DMV DOCUMENTS
DMV - Michelle Snyder (Manager of Drivers Licensing)
Bill Cather (Assistant Director for Legislation)
CHP- Commissioner Dwight ("Spike") Helmick or stand-in
California Trucking Ass'n - Stephanie Williams
Teamsters Public Affairs Council- Shane Gusman (Legislative
Advocate)
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DMV DOCUMENTS
The authenticity ofDMV documents, notably the drivers license and other documents that are
typically used to establish one's identity, is of critical importance in modem society. These
instruments have been termed "gateway documents" since they enable their holders to establish
identities (real or fraudulent) that facilitate access to myriad types of benefits, both in the
financial arena and in the ability to gain physical entrance into public and private facilities,
including airliners and other transportation facilities. Additionally, the DMV issues
endorsements to holders of commercial drivers licenses that authorize those licensees to transport
hazardous materials.
The panel that examined the security of DMV documents outlined the various steps that are
being taken to protect against the issuance or use of fraudulent drivers licenses and hazardous
materials endorsements. Since the integrity of drivers licenses had been the subject of increasing
scrutiny for some time prior to September 11, the enumerated efforts have been underway for
many months. However, the importance of DMV document integrity was highlighted by the
revelation that several of the September 11 hijackers were in possession of false drivers licenses
issued by other states' departments of motor vehicles. Furthermore, it has been reported that
members of the terrorist network were seeking hazardous materials endorsements as well.
Recent reforms instituted by the DMV include matching drivers license applicants against any
photographic records in the DMV files, verifying social security numbers and citizenship or
residency documents with the appropriate federal agencies, and enhancing the physical drivers
license itself to make it more resistant to counterfeiting. Additionally, the DMV publishes a
brochure to help merchants and others more easily identify false drivers licenses.
Nevertheless, the ability of individuals to obtain fraudulent birth certificates will continue to
provide identity thieves an inroad to the procurement of drivers licenses using names other than
their own. It is widely acknowledged that the best means of conclusively liking the identity of an
individual to his or her license is through "biometrics" (e.g., fingerprints, retinal scans, facial
recognition). Money to begin the development of biometric technology for drivers licenses was
stricken from the 2001 Budget by the Senate budget conferees. Legislation to provide a
dedicated source of funding for this activity is currently stalled in the Senate. Absent the
development of a biometric identification system for the drivers license, the integrity of the
document will remain in doubt.
Additionally, it was noted that despite the best efforts ofDMV, any reforms are ultimately
subject to subversion if an identity thief is able to obtain the cooperation of DMV staff. Recent
publicity regarding this problem has resulted in a spate of investigations and prosecutions that
will, presumably, discourage illegal activities by DMV personnel. This effect may be transitory,
however, and it is thought that enactment of stiffer penalties for DMV staff who abet the
procurement of false drivers licenses would serve as a powerful disincentive to employee
complicity in identity theft.
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Finally, in regard to the issuance of drivers licenses based upon social security numbers and
citizenship or other residency documents, testimony indicated that AB 60, passed by the
Legislature last summer, would make it more difficult for the DMV to verify the identity of
individuals applying for drivers licenses. The committee was informed that the Davis
Administration does not believe the bill was properly on the Governor's desk for consideration
upon the adjournment of the Legislature and, therefore, that it was not eligible to become law
without his signature. It was surmised, however, that advocacy groups were prepared to go to
court to argue that the bill is indeed law and to ask that the DMV be required to implement it.
On the issue ofhazmat endorsements, it was noted that there is currently no background check
made of applicants. Although this step would have some impact on screening out potential
misuse of these endorsements, there is an associated fear that in a tight labor market, it could
inadvertently screen out trustworthy applicants who may have committed a minor transgression
many years ago. It was suggested that the parameters of any mandated background check need
to be carefully developed.
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Calif National Guard- Brigadier General Dennis Kenneally
Office of Emergency Services - Rich Eisner (Regional Manager)
City of San Jose- Dr. Francis Edwards-Winslow (OES)
Fremont City Police -Lt. Mike Eads
Fremont Fire Dept- Vic Valdes (Division Chief)
Alameda County Fire Dept- Chief Bill McCammon
Alameda County Sheriffs Dept- Captain James Williams
Washington Hospital-Kristine LaVoy (Strategic Planning
Management)
Alameda County Medical Center- Jim Devitt (Assistant Office
Administrator)
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE

The recurring central themes in the area of emergency response are well-defined action
plans, regional coordination of effort, training, staffing, equipment, and supplies, and
funding.
The City of San Jose is the model in Northern California for terrorist attack response. It
was the first city in the nation to create a federally approved terrorism response plan as
part of its emergency preparedness program first begun in the early 1990's. The City's
Emergency Operation Plan was developed to comply with the State's Standardized
Emergency Management System, and to provide a framework for responding to any type
of disaster.
As one ofthe country's twenty-seven largest cities, San Jose was chosen to participate in
the Federal Government's Domestic Preparedness Program. It therefore received training
from the Department of Defense and planning guidance from the Department of Health
and Human Services in 1997. It also received funding for the development of a cache of
equipment and pharmaceuticals to support the care of victims of weapons of mass
destruction for the first 12 hours following an attack. Over 500 public safety personnel
and their mutual aid partners completed "train the trainer" courses on responding to
terrorist attack and caring for the victims of such an attack. In addition, the Department
of Justice awarded two competitive grants totaling over $1.38 million to the San Jose
Metropolitan Medical Task Force (MMTF) for planning, equipment and training
exercises. Regular exercises are conducted with the larger Metropolitan Medical
Response System (MMRS). The MMRS concentrates on beyond the scene care and
partners with the County Health Department, the Medical Examiner/Coroner, private
medical transportation services and the medical community (laboratories, private
practitioners, and hospitals).
The City's size and its ability to act on the opportunity afforded it by the federal
government has given it a huge head start in emergency response preparedness.
Other cities and regions are not as fortunate. Panelists revealed that Alameda County,
and most other regions in the State, remain ill-prepared to deal with major hazardous
materials and biological agent situations. Coordinating federal funds distribution in an
effective regionalized manner is a real problem. Recently, for example, Fremont and
Oakland (the County's two largest cities) qualified for emergency medical equipment
funding but Alameda County and its other cities did not. The effort needs to be regional
because no one city can respond adequately to an incident on its own.
Among the problem areas are lack of sustained pharmaceutical supplies (which should be
replaced every 12 months), mass decontamination facilities and chemical agent detection
equipment. The expense of maintaining an effective emergency medical response
program is substantial.
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For example, a simple decontamination system involving hoses, a tent and peripheral
equipment can cost more than $20,000 per unit. In addition, county labs are unprepared
to accept all possible chemical agents for analysis, chemical agent field analyzers are not
available (the Lawrence Livermore Lab is developing small
portable devices), and more training for first responders in chemical and biological
weapon attack scenarios is needed.
It was suggested that the State can help by creating incentives for regional response
systems.

The City of San Jose stressed that the State's public health labs are vastly under-funded
and under-equipped. They have no microbiologists. In addition, California's paper file
disease reporting system is inadequate and needs to be computerized and automated.
Without adequate labs and accurate reporting, disease outbreaks and contamination
situations can easily reach crisis proportions before state and local officials can act. A
ventilator shortage also hampers effective emergency medical response. Victims of
chemical or biological agent contamination need to be placed on ventilators because the
treatment of such victims shuts down their biological functions to the point where they
cannot breath on their own. It was also stressed that teachers should receive emergency
training.
Local emergency service providers emphasized that more inter-agency practice training
exercises are necessary. These exercises not only help develop more efficient response
times, they familiarize the agencies with one another's procedures and therefore
minimize misunderstandings.
The State Office ofEmergency Services (OES) continues to coordinate emergency
response procedures with local governments, and it has developed transportation
emergency solutions with the National Guard, the CHP and Caltrans since the 1980's,
including bridge closing contingency plans involving expanded ferry service. The CHP,
Caltrans and the OES share procedures and protocol. However, communication between
emergency service providers is still a problem. There is a need for more black box
transponders in order to communicate with different frequencies.
The National Guard has called upon an additional 10,000 to 11,000 personnel and is also
prepared to assist in decontamination scenarios. It works 24 hours a day with OES and
the Governor's Office, as well as with other state and local agencies.
Most local law enforcement agencies have chosen specifically identified bridges, roads,
tunnels and other major facilities within their communities that might be possible terrorist
targets. Increased security has been implemented to protect these facilities, as well as to
respond to emergency situations. They are coordinating this effort with the FBI and other
federal and state agencies.
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Various agencies raised the issue of funding, since many of the steps being taken present
substantial long-term budget burdens. Given the State's current budget situation, many
local government jurisdictions are concerned that they may lose Vehicle License Fee
(VLF) backfill funds. Many have tapped into this funding source for emergency response
efforts and, consequently, the loss of these funds would have a substantial impact on
emergency preparedness.
Another area of concern has been the inability of first-on-scene responders, such as
paramedics, to act because of scope of practice issues. There have also been instances of
law enforcement units not being able to assist their own personnel due to this issue. The
State can correct these issues through appropriate legislation.
It is evident from the panel discussions that emergency response needs to be part of a
proactive coordinated safety effort requiring the updating of building codes, land use, fire
codes, flood control, hazardous materials handling and disease control procedures. It also
requires the coordination of medical, law enforcement, hospital, and health services.
Terrorist attack preparedness needs to part of a well-coordinated emergency response
program. It is also clear that the issues are usually multi-jurisdictional therefore requiring
national, state and regional coordination. The State can help by creating coordination and
incentives for such efforts.
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ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS

While the November 20 hearing examined security issues across most of the varied and diverse
modes of transportation- air, sea, and ground; highway and rail; passenger and freight- certain
themes and suggestions recurred throughout the proceedings. It was apparent that within the
realm of transportation, there are common assessments and recommendations regarding the
protection of system users from terrorist attack. Identification of these common themes, which
are described below, may represent the most significant product of the hearing.

I.

Communication & Coordination

Perhaps the need most often highlighted was in regard to communication and coordination
among transportation and public safety agencies. In the area of bridge security, for example,
Caltrans, the CHP, and the Golden Gate Bridge District must (and do) share information with
one another as well as with the Coast Guard, National Guard, and local law enforcement. These
relationships, some of which are longstanding, others newly established, are key to the success of
individual and collective security arrangements. The testimony revealed that through the
establishment of task forces, the auspices of public agencies and private associations, and the
simple expedient of one-on-one meetings, a vast collaborative network has evolved within which
the level of communication and cooperation is exceedingly high. In many instances, however, it
was suggested that even more collaborative efforts will be necessary.
II.

Sustainability

Virtually every agency at the hearing described actions taken since September 11 that simply
cannot be sustained at their current levels using existing resources. Crews are working
substantial amounts of overtime with few if any days off. Retirees have been called back to
work and have thus far been willing to remain on the job. Regular agency programs and
activities have been deferred or neglected. Budgets have been stretched thin or exceeded. In
order for these efforts to continue, staffing must be increased and budgets augmented. The need
for some of these ongoing costs may be reduced by one-time capital expenditures for items such
as fencing, surveillance cameras, motion detectors, and other "target-hardening" measures.
Additionally, should the threat of terrorism recede and the public apprehension decline over
time, the state of alert and its concomitant need for resources may be reduced to some degree.
Nevertheless, it is clear that current levels of effort are not sustainable for much longer under
existing circumstances and that permanent security arrangements must be designed to be
sustainable within whatever resource mix is ultimately made available.

-41-

III.

Budgetary Constraints

Witnesses uniformly recognized that their new monetary needs are unlikely to be met by
significant state augmentations at a time when the General Fund faces a likely deficit in excess of
$12 billion. While some transportation sectors (e.g., aviation) have an ability to cover their new
security costs through customer surcharges, in most instances that approach would simply erode
the customer base and ultimately be self-defeating. What most agencies are requesting the state
to do is to advocate on their behalf with the federal government for financial assistance. One
persistent recommendation was for the Legislature to enact resolutions requesting Congress to
fund various initiatives that would enhance the ability of these agencies to secure their facilities.
IV.

Building Upon Prior Efforts

While the September 11 attacks highlighted the need for enhanced security of transportation
services, the protection of clients has long been a concern of California's providers. From floods,
fires, and earthquakes to civil unrest and prior threats of terrorism, transportation agencies
already had developed action plans and procedures and had taken other steps that laid the
groundwork for more recent anti-terrorist security efforts. In many instances, post-September 11
planning exercises and risk assessments were simply extensions of activities undertaken prior to
that date. In other instances, lessons learned from dealing with natural disasters and other
historical disruptions allowed for the speedy development of anti-terrorism measures.
V.

Avoid Overreaction

Several witnesses opined that while their facilities were certainly potential terrorist targets, they
were unaware of any specific credible terrorist threats against them. Although there was
universal agreement that all reasonable steps should be taken to close security breaches, many
agencies expressed concern that the current climate of apprehension might lead to unnecessary
expenditures and could inadvertently and unduly hinder commerce or travel. One example, cited
by the Coast Guard, involved the potential interception and inspection of every parcel of cargo
carried by marine shipping. Since many cargo recipients now use "just-in-time" systems of
shipment and inventory control, proposed security programs that would have the effect of
excessively slowing marine commerce would simply result in the diversion of shipments to other
transportation modes.
VI.

Define the Threat

Although most agencies cited risk assessments that they have undertaken in the wake of the
attacks, a few requested the state's assistance in determining the types of incidents they need to
protect against. In an environment where potential types and agents of terror attacks are virtually
unlimited, agencies can never hope to attain a completely airtight level of security. While the
Legislature itself may not have the expertise to make useful threat assessments or threat
inventories, it does have the ability to convene the various security agencies and experts that can
perform that function.
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VII.

Reassure the Public

While it is not possible to guarantee complete security for all transportation users in all segments
of the industry at all times, the efforts described at the hearing were of much comfort to
committee members and to other observers. It became quite apparent upon hearing the
testimony that the efforts of the various parties have been comprehensive, well thought out, and
well coordinated. And, as previously noted, these security activities pre-date, in large part,
September 11, so that few agencies are considering these issues for the very first time. The level
of preparation by transportation providers would be tremendously reassuring to the public were
they widely publicized and recognized. A need for this information to be disseminated is
apparent.
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HEARING RECOMMENDATIONS

The hearing uncovered no magic potions or silver bullets that would universally protect
transportation facilities and services from terrorist attack. Not surprisingly, the most common
suggestion was for the infusion of public funds to assist agencies in bearing the new burdens they
have assumed since September 11 -not an unreasonable request given the labor-intensive and
otherwise expensive nature of most of the measures already taken or recommended for future
implementation by these agencies. However, as previously noted, the state is unlikely to be able
to provide much more than a token amount of financial assistance in this regard.
Nevertheless, several concrete suggestions were offered by participants for consideration by the
Legislature. These recommendations fall into three major categories as outlined below:
Legislation

+ Enact resolutions supporting various Congressional initiatives that would provide funding
and other assistance to transportation agencies for their new security responsibilities.

+ Enact legislation making it a felony for DMV staff to knowingly assist identity thieves in
obtaining drivers licenses to which they are not entitled. One such bill is AB 1155 (Dutra),
which is currently in the Senate Public Safety Committee.

+ Enact legislation to create a funding source for the establishment of a biometric identifier for
drivers' licenses. One such bill is AB 1474 (Koretz), which is currently in the Senate Privacy
Committee.

+ Do not enact legislation (such as AB 60 in its current form) that would hinder the ability of
DMV to verify the identity of drivers license applicants.

+ Enact legislation requiring background checks of applicants seeking commercial driver's
license endorsements authorizing the transportation of hazardous materials. The standards
for approval of endorsement applicants must be developed with care to assure that they only
screen out individuals at risk for performing serious criminal acts.

+ Enact legislation that clarifies the role of the Public Utilities Commission in overseeing the
security efforts of railroad and transit operators. The legislation should clearly grant the PUC
access to appropriate railroad and transit agency records and facilities.

+ Enact legislation increasing the penalties for the commission of terrorist acts targeting
transportation facility users.

+ Pass a resolution requesting Congress to reconsider the requirement for airport baggage
screeners to be American citizens.
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+ Enact legislation strengthening the state's support of general aviation airports and
standardizing security procedures at these airports.

+ Enact legislation streamlining highway project development processes so surplus
transportation funds may quickly be expended as a means of stimulating the economy.

+ Enact legislation creating incentives for the establishment of regional emergency response
systems.

+ Enact legislation addressing scope-of-practice issues that thwart emergency response efforts
by on-the-scene responders.
Budget

+ Provide funding for the development of a biometric identification system by DMV.
+ Provide funding and staffing so that CHP may assume its new security functions and
responsibilities without deferring or neglecting its normal and routine duties.

+ Provide funding to the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory for the further development of
technologies that detect and deter terrorist actions.

+ In addressing the General Fund deficit, resist any proposals to scale back levels of VLF
reduction offsets currently allocated to local governments.
Other activities

+ Support efforts to publicize the high degree of safety that has been achieved through the
security measures that have been undertaken by transportation providers.

+ Convene a meeting of security and public safety experts to assist transportation providers in
identifying and assessing the various potential risks posed by would-be terrorists to their
facilities, services and passengers.

+ Coordinate security efforts with the Federal Railroad Administration, Federal Transit
Administration, and American Public Transportation Association, which will jointly be
releasing security recommendations early next year drawn from the experiences of transit
operators throughout the country who are upgrading their prevention and response programs.
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Chairman's Recommendations
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CHAIRMAN'S CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

While the hearing's witnesses offered various observations and suggestions on how to deal with
the specific needs of their individual agencies, the Chair found it necessary to take a wider view
of the testimony in order to attain a global perspective on the security challenges facing
California's transportation sector and the state as a whole.
The Chair has concluded that the United States finds itself to be in a state of war with enemies
both known and unknown, foreign and possibly domestic. Under these circumstances, California
as well as all the other states of the nation must take a variety of actions to secure the home front
that will be enormously expensive. Just as the testimony indicated that none of California's local
governments or agencies can reasonably be expected to bear all these new expenses without
outside assistance, neither can any of the 50 states reasonably be expected to shoulder their new
burdens without federal help. Since the national defense is a federal responsibility, the cost of
providing that defense when the home soil is threatened should be a federal responsibility as
well.
While the costs of protecting our facilities and services will be inordinate, they pale in
comparison to the cost of replacing just a handful of our most treasured assets. Our failure to
take adequate security steps today will be judged harshly by our forebears should we fall prey,
unprepared, to terrorist attack tomorrow. In the Chair's words: "The day of reckoning is
coming." It is incumbent upon the state, and in tum the federal government, to face up to its
responsibilities to protect the citizenry.
The Chair believes that the most prudent means of providing an adequate defense is first for the
appropriate public safety or "first response" agencies (CHP, OES, National Guard, and Coast
Guard) to come together and assess California's defense posture (i.e., Where will any likely
attacks come from? What will be the nature of the attacks? Which assets are not adequately
protected and what are their points of vulnerability?) Next, these agencies must create an
inventory of security measures that will address the vulnerabilities they have identified. Finally,
the estimated costs of these measures, both one-time outlays for equipment and ongoing
expenditures for personnel, must be quantified and the results of the assessment must be
transmitted, confidentially, to the legislative leadership.
Testimony offered at the hearing indicated that many of these assessments have already been
accomplished, at least on a preliminary level. In any event, the Chair specifically recommends
that legislation be adopted requiring a more comprehensive and coordinated assessment. The
results of that assessment should be submitted to the Legislature within a very tight timeframe.
Once the results have been received, the Legislature must identify and allocate sufficient
resources to fund the recommended measures and should mandate their implementation, without
waiting/or federal assistance. Should the federal government shirk its responsibility in this area,
the state would have to look to bonding, temporary sales tax increases, or any other expedient to
come up with the necessary financing. The physical well-being of the populace requires that we
do no less.
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The Chair has been both sobered and encouraged by the information garnered at this hearing.
Public safety and transportation agencies have done yeoman's work in addressing the inordinate
number of security concerns that have recently come to their attention. It is clear, however, that
their efforts not only are not sustainable at their current level without additional resources, but
that they are also not yet comprehensive enough to yield the degree of security that Californians
expect and deserve from their government.
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Appendix A:
Bridges, Tunnels and Highways

Golden Gate Bridge, Highwav and Transportation District
Security Improvements

In light of the tragic events that occurred on September 11,2001, the Golden Gate Bridge has developed an action
plan designed to increase the safety and security of its transportation facilities and the people who use them. The
cost to implement the measures identified in this plan is $24.45 million. These measures include expansion of
our security forces and installation of equipment to support tightened access monitoring and security.

Golden Gate Bridge
Security of the Bridge is of utmost importance, as it is a core element of the San Francisco Bay Area transportation
network. The potential for terrorist activities at the Bridge is heightened by its status as a national landmark and
American icon. As a result, immediately following the September 11 terrorist activities, the Golden Gate Bridge took
action to install an increased security presence on the Bridge, its highway approaches, and adjacent lands consisting of
Bridge security personnel, National Park Service police and state law enforcement personnel. Security measures to be
funded with this request include sustaining these increased levels of security personnel at the Bridge coupled with
installation of additional surveillance, access control, intrusion detection, and security lighting systems on the Bridge
and at various Bridge access points, including the national park facilities at each end of the Bridge.
FY 2001-02
Qperatin_g
$3~000,000

$4,000,000
$7,000,000

Item
Bridge Security Personnel
Contract Federal/State/Local Law
Enforcement Services
Total Bridge Operating

Capital Equipment Item
$2,000,000
Capital Equipment

$2,000,000

Total Bridge Capital

$9.000.000

TOTAL BRIDQE REQUEST

DescriPtion
To provide additional security personnel/patrols 24/7/365
To provide 2417/365 security patrols on Bridge highway approaches and
on NPS land immediately adjacent to and underneath the Bridge

DescriPtion
Surveillance cameras, monitoring and intrusion detection equipment,
electronic access control systems, security gates and fencing, security
lighting. and back-up emergencv communications equipment

Golden Gate Transit
The Golden Gate Transit bus and ferry system provides 11.3 million passenger trips per year in the 60+ mile service
corridor between San Francisco, Marin, Sonoma and Contra Costa Counties. These facilities and services were
critically needed on September 11 and after serious earthquakes. Security measures to be funded with this request
include expansion of security forces and installation of additional surveillance, access control, intrusion detection, and
security lighting systems at various transit facilities, particularly at the Larkspur and San Francisco Ferry Terminal
facilities. They also include improved communications systems and vehicle tracking systems.
FY 2001-02
Ooerating
$2,000,000
$2,000,000
$4,000,000

..
Item
Bus Security Personnel
Fe!!Y Security Personnel
Total Transit Operatin_g

Capital Equipment Item
$600,000
Bus Capital Equipment
Ferry Capital Equipment
$1,100,000

$11,450,000

Automatic Vehicle Locator
System
Emergency Power Generators
(Novato/Santa Rosa)
Total Transit Capital

$15,450.000

TOTAL TRANSIT REQUEST

$24.450.000

TOTAL REQUEST

$9,000,000
$750,000

Description
To provide additional rotating security patrols at transit facilities 2417/365
<

Descriotion
Surveillance cameras, monitoring and intrusion detection equipment,
electronic access control systems, security gates and fencing, security
lighting, and back-uQ_ emergency communications equipment
To provide AVL and an integrated radio communications system to
support real-time surveillance and monitoring of bus operations
To provide sufficient back-up power generation to ensure continuous
operation ofGGT bus services during an emergency

Appendix B:
Airports

TESTIMONY BY STEVEN GROSSMAN, DIRECTOR OF AVIATION
OAKLAND INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT SECURITY
ASSEMBLY TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE
NOVEMBER 20, 2001

Good morning Chairman Dutra and members of the Committee, my name is Steve Grossman
and I'm the Aviation Director at Oakland International Airport. I'm pleased to come before this
committee today to discuss the current status of our airport security measures and to look at what
the state legislature can do to assist California airports. Since we're in our busiest week of the
year, the week of Thanksgiving, it is particularly relevant that we are looking at this important
issue at this time.
First, I'd like to give you the good news. The Oakland Airport is rebounding from the recent
tragic events, with customers returning to use our facilities. Our passenger levels for October
were 95% of what they were last October. Although we lost more than 5% of our passengers,
since we were growing rapidly this year, we are pleased that we did not sustain greater losses.
Furthermore, passenger load factors are at the expected November levels. Our November
passenger totals are expected to equal those of November 2000. Concession revenue is at the
expected November 2000 levels. Food and Beverage/News Gift revenues are higher than 2000
levels. We are still being contacted by airlines that wish to move to Oakland. And, lastly,
domestic and international carriers are adding new service at Oakland International.
However, even though our numbers look extremely positive, September II will have a major
impact now, as well as in the future, on our bottom line. We have placed a tremendous amount
of our time, efforts, and finances into improving airport security. We no longer can return to the
levels that we saw on September 10. Therefore, we expect our security costs this year will
increase by at least $7 million due to the increased standards. I will discuss this further when I
respond to the three questions posed by the Committee.
I would like to step back for a moment to reflect on what I believe is the most critical issue that
our policy makers can address. The issue that I am referring to is the definition of"the threat."
It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for airports to protect our passengers and the public
without understanding what we are guarding against. Defining "the threat" will enable airports
to come up with viable solutions and directed efforts to avoid those dangers. Without this
definition, airports are left with a monumental task - to come up with an infinite number of
scenarios of potential harms that may be exacted against the public and then to implement
policies to prevent these potential activities. At this point, we simply are unable to address this
topic in such a widespread manner.
Just this past week, Congress passed important aviation security legislation. We believe that this
will boost the confidence of the traveling public and we hope that this will sustain higher
passenger levels. While overall this was very positive and important legislation, there were
elements of this legislation that will be extremely costly and difficult to implement.
I look forward to providing information today to the committee to assist you as you craft your
recommendations· for the Speaker. The airport community looks forward to working with the

Committee as well as the State Legislature, as we grapple with the difficult security issues that
we are faced with on a daily basis. Thank you.

QUESTIONS
1. What has Oakland International Airport done to enhance security?
Oakland International Airport has been working diligently to ensure the safety of its passengers
and employees. Following the events of September 11, the following actions were taken to
increase security and comply with all federal directives relative to Airport Security:
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

Oakland Police Officers on-duty were increased from 8 Yz to 21
Oakland Police Department is responsible for security within terminal buildings
Alameda County Sheriffs Office assigned 23 deputies to the Airport
Sheriff is responsible for security on roadways, parking areas and terminal curb areas.
Also responsible for monitoring activities of private security firm.
Private security firm increased its staffing to handle additional posts at vehicle access gates
and parking lots close to the terminals.
The short-term parking lot was closed within 300 feet of terminals
Airport implemented a monitoring program to ensure commitments are met
National Guard is staffing the checkpoints with three guardsmen
Port Board enacted performance standards program for security checkpoints
The Oakland Airport expects an increase in security costs of $7 million per year

Although this increased security has caused inconveniences to our travelers, we have not been
receiving many complaints. The traveling public has seemed to be pleased with our efforts to
enhance our security.

2. What more can be done to increase security at Oakland International?
There are two areas where I believe there could be efforts to increase our security. The first is
educating employees and others who enter the airport operating area about security risks at the
airport. It is important that we not only educate airport employees, particularly those who have
contact with the airport operating area, but also those who serve the airplanes. There are
approximately 100 people who will have contact with an airplane once it reaches the ground.
The caterer, the fueler, the cleaning staff, the mechanics and the marshals are just a few of those
individuals who will come into contact with it in addition to the on-board staff. We need not
only to educate these individuals initially on airline security risks, but also to ensure that this
subject is taught on a continuing basis to these employees.
The second area is more Oakland International Airport specific, although it applies to many other
California airports. This is the issue of initiating a central point of access for the airport
operating area. What would be ideal would be to redesign our airport to ensure that every person
and every item that comes into the airport operating area is screened. This central point would
enable us to make a thorough check of each person or item that would be getting close to an
airplane. This central point should contain x-ray machines to enact this function.
This effort, however, would pose a significant cost to our airport. This brings me to your third
question, "What can the state legislature do to help?"

3. What can the State Legislature do to help?
Quite frankly, the most useful assistance that airports could receive from the State Legislature is
help with funding these increased security efforts. All ofthese efforts that are already underway,
and those that are contemplated, cost significant dollars. If the State was able to assist with this
funding, it would relieve much of the burden on our airports.
Furthermore, as stated in my opening statement, it would be extremely helpful if the State, in
concert with the Federal government, would help the airports direct their efforts by defining "the
threat." If the threat was defined, our airports could place the necessary resources into the most
appropriate activities to protect the public.

City of Livermore
Livermore Municipal Airport
Leander Hauri, A.A.E.
Airport Manager
Thank you, Mr. Chairman Dutra, members of the Committee. My name is Leander
Hauri. As current president of the Association of California Airports, an
organization of approximately 150 members largely representing the states smaller
facilities, I'd like to express our concern with the state of security at California's
smaller airports.
As you know, small airports in other states figured prominently in the activities of
the September 11th terrorists. They took flying lessons, rented aircraft, toured crop
dusting operations and effectively had unfettered access to these facilities. Small
airports remain vulnerable. As of today, there is virtually no state financial or
regulatory involvement in security of smaller airfields. Other states have taken the
lead by funding security enhancements and regulating security requirements in
order to preclude the use of these facilities as terrorist launching pads.
Our industry would like to see the State Legislature introduce legislation to tighten
up this vulnerability by funding security enhancements and regulating uniform
security requirements at these smaller fields. Well over one hundred million
dollars in jet fuel sales tax revenue goes into the state's general fund each year,
with only something close to eight million dollars returning to benefit aviation in
the form of funding for the Caltrans Division of Aeronautics.
California has one of the most under-funded aviation programs in the country. The
events of the last two months have clearly illustrated both the importance of our
airports system to our economy as well as its vulnerability. Prior to September
11th, airports faced challenges with inadequate funding, keeping up with
infrastructure maintenance, capacity, mitigating the impact of aircraft noise on our
neighbors and dealing with the consequences of incompatible land use near
airports.
Add to those issues now the lack of meaningful security in and around our smaller
airports. Security is not simply a large airport issue. Terrorists have demonstrated
their ability to exploit our weaknesses. Every California airport represents a
gateway to the national air transportation system . Let's not fix the problem at the
States largest airports while leaving our smaller airports exposed. California's
small airports need your help, now more than ever.
Thank you. I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today. I'd be happy to
answer any questions.
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Good Morning my name is Tom Csekey, I am Vice President of SEIU,
Local1877.
SEIU represents 1000's of airport workers - in particular we represent
about 600 screeners at LAX, 500 at SFO, and are organizing 100 at
Oakland International.
We have for years spoken out about a system at our nations airports
which did not work - in part because the system in place by the Airlines
forced contractors to make ever lower bids to maintain the work and thus
paying the screeners just slightly over minimum wage.
This led to extreme high turnover rates and a workforce which was
not properly trained.
The recent legislation concerning Airport Security which was signed by
President Bush yesterday has some serious flaws- in fact it punishes the
workers for system failure.
SEIU is outraged that the final legislation signed requires citizenship to
work as a screener.
In order to serve in our Armed Forces you do not have to be a citizen yet
you can come out and not be able to get a job as a screener.
The current workforce is low paid and thus the job dislocation will hit the
poorest communities the hardest again.
If the government displaces them - government must be responsible to
find them alternate employment.
We must insist on a smooth transition which allows those who qualify to
be retrained in order to remain in the Federalized jobs.
So SEIU asks the California Legislature to1. Write a letter to Congress protesting the Citizenship requirement
for screeners and urge that piece of the legislation to be
corrected.
2. We ask for State Government to work with Local
Government and Federal government to insure that those
screeners who are displaced be found alternate employment.
If the Federal government sees fit to bail out the Airline Industry certainly
we can bail out the additional victims of a failed Airport security system.
Thank you.
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October 12, 2001

SEIU

Honorable [Congressional member]
Washington, DC 20515
Re: National Airport Security System
Dear Representative [ Name ]:
On behalf of the 450,000 working people in California who are members of the
Service Employees International Union, I am writing to ask you to support
Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta's proposal to strengthen our nation's
airport security system. His proposal would change the security screening
procedures in our nation's 450 airports to a safer system that is similar to
successful models in Europe and Israel.
Secretary Mineta's approach is a better alternative to plans currently being
debated in Congress that would exclusively use federal employees to screen
passengers at all airport security checkpoints. It would institute new thorough
federal governmental control and oversight to ensure a high level of security
while taking steps to professionalize screeners through stricter hiring practices,
more training, better pay and benefits, and other improved standards.
This approach would avoid a serious pitfall: the near impossibility of recruiting
and training a new 30,000-person screener workforce within a reasonable
timeframe necessary to address the public's aviation safety concerns.

SERVICE EMPLOYEES
INTERNATIONAL UNION
AFL-CIO,CLC

CALIFORNIA
STATE COUNCIL

I 007 7th Street
4th Floor
Sacramento, CA 958 I 4
916.442.3838
Fax: 9 J 6.442.0976

As you consider improvements to aviation security at this critical time, SEIUthe largest union of private security workers and the largest union in the AFLCIO- urges you to ensure that the final bill:
•

Establishes rigorous standards and criteria for hiring screeners, including
federally administered background checks for current and new
employees;

•

Establishes federal training programs for screeners and management;

•

Establishes federal certification for individual screeners and screening
companies;

October 12, 2001
Page 2
•

Applies policies to all airports - both large and small uniform safety standard throughout the system;

in order to maintain a

• Ensures adequate worker pay and benefits to decrease turnover rates and stabilize
the screener workforce;

•

Mandates government audits of training procedures; and

•

Gives the government the right to suspend licenses of, and terminate companies
that are performing poorly- allowing maximum accountability and flexibility.

We would welcome the opportunity to meet with you to discuss these principles and provide
more information about workers' concerns about public safety and aviation security
measures being considered. Thank you.
Sincerely,

Allen Davenport
Director of Government Relations
cc:

Dean Tipps
Skip Roberts

http://www.llysatemow.com/print_release.cfm?ID= 1005
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SEIU Press Release
For Immediate Release: Saturday, September 15, 2001

Airport Security Workers Issue Checklist for Protecting Public Safety
Airport security workers issue five proposals for protecting passenger safety.
For several years, airport security workers have been asking for improvements they need to be able to protect
public safety.
As a result of the September 11 tragedy, Congress and the nation may now be ready to act on the concerns
security workers have been raising. Here are five proposals from members of the Service Employees
International Union (SEIU), the largest union of security employees in the U.S. and the largest union in the
AFL-CIO:
1. Increased Federal Role, With Airports- Not Airlines- Managing Security

According to a recent General Accounting Office report, "When several air carriers and security companies are
handling screening within one airport, as is the case in the United States, responsibility is fragmented, uniformity
is lacking, and competition among the security companies to be the low bidder for the air carriers' screening
business puts downward pressure on screeners' wages, making it difficult to attract and retain good screeners."
(Longstanding Problems Impair Airport Screeners' Performance, June 2000, page 38) When airports are
responsible for hiring and overseeing pre-board screening - as they are in Europe- there is not the same
pressure to put profits ahead of passenger and public safety.
Increasing the federal government's role in training, certifying, and supervising screeners - including placing a
U.S. Marshall at every airport checkpoint- along with mandating better staffing, working conditions, and
compensation, is essential to ensuring that the 18,000 screeners in the U.S. are able to make our nation's 450
airports as secure as possible.
2. Screener Staffing Should Allow For Thorough Inspections

Too often, airport security checkpoints are staffed at skeleton levels and workers who are unable to work are not
replaced. Requiring adequate staffing levels- and vigilantly pursuing understaffing violations- would help move
people through security checkpoints quickly and reduce the chance that security could be breached.
X-ray screeners also should be rotated after 30 minutes so they are as alert as possible. Currently, it is not
uncommon for x-ray screeners to be forced to stay at their post for as long as an hour and a half without a break,
causing lack of concentration, blurry vision, and headaches.
3. Pay and Benefits Should Be Raised to Reduce Turnover

Even though pre-board screeners play a critical role in aviation security, they are among the lowest-paid
employees in U.S. airports. Last year, the GAO found that starting salaries for screeners at 14 of the nation's 19
largest airports were $6 per hour or less, and starting salaries were $5.15 per hour at the remaining five airports.
(Slow Progress in Addressing Long-Standing Screener Performance Problems, March 16, 2000, page 5) Many
screeners have to work two or more jobs, leaving them tired and distracted as they scan thousands of objects
per hour for tiny but potentially significant signs of danger.
According to the Federal Aviation Administration, from May 1998 through April 1999, turnover at the same 19
largest airports ranged from 100 to more than 400 percent, meaning nearly all workers leave after only a few
months, just at the point where they have mastered the job. Without the paid sick leave or health coverage that
most other workers receive, they are on the job even when not feeling well enough to focus properly.
Improved pay and benefits would reduce the industry's alarmingly high turnover rate and make it easier to recruit
and retain the kind of skilled, experience, stable workforce that passengers and the public can depend on. It
would also bring standards for airport security closer to those in European airports, where security workers

101!9/01 3:58PM

"rsmgnomt:s- n.1rpon ::>t:curny worKe ... e

~..-m::cKnsi

IOT

tTOICCLill!$

ruuu" ""'"'Y

typically make at least twice what their American counterparts receive, along with health coverage, sick leave,
and other benefits.
4. Screeners Should Be Given Tools to Meet the Demands of the Job
Screeners' skills vary from airport-to-airport and even concourse-to-concourse, since the air carriers - not the
airports or the federal government - design and administer their training and oversee their testing. Screeners can
be on the job after less than two days of training. There is no consistent and reliable means to measure their
performance or the performance of their managers or equipment. Extremely high turnover makes the problem
even worse.
To ensure consistent, high-level training, the federal government must provide it. With initial and ongoing training,
screeners should be taught the skills they need to meet the inter-personal, regulatory, and technical demands of
their jobs, and those skills must be updated on a regular basis with classroom, as well as hands-on training. Aii
manuals should be regularly updated. Security companies also must use up-to-date, quality equipment that is
promptly replaced if it breaks.
When the GAO studied practices in France, England, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Canada, the agency noted,
"A test conducted jointly by FAA and one of the countries showed that the other country's screeners detected
over twice as many test objects as did U.S. screeners."
5. Screeners Need a Strong, Independent Voice to Speak Out for Safety
Many security workers are afraid to speak out for safety. Screeners need to know that they can raise safety
concerns with Federal Aviation Administration or airport officials without fear of retribution.
Screeners also must have the freedom to form a union so they can gain a strong, independent voice to speak out
for safer procedures, improve their working conditions, and bargain for better wages and benefits. When
screeners at airports in Los Angeles and San Francisco formed a union, they won a living wage for security
employees and quality standards that gave airports the authority to enforce rules protecting passenger and public
safety.
Nearly all European screeners have both union protection and strong legal rights to speak out about safety
violations.
To get more information or arrange to interview screeners, contact Dan O'Sullivan, 202-898-3437.
[Close Window]
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Heightened Federal Standards with Local Accountability
Proposed Legislation to Improve Airport Security
The current system of low-bid contracting, poor screener training, high turnover, minimal background
-checks, and inadequate staffing jeopardizes our ability to adequately safeguard passenger security. The
responsibility of aviation security must clearly be removed from the airlines and replaced by a new
program with higher federal standards and stronger oversight for screeners, screening procedures, and
security contractors.
In tandem with increased federal standards, airports should assume responsibility for enforcing these
new regulations as part of an integrated airport-wide security program. This program should include law
enforcement officers at each screening checkpoint to ensure that federal standards are met. The
program should be paid for through a nominal per-ticket user fee.
The following proposed legislation, similar to airport security programs common throughout Europe, is
the most comprehensive and enforceable long-term solution to addressing airport security needs:
1. Increased Federal Standards for Screeners and Contractors

Tough Federal standards must be established to:
• Provide strict guidelines for screener training and certification before screeners are permitted to
staff a checkpoint. Training must address all of the interpersonal, regulatory, and technical
demands of checkpoint security jobs, and those skills must be updated on a regular basis with
classroom, as well as hands-on, training.
• Provide comprehensive government-conducted background checks for all airport screeners.
• Increase staffing levels at checkpoints to allow for thorough inspections of passengers and
luggage and to ensure that screeners who monitor x-ray machines are rotated every 30-minutes to
reduce fatigue and concentration lapses.
• Provide increased pay and benefits for screeners. Improved pay and benefits would reduce the
industry's alarmingly high turnover rate and make it easier to recruit and retain the kind of skilled,
experience, stable workforce on which passengers and the public can depend. It would also bring
standards for airport security closer to those in European airports, where security workers typically
make at least twice what their American counterparts receive, along with health coverage, sick
leave, and other benefits, with the result that annual turnover is often below five percent.
• Ensure that security screening equipment is up-to-date, quality equipment that is promptly
replaced if it breaks.
• Provide screeners with whistleblower protection to raise safety without fear of retribution.
• Ensure that the Federal Government certifies prospective contractors before they are able to
operate at U.S. airports. Contractors must be re-certified each year and be debarred if they have
too many violations.
2. An Airport-Wide Security Program with Local Accountability

• In order to ensure that there are no gaps in or a lack of coordination in airport security operations,
security screening must be integrated into existing airport security systems that include airport
oversight of airport police, airfield access, baggage handling, terminal gate guards and parking lot
security. Only by having one entity that is familiar with the particular needs of each airport
responsible for all security at an airport can we be assured of coordinated and seamless security
from airport entry to the plane.
• In order to ensure full integration of all security operations at airports, this comprehensive security
program for each airport must be administered locally by an Airport Security Director who oversees
the implementation of federal security and screening standards at all airport screening
checkpoints. Only by making one individual who is familiar with the particular needs of each airport
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responsible for all security at an airport can we be assured of coordinated and seamless security
from airport entry to the plane.
• The Airport Security Director must assign a law enforcement officer to supervise each security
screening checkpoint. Each officer should be trained to enforce all federal security screening
procedures and will ensure that individual screeners and contractors are in complete compliance.
3. Funding Through Passenger Security User Fee
• This comprehensive airport security program would be funded though a Passenger Security User
Fee applied to each ticket and redistributed to each airport based their number of annual
enplanments. A tripling of current U.S. screening costs, to pay for the aforementioned security
enhancements, would cost each airline passenger an estimated $2 per airline ticket.
• Airport authorities should be indemnified beyond $1 million from liability through a system of
self-insurance funded through the user fee.
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Chronology of SEIU's Push for Enhanced Aviation Security
June/July, 1998: Hundreds of airline passenger security and service workers at Los Angeles
International Airport (LAX) begin organizing with the Service Employees International Union (SEIU)
-Local1877 in order to improve wages, benefits and working conditions. Workers testify before City
Council about how high turnover, low pay, and inadequate staffing and training hurt passenger security
and safety.
November 10, 1998: Based primarily on the testimony of pre-board screeners at LAX and concern about
high turnover, the Los Angeles City Council votes to amend the City's Living Wage Ordinance to cover
airline subcontracted security workers at LAX. Wages are lifted from $12,000 to $18,000 a year.
January 1999: After a number of security breaches at LAX, pre-board screeners meet with FAA officials
to discuss concerns about staffing, training and the need for whistle-blower protection for security
personnel. Over 60 LAX pre-board screeners sign a petition to the FAA calling for the FAA to address
high turnover, short staffing, and the need for whistle-blower protection for screeners who speak out
about security concerns.
February 16, 1999: A special hearing of the Los Angeles City Council Commerce Committee is called to
address screener concerns about airport security. Workers testify that contractors continue to ignore
staffing and training concerns and that screeners suffer from blurry vision, headaches and inability to
concentrate when contractors fail to rotate them every 30 minutes as is customary.
September/October 1999: Airport Screeners at San Francisco International Airport (SFO) together
with SEIU Local 790 raise concerns about low pay, high turnover and inadequate training in testimony
before the San Francisco Board of Supervisors and SFO officials.
January 2000: San Francisco Mayor Willie Brown, together with SFO officials, passes the Quality
Standards Program designed to raise wages, improve hiring standards and increase training standards
for airport security personnel, including all pre-board screeners.
April 4, 2000: SEIU Local 1877 brings an LAX pre-board screener to testify at an FAA public hearing in
San Francisco. The screener, together with an LAX Airport Commissioner, Miguel Contreras, provides
testimony about the need to reduce turnover, improve staffing and training standards and protect
screeners against retaliation for speaking out about security concerns.
January 2001: SEIU Local 6, together with other Seattle airport unions, issues a policy memo to
Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (SEA) officials calling on the Port of Seattle to address high
turnover and low wages among pre-board screeners at SEA-TAC.
June 14, 2001: Screeners at Oakland International Airport (OAK) meet with President of Oakland Port
Commission to discuss their concerns about how low-bid contracting, high turnover, and working
conditions adversely impact airport security.
June 25, 2001: Screeners at OAK testify about security concerns to Aviation Committee of Oakland Port
Commission.
July/August 2001: Huntleigh (ICTS) screeners at LAX, OAK, and SEA meet with Southwest, Alaska and
Northwest Airlines as well as with airport officials to raise concerns about how working conditions and
management practices prevent them from providing the best possible security services. In OAK and
SEA, SEJU and screeners ask airport officials to adopt Quality Standards Programs, similar to measures
adopted in Los Angeles and San Francisco, to reduce turnover and ensure that security contractors are
obeying all local, state and federal laws.
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Testimony of the California Transit Association
to the
Assembly Committee on Transportation
Information Hearing
Impact of Terrorism on State Transportation Services and Facilities
Tuesday, November 20, 2001
Jeanne Krieg
Chair, California Transit Association
CEO/General Manager, Eastern Contra Costa Transit Authority
X

Introduction and thank you for invite to participate. Jeanne Krieg, Chair of the California
Transit Association, General Manager of the Eastern Contra Costa Transit Authority I Tri
Delta (Antioch).

X

The Association represents 80 of the state's public transit operators, including the 10
largest urban systems, as well as suburban and rural systems throughout the state. We
represent both bus and rail systems. Several of our members are on the panel today

X

Last year Califomia,s transit operators provided more than 1.3 billion passenger trips.
Our members provide about 85-90% of the transit trips in California.

X

As stewards of the public trust as well as public funds, the top priority of all California
transit operators is to provide safe, efficient and effective transportation services to our
citizens. We have always focused much of our energy and resources on ensuring the
safety and security of our operations and facilities.

X

We have always worked with our local, regional, state and federal law enforcement,
medical and emergency service agencies on disaster and emergency preparedness
training. All of our agencies have written plans to cover such contingencies, and most of
us actually participate in local agreements spelling out which agency takes which actions
during a disaster or emergency. And, we regularly train and re-train on these plans,
enhancing communications and relationships with our partner agencies, and refining the
skills and response times of our own personnel.

You have invited some of our largest systems who operate some of the most high profile services
and facilities in the country to speak to you today. They will detail for you the specifics of their
plans and programs so I will focus my comments on the small and medium operators.
X

To illustrate what some of our other, smaller operators are doing, I'll describe just some
of the recent and planned efforts of one small-medium operator on the Monterey
Peninsula:
X
Conducted a risk assessment of the agency services and buildings.
X
Practiced with local SWAT team on bus hijacking scenarios.
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Trained. local fire department and EMT personnel on how to access a bus,
use its equipment, and transport wounded passengers from the vehicle.
Consulted with local counter-terrorist expert on preparation measures.
Educated agency staff: how to communicate with the public in such an
event. emergency contact information. etc.
Updated their contingency plan for agency's buses to be used in
evacuation of surrounding communities and from specific buildings.

X

For the most part, smaller agencies do not employ their own security or police forces.
They do often, however, have informal agreements with the local police or sheriff for
regular observation of transit routes and vehicles during service.

X

Some of our larger members, are upgrading security forces, adding personnel to routes or
stations, and adding or upgrading teclmology like on-board or in-station video cameras.
Of course, all these efforts require additional financial investments.

X

Additionally, the Federal Transit Administration has always provided training and
resources to transit agencies on emergency and even terrorist situations. For instance, the
FTA published in 1997 a synthesis of best practices on "Emergency Preparedness for
Transit Terrorism, and a synthesis on "Improving Transit Security.,

X

Other published resources include 1999's ''The Use of technology in Preparing Subway
Systems for Chemical I Biological Terrorism," 1998's "Defending Subways Against
Biological Terrorism," and this year's "Protecting Surface Transportation Systems and
Patrons from Terrorist Activities."

X

Existing training courses provided by theFTA include "Threat Management and
Emergency Response to Bus Hijacking," "Transit Bus System Safety," ''Threat
Management and Emergency Response to Rail Hijacking," ''Transit Rail System Safety,"
"Effectively Managing Transit Emergencies," and ''Response to Weapons of Mass
Destruction."

X

Since September 11th, the FTA has indicated that it is arranging to have professional
security experts conduct security assessments of the 100 largest transit systems in the US.
In addition, the FTA will be offering two-day, cost-free security awareness and training
workshops across the country. The FTA already sent us a Safety and Security Tool Kit,
containing many publications and resources on these subjects, a swmnary of practical
security and emergency response advice from New York and Washington, D.C., and
sample materials to increase public awareness about safety and security.

X

Thank you for your attention and efforts.
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GIL MALLERY TESTIMONY
ASSEMBLY TRANSPORTATION COMMITIEE
NOVEMBER 20, 2001

Good morning, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. for the opportunity to appear before
the Assembly Transportation Committee to update you on Amtrak's efforts to enhance
the security of the traveling public in the wake of the horrible tragedy that was September
II. Now, more than ever, the indispensable role that passenger rail plays in our nation's
transportation system is abundantly clear. For three days, when not a single commercial
airline was operating in the United States, Amtrak kept business people moving and
brought stranded family members home. Here in California, the trains continued to run,
often very full. The State of California is one of Amtrak's most valued partners, and your
history of support for planning, developing and investing in passenger rail services has
become a standard to which other states look as an example. The State's investment is
based on the notion ofproviding a multi-modal transportation system, which allows for
the many choices oftravel, resulting in reduced congestion, improved mobility and many
alternatives, especially in times of national emergency. Your foresight is commendable.

Californians - indeed all Americans - are riding the rails in substantial numbers,
even in the face of dramatic decreases in travel nationwide. Americans are simply
staying home these days. Some Amtrak services - notably the Northeast Corridor and
corridors such as the Pacific Surfliner- have seen strong ridership gains since the
September 11th tragedy. Others- such as the Cascades in the Pacific Northwest and the
Capitols- are more affected by the downturn in the economy. While airlines are seeing
decreases of 20 - 25 percent, Amtrak's ridership nation-wide has declined just 1% during
the month of October. Here on the West Coast- where the soft economy is having an
effect more than other regions -- ridership is even with last year. Amtrak is being called

on to play a greater role than ever in today's transportation environment. People still
need to attend their business meetings, visit their grandchildren or get away with the kids,
but Amtrak does not offer sufficient capacity over some of our routes.
With the demand and attention in a post-September 11 environment comes the
need to reassess the type of safety and security measures that we need across the system.
Quite literally, our world changed instantaneously and Amtrak moved quickly to keep
pace and implement some important security enhancements. Shortly after September
11th' Congress asked Amtrak to take a look at its security measures and report back. In
response, Amtrak assembled a $ 3.14 billion September 11 Response Package that I will
discuss in just a moment. But let me tell you how Amtrak responded on September 11th
and the days following.

Almost immediately after the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, Amtrak suspended all train operations so that an inspection of all the rights-ofway over which we operate could be conducted. Our engineers, as well as the engineers
of the freight railroads over which we operate, ensured that all of the infrastructure- all
of the bridges and tunnels and rails- were safe for our passengers. Theinspection was
expeditious and full operation was resumed hours later. As I mentioned earlier, as the
airlines were grounded for the next several days, Amtrak was one of the only public
carriers keeping America moving.

In the days after September 11, Amtrak's nationally accredited police force led
the effort to identify and implement security enhancements throughout the system,
consistent with Amtrak's current level of resources. For example, for the first time ever
in the rail industry, passengers are required to produce photo identification before being
issued a ticket. In addition, our QuikTrak ticket machines -the self-service machines
located throughout the system are now equipped with a system that checks data contained

on a person's credit card against a FBI maintained watch-list. In fact, regardless ofwhere
a reservation is made - whether at a QuikTrak machine, online or with an Amtrak agent names are automatically compared with the FBI's watch list on a real-time basis.

Many of our stakeholders ask about our baggage policy, and I can report that
Amtrak does inspect its checked baggage as well as its mail and express shipments. It's
important to recognize, however, that- world-wide- surface transportation systems are
open systems, distinguishable from the enclosed environment oftypical airline travel.
Surface transportation generally does not employ baggage screening or metal-detection in
the stations or on the trains. But Amtrak police officers, who have been on highest alert
almost every day since the attack, will search individual bags with probable cause. Our
police force has been more visible, more vigilant and takes its mission very seriously.
The Amtrak Police Department coordinates closely with outside agencies - most notably
the FBI, other law enforcement agencies and our host railroads- to improve the
monitoring of our physical infrastructure and facilities.

We are consistently educating and training our employees to be aware of
suspicious items, such as packages, and to be diligent about the "Employee Watch
Program" - a proactive program to ensure that our employees are actively working to
keep guests, the equipment and themselves safe and secure.

These are things that Amtrak can do, and has been doing, to both enhance security
and bolster the public's confidence in passenger rail travel. What Congress asked
Amtrak to provide them with was an estimate of what we need to move forward.
Americans are counting on Amtrak, more than e\·er, to get them where they need to be
with the utmost safety and care.· Amtrak requested $1.53 billion in safety and security
improvements and $1.61 billion for capacity to meet the demand. Were Amtrak to
receive the safety and security funding, Amtrak is prepared to do the following:

•

On a system-wide basis, Amtrak will install more security-enhancing systems at
facilities (stations. maintenance facilities, on the trains) such as fencing, lighting,
security cameras and communications-systems. In the West, we will deploy 50
more personnel and four K-9 units. Amtrak employees will receive additional
training in anti-terrorism, hazmat detection and response systems.

•

Amtrak will enhance the life-safety conditions of the tunnels in New York,
Baltimore and Washington, DC.

•

Amtrak will repair and upgrade trainsets that are sitting in the shops to redeploy
out in the field to provide the additional capacity needed. And, Amtrak will
purchase additional trainsets for corridor type service, such as in California.

That request is working its way through Congress and we certainly hope it will be
successful. People are thinking twice about traveling, but when they are, they're thinking
about Amtrak. Amtrak is ready for the challenge, but we need the resources to continue
to enhance the system.

What's clear is that :\mtrak has proven itself once again to be an important part of the
national transportation network. The public has recognized that. Supporters in Congress
are advocating other bills- such as the High Speed Rail Investment Act and S. 1530
(RAIL-21) and S. 1550. both sponsored by Sen. Fritz Hollings, that will place Amtrak on
a level playing field with other transportation systems nationwide. Californians will
certainly benefit from these bills with increased roundtrips, faster trip times and enhanced
security and service. We hope the legislation is successfully enacted into law.

We look forward to continuing to do our part in this new paradigm. Our objective is
simple: meet the growing demand for train travel in the safest and most secure
environment.

Thank you.

San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District

California State Assembly

Transportation Committee

Statement of

Paul Oversier

Assistant General Manager of Operations

November 20, 2001

1

Good morning Chairman Dutra and Members of the Transportation

Committee.

Thank you for giving the Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART) the

opportunity to discuss our efforts to provide safe and secure public

transportation for the residents of the San Francisco Bay Area.

My name is Paul Oversier and I am BART's Assistant General

Manager for Operations.

As such, I have overall responsibility for the day-to-day operation and

maintenance of the system.

2

BART is a 95-mile rapid rail transit system with 39 stations located in

the counties of Alameda, Contra Costa, San Francisco and San Mateo.

BART's role as the backbone of the region's transportation network is

borne out both by what happens on a normal weekday and by what

happens when circumstances are atypical.

A normal weekday for BART means providing on-time service to over

326,000 riders, who are going to work, school, medical appointments

as well as cultural and sporting events.

3

When BART is not operating normally, such as was the case in the fall

of 1997 when we were shut down for several days due to a strike, the

impact on the region and its economy was far-reaching and

immediate.

Traffic congestion, for example, reached unprecedented levels, as

many commuters experienced a doubling and even tripling of their

normal commute travel times.

4

On a more positive note, in the aftermath of the 1989 Lorna Priata

earthq'uake and the temporary closure of the Bay Bridge, BART's role

in

the

region's

transportation

network

evolved

from

one

of

importance to one of critical necessity as the system provided the

only practical means of access between the East Bay and San

Francisco.

To this day, during the peak one hour of the commute, the 21,000

Transbay riders carried by BART exceed the number of vehicles that

cross the Bay Bridge during the same one hour period.

Without BART, it would take an entirely new deck on the Bay Bridge

to handle today's commute traffic.

5

To carry 21,000 Trans bay riders in the peak one hour and 48,000

Transoay riders during a typical 3 hour commute period, BART

operates trains from 4 different East Bay lines every 2.5 minutes

through the Transbay Tube.

Each of these trains carries between 700 and 1,000 riders.

BART also provides a"t:,ess to other key activity centers in the Bay

Area.

For example, fully 1/3 of the commuters traveling to work here in

downtown Oakland from Central Contra Costa County do so by BART.
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BART Police Commander Clark Lynch will touch on some of the

specific steps the District has taken since September 11th to further
'

enhance the safety and security of our system.

Before I turn it over to Commander Lynch, I'd like to share with you a

brief thought about the new environment in which we find ourselves

and areas where the legislature might be able to help systems such

as BART.

Almost by definition, rail rapid transit systems are characterized by

high and concentrated utilization levels supported in part by easy,

convenient and open public access.
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Many of the security measures available, in varying degrees, to other

modes of transportation, simply aren't practical in the high volume,

multi-access point environment of rail rapid transit.

Capital improvements that fund technological solutions for detecting

and/or deterring unauthorized intrusions into our right-of-way and

facilities is one example of an area where state financial assistance

would be helpful.

Funding for enhanced use of closed circuit television technology is

another.
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These types of one.;time investments would not only enhance the

safety and security of the BART system and its riders, but would help

mitigate the post September 11th on-going financial and physical

burden of protecting these locations with just our human resources.

I'll now turn it over to Commander Lynch.
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STATEMENT OF CLARK LYNCH
COMMANDER
S.F. BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT (BART)
POLICE DEPARTMENT

BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE

NOVEMBER 20, 2001

Chairman Dutra and members of the Transportation Committee, thank you
for inviting BART to speak with you this morning and describe some of the steps
we have taken in preparation for terrorist activities and some of our future needs in
this area. I am Clark Lynch, and I am the Patrol Commander for the BART Police
Department.
BART has been involved in emergency planning since the system began
operations, and has a detailed Emergency Plan in place which includes chapters on
a variety of events which could occur. These include natural events such as
earthquakes, fires, floods, or high winds; and also includes District responses to
criminal activities such as explosions, bomb threats, and hostage taking. The
Emergency Plan is updated regularly, and stresses a coordinated response by .all
involved personnel, both District employees and other first responders, utilizing
the incident command system (ICS).
After the Tokyo subway sarin attack in 1995, the District recognized a need
to update this plan in a new area, the potential use of nuclear/biological/chemical
(NBC) weapons. We sent personnel through the U.S. Army's chemical school, the
Department of Defense Domestic Preparedness training, the Federal Transit

Administration First Responder Training, and a variety of other courses dealing
with this specialized subject. The District also prepared an NBC response plan
that, for obvious reasons, was not part of the public Emergency Plan, but followed
the same format in providing guidance to employees in various departments with
response protocols.
The BART District has been focused on two areas when dealing with
potential terrorist activity. These include prevention of acts on the system and
mitigation of the consequences if an act does occur. The preventative steps have
included steps toward "target hardening" and cooperative sharing of information
with other organizations, including intelligence information. Target hardening
steps have included the installation of closed-circuit television systems,
installation of improved intrusion alarms, and improved use of the "crime
prevention through environmental design" (CPTED) concept. CPTED includes all
physical traits of an area from landscaping to lighting to the types of building
materials used, and this can have a significant impact on general crime prevention
as well as terrorism. BART has also been involved in several regional groups
which facilitates the flow of intelligence information which may be critical in
anticipating terrorist events.
In the area of mitigation after an event, we cannot overstate the need for
2

immediate and appropriate first responder actions to save lives. This will require
early recognition of an event, immediate actions to contain the scene, and
gathering all the necessary resources to provide appropriate levels of aid. For an
event of the magnitude ofthe Tokyo attacks, this level of response will not be
available from any single source, but must be coordinated among a variety of first
responders. BART has worked to make certain this response does occur smoothly,
but the recognition and response by District employees in the first one-two
minutes of any NBC event will be critical to the safety of our patrons, other
employees and first responders. This requires planning, training and execution.
We have conducted drills in this area and will continue to do so in the future.
In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11 t\ BART initiated some
additional steps to further enhance the safety of our system. These included higher
employee visibility, especially uniformed police presence; conducting "sweeps" of
trains at selected locations to check for suspicious packages or suspicious activity;
removal of trash receptacles at underground platforms; closure of restrooms; and
manual control of selected elevators. The District has continued to stress to its
employees that everyone shares a responsibility for safety and security, and has
encouraged employees and patrons to report suspicious circumstances to the
police department. The police department has responded to these additional calls
3

related to unattended packages, unknown powders, or other circumstances
generated by increased public concern throughout the past two months. We have
also continued and strengthened our relationship with other agencies, including
local, state and federal agencies to exchange information on these topics.
Lastly, I would like to discuss some of BART's future needs required by the
current situation related to potential terrorist activities. The District has retained a
consultant with nationally recognized expertise in transportation and anti-terrorism
to assist us with a comprehensive threat and vulnerability analysis. This analysis
is designed to make sure we don't overlook any area and to ensure that we are
expending our limited resources in the most productive manner. Included with the
document provided to the committee are several needs that the District has
identified, and proposed steps to address those needs. I will just highlight a few of
these needs.
One of the most critical assets and most visible icons of the Bay Area is the
District's trans-bay tube. We recognize the inherent vulnerabilities of a pubic
transit system designed to provide fast, efficient transportation to large numbers of
riders. However, we also recognize a need to target harden our facilities to the
fullest extent possible. For the trans-bay tube, this has included placement of
personnel at critical points and the enhancement of physical alarms. We are
4

currently enhancing tunnel alarms designed to better detect trackway intrusions.
We are also looking at improvements in the area of our administrative and control
facilities, enhanced use of CCTV technology throughout our system, purchase of
personal protective equipment for employee use in the event of an NBC event, and
improved use of electronic lock technology to better control access at critical
points throughout the District. As biological and chemical detectors reach a
higher level of development and refinement, we will also be investigating their
potential uses in our system.
These physical, target hardening, capital projects are in addition to the needs
for enhanced personnel resources which have been required at the highest states or
alert. The District has provided this enhanced physical presence through the use
of overtime and redeployment, but the monetary costs and physical toll on
employees continue to build. As the current situation develops into the future,
BART will continue to address these needs, but we ask that your committee and
State Government continue to consider the requirements of local transit in terms of
funding and assistance with specialized personnel in continued periods of
heightened alert.
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San Francisco Bay .A..rea Rapid Transit District (BART)
SU?vEv1ARY OF ENHANCED SECURITY P,""EEDS
October 5, 200 1
The summary presemed belo'>v is in priority order in temzs of needs thar BART has idewified as cnu.:ial
to the safe operation of the system in a heightened state of security a! err. Indicated costs are I:!Stimares
only, and reflect an order of magnitude cost only.

PROJECTS
Install Closed Circuit TV (CCTV) and intrusion
alarms at entrances to the most vulnerable
tunnels and underground areas.

EST. COST
$1.4 million

2.)

Upgrade all locks at BART administrative
offices, stations and maintenance facilities.

$5 million

3.)

Improve physical security at BART's main
administrative building which houses the
operations control center and police dispatch center.

$200,000.

4.)

Install CCTV at entry points of all stations.

$3 million

5.)

Purchase a mobile command post vehicle.

$500,000.

6.)

Develop redundancy capability for BART's
communications and train control systems.

$5 million

7.)

Install intrusion alarms at all personnel access points
to underground portions of the system.

$ 500,000.

8.)

Improve the physical security of all maintenance/
storage yards with hardened perimeters, use of CCTV
and improved entry controls.

$2 million

9.)

Purchase personal protective equipment, i.e., escape
masks suitable to use in chemical vapor environment.

S416,000.

10.)

Improve intrusion protection system on all above ground
richt-of-wavs,
includimr an enhanced barrier svstem andJor
::::
electronic alarms.

S 12

1.)

-

.

-

~
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11.)

Establish an alternative Emergency Operations
center (EOC) with the capability to also function
as a.fully operational operations control center.

S30 million

OPERATIONAL AND STAFFING STRATEGIES:
1.)

Additional police officer staffing to allow sweeps
of all trains entering the Transbay Tube.

S3.57 million/yr.

2.)

Additional personnel to staff vulnerable portals and
other access points.

$2.774 million/yr.

3.)

Additional personnel for full-time monitoring of CCTV
cameras.

$1.73 million/yr.

Santa Clara Valley Transportation
Peter M. Cipolla, General Manager
Transportation Security Testimony
APTA:
•

CLEARLY, THE VALUE OF AN EFFECTIVE PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION NETWORK HAS SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED
OVER THE PAST FEW MONTH'S.

•

WHILE MOST OF US IN THE INDUSTRY KNEW AND ARE PREPARED
TO RESPOND IN TIMES OF CRISIS, THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11
AND THE RESPONSES BY TRANSIT SYSTEMS ALL OVER NORTH
AMERICA-PARITCULARL YIN NEW YOUR AND WASHINGTON
DC-PRVIDED CLEAR-CUT EVIDENCE THAT TRANSIT IS A KEY
ELEMENT OF OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE STRUCTURE.

• BY THE END OF SEPTEMBER, APTA, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION HAD EXTABLISHED A
FRAMEWORK WHICH FOCUSED ON A TWO-PRONGED APPROACH
TO THIS ISSUE ... ONE WHICH DEALS WITH
EVACUATION/EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND THE OTHER
WHICH DEALS WITH EFFECTIVE SECURITY.
• AS INCOMING CHAIR OF APTA, I EXTABLISHED A SPECIAL TASK
FORCE COMPRISED OF SELECTED MEMBERS OF APTA'S EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE ... AS LUCK WOULD HAVE IT, APTA WAS HOLDING OUR
ANNUAL MEETING IN PHILADELPHIA SEPT 30-0CT 6---NEARL Y ALL
EXECUTIVE LEVEL PROFESSIONALS-BOTH FROM OUR PUBLIC
SECTOR AND PRIVATE SECTOR-WERE COMING TOGETHER. WE
SPENT HOURS RELIVING THE EVENTS OF SEPT 11---HOW WE AS AN
INDUSTRY RESPONDED. I GIVE US HIGH MARKS, BUT ROOM FOR
IMPROVEMENT.
• SEC, MINETA, THE FTA ADMINISTRATOR, FRA ADMINISTRATOR
AND OTHER KEY FEDERAL OFFICIALS JOINED US AND WE WERE
ESSENTIALLY ABLE TO EXTABLISH A VIABLE FRAMEWORK TO
WORK FROM.

AMERICAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE SECURITY TASK FORCE
Notes and Actions Arising From Meeting On October 29, 2001

Attendance:
Richard A. White-Task Force Chair
Peter M. Cipolla
Celia M. Kupersmith
Ronald J. Tober (via telephone)
Ronald L. Barnes (via telephone)
Peter A. Cannito
Alan C. Wulkan (unable to attend)
Robert H. Prince (unable to attend)
Anthony M. Kouneski, APT A Staff
Karol Popkin, APT A Staff
Greg Hull, APTA Staff
1. The TaskForce confirmed that on September 29,2001 the APIA Executive Committee
Established the APIA Executive Committee Task Force to provide policy and strategic
direction on emerging security issues and needs of APIA and the transit industry. The Task
Force has been formed with Richard White as Chair and includes APIA Chair, Peter Cipola,
APIA First Vice Chair, Celia Kupersmith, APIA Immediate Past Chair, Ronald Tober, Bice
Chair-Business Members, Alan Wulkan, Vice Chair-Bus and Paratransit Operations, Ronald
Barnes, Vice Chair-Commuter and Intercity Rail, Peter Cannito, and Vice Chair-Rail Transit,
Robert Prince. With the imminent retirement and resignation of Robert Prince from the
APIA Executive, Larry Reuter will be appointed as Vice Chair-Rail Transit and will be
included as a member of the Task Force.
The Task Force acknowledged the strong support ofFTA Administrators, Jenna Dom and the
Transit Oversight Projects Selection Committee in securing $2 million of TCRP funding to
specifically address transit security research needs. The TOPS Committee further identified
the APTA Executive Security needs, The TOPS Committee further identified the APTA
Executive Security Task Force as the steering group for determination of these projects.
2. It was agreed that the composition of the Task Force will be maintained as established but
will be augmented by a designee of the Department of Transportation (this has subsequently
been determined to be Robert Jamison, Program Manager, Federal Transit Administration).
Additionally, the Task Force will be augmented by a representative of the Transportation
Research Board, Stephan Parker, for those matters pertaining to TCRP projects planning.
The task Force will additionally be supported by members of the industry for specific task
assignments yet to be determined.
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3. The Task Force determined that short term and mid to long term tasks need to be addressed
and that there is an immediate need for short term deliverables through the Task Force;
Short Term Tasks:
);>

Enlist industry support to develop and distribute checklists that can be utilized by all
modes of the transit industry to address emergency preparedness and security.
This task is target for completion by December 15, 2001.

>-

Select a consultant to assist the Task Force with the following functions;
development of a work-plan and implementation timetable
frame issues
determine additional requirements for industry support
recommend prioritization of issues and potential security projects for funding
through the $2 million allocation by TCRP
establish modal security working group forums for the inter-agency sharing of
security programs, processes, procedures and resources
The task Force determined that the consultant to be selected must be knowledgeable of
the transit industry, possess transit security expertise, and also be knowledgeable of
international transit security programs and processes.
The selection of this consultant is to be effected immediately. The intent is to advance
issues in time to review at the next APTA General Managers' Seminar February 2-6,
2002 in San Diego.

>-

Meet with the TRB representative to confirm processes and procedures and scope of
work necessary for selection of TCRP projects.
This meeting is to be effected immediately.

>-

Arrange a meeting of the Task Force with the Assistant Director of the FBI to discuss
possible and practical means for intelligence information provision to the transit
industry.
This meeting is to be arranged as soon as possible.

>-

Arrange a meeting of the Task Force with the newly created National Infrastructure
Security Committee chaired by John Flaherty, Chief of Staff, Department of
Transportation.
This meeting to be arranged through Robert Jamision as soon as is practicable.
Mid-Long Term Tasks:

>-

Select and initiate TCRP security projects according to prioritization of needs identified.
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>- Determine international liaisons to support security programs development and industry
information/ best practices sharing (example-U.I.T.P.)
>- Review security strategic plans and directions of other related organizations (exampleU.S. Conference of Mayors.
4. Next meetings of the Task Force;
>-Teleconferencing as may be required
>- Friday, December 7, 2001,7:30 AM-8:30AM breakfast meeting in Washington, D.C.
Location to be determined.

Testimony from the Southern California Regional Rail Authority
Before the Assembly Transportation Committee
Provided by Anne Louise Rice, Government Affairs Manager
November 20, 2001
Good morning, Chairman Dutra and members of the Committee, my name is Anne
Louise Rice, Government Affairs Manager for the Southern California Regional Rail
Authority, operators ofMetrolink the commuter rail service. As you know, Metrolink
provides service in the six -county region of Southern California. We started service in
October 1992 with 24 trains and 2,500 riders. Today, we operate 128 trains daily,
Monday through Friday, plus weekend service. Our average daily weekday ridership is
now 32,500.

I am pleased to be here today to report on Metrolink's on-going security program which
was updated in light of the September 11th incidents. Since that fateful day Metrolink
has initiated new security measures to protect our passengers and physical assets, while
enhancing operational safety. I will briefly highlight those and then address the questions
of what more can be done and how the Legislature can help.

First, concerning the measures we have taken since that time, we have added some 19
safety initiatives. Some are currently underway while others were short-term measures
which have concluded. They include:

•

Adding five special unscheduled trains on September 11 to return passengers home
in advance of regularly scheduled afternoon trains;

•

Increasing randomized track, bridge and tunnel inspections;

•

Instructing all locomotive engineers to lock cab car and locomotive doors;

•

Increasing frequency of conductors walking the train;

•

Developing security awareness messages for passengers, including seat drops, web
site and placards on bulkheads

•

Increasing the presence of the Los Angeles County Sheriffs at Los Angeles Union
Station by assigning extra deputies.

As you can appreciate, to identify which measures we are currently implementing as
opposed to those that were needed only in the short-term would be to compromise the
security program. However, we can assure you that we continue to monitor daily the
situation, working in concert with the LA County Sheriffs Department and other local,
state and federal agencies, and evaluating our efforts as the situation dictates.

Second, what more needs to be done? In addressing this issue, we must first recognize
that each transit system operates in unique environment and so there is no "one size fits
all" approach to the question of enhancing security. Any solution must meet the criteria
of feasibility, sustainability, long-term use and multi-benefit investment. The last two are
closely linked. As an example, when we retrofit our bridges against tectonic plate
movements our long-term investment yields a benefit of enhanced security against terror
attacks. Likewise, when we strengthen our rolling stock to withstand impacts from grade
crossing incidents, a corollary effort is to strengthen the car in the event of a terror attack.
Accruing safety benefits in multiple areas is essential when making such investments.

Finally, as to specific recommendations, at a minimum, we would like to see state funds
provided for on-going operating costs associated with increased law enforcement. We are
still preparing our estimates for long-term incremental costs, but as an example, we know
that in the past three months we have spent an additional $500,000 for these services. In
addition, as new safety technologies become available, we will need to implement them.
This will require additional training of our Metro link staff and our contracted safety
personnel beyond what is currently budgeted. Because we are in the business of moving
the people of California, we need the state to be a partner by providing a long-term
investment. If state dollars drop off and/or are expected to be supplanted with local funds
which aren't available, then we've will have unintentionally created an unfortunate and-perhaps unsafe --situation.

Testimony on Security Program
Provided by Southern California Regional Rail Authority
November 20,2001
Page2

Third, what can the Legislature do? Again, state funding for long-term investments both
for capital projects and on-going training would be most helpful. Recognizing the
Assembly Transportation Committee is the policy making arm of the Assembly, we
would ask that you consider creating an umbrella program dedicated to these types of rail
safety enhancements that could then be approved for funding by the appropriators. To
avoid overlap and ensure cost-effective measures are put in place, we would ask that you
coordinate with our other partners, the Federal Railroad Administration, the Federal
Transit Administration, as well as the American Public Transportation Association, all of
whom have been actively engaged in addressing these security issues from the national
perspective. In fact, they are expected to release recommendations early next year which
draw from the experiences of rail operators' throughout the country who are currently
hardening their systems. Clearly, the link to these upcoming national recommendations
is a necessary input into developing state policy.

Thank you for the opportunity to address the Committee today.

Testimony on Security Program
Provided by Southern California Regional Rail Authority
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Southern California Regional Rail Authority
Operations Center
2558 Supply Street
Pomona, California 91767
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October 12, 2001

Fran L. Hooper
American Public Transportation Association
1201 New York Ave.

Washington, D.C. 20001
Dear Fran:
Because of rhe incidents of September 11, 2001, the Southern California Regional Rail Authority
(Metrolink) has undertaken a number of initiatives. Some of them are underway and are not yet
completed, but will be as quickly as possible. We will be continuing to monitor the situation and
evaluating our security efforts as the situation dictates.

Physical Assets
Activities since September 11

>

>
}>
}>

~

>

Track, signal, and communication personnel given instruction about increasing
personal awareness of their environment.
Initiated Threat Awareness training for all employees and contractors.
Increased the randomization of the track, bridge and tunnel inspections to include
nights and weekends.
Inspected trains and track/structures within 24 hours of September 11, 2001
incident.
Ensured all locks on cab cars and locomotives were functional.
Ensured fuel levels in storage tanks were kept topped off, in case of fuel shortages.

pperational Issues
Activities since September 11

>
>
>

Initiated Threat Awareness training for all on-board crewmembers, transportation
supervisors and managers.
Ensured that a uniformed off-duty police officer is in cab car when operating in
push mode.
Instruction to all locomotive engineers to lock cab car and locomotive doors.
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)> Reviewed the SCRRA emergency procedures as it relates to mass casualty situation.

>

Initiated security assessments of the six most critical facilities of the Metrolink
system using the Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)
process. Two completed.

Information Systems Security
Activities since September 11

> Updated virus protection.
· ~ Removed outside access then slowly re~implemented to ensure no unauthorized

>-

access.
Reviewed network security.

Passenger Handling
Activities since September 11

>
>
>

>
)>

Instruction to all crewmembers about increasing awareness of their environment.
No additional cost.
Increasing the frequency of the conductors walking the train. No additional cost.
Developing security awareness messages for passengers, which will include seat
drops, web site, passenger newsletter information, and placards on bulkheads. Cost
$5000.
Arranged for special, unscheduled trains on September 11, 2001 to return
passengers home in advance of regularly scheduled afternoon trains.
Increased the presence of the Los Angeles County Sheriffs at Union Station by
hiring extra deputies who are assigned to Union Station.

If you have, any questions about any of the security issues please call me.
Sincerely,

Edward Pederson
Manager of Safety and Security
(909) 593 2954
cc.

David Solow
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Transit Security Needs for AC Transit
Those projects are proposed and combined would total approximately $7- $10
million.
•

GPS Computer Installation of computers in the AC Transit sheriff's cars to
enable access to Global Positioning System data currently being installed on
transit buses. Would enable more rapid response time to security/safety
threats.

•

Security Gates. Installation of new security gates with guardhouses
surrounding the transit bus storage facility.

u

Extension of Security Card Program. Provide for automated security
admission and employee tracking at all facilities.

•

Video Surveillance. Acquisition and installation of video SUIVeillance
cameras and security system in the transit bus storage yards.

•

Bus Video Surveillance System. Install on-board bus video surveillance
system in remaining in remaining fleet vehicles that are not equipped.

•

Command Center Bus. Using an Over-the-Road style bus shell, install
dispatch, cellular~ fax and other state of the art communications equipment to
facilitate continued control of operations. This vehicle would provide
continued opem.tion of needed transportation services during emergency
situations. The command vehicle would be able to communicate with other
transit, police and fire vehicles.

•

Fault Tolerant Voice and Data Communication. Install equipment to
enable our voice and data communications network to withstand isolated
outages without disrupting the entire system. Provide alternate routing and
redundancy, and improve network data security from electronic attacks.
Additionally, Wido Area Network (WAN) routers, servers and firewalls need to
be upgraded.

•

Increase Security of Network Equipment. Physical network and
telecommunications equipment must be in dedicated spaces secure from
unauthorized access. Access to these spaces must be included in the above
mentioned surveillance and security systems and need uninterruptable power
and temperature control.

~t

Disaster Preparedness and Recovery. Develop and implement procedures
and facilities to replicate business critical processes and systems offsite.
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Los Angeles County
Metro pol ita n Transportation
Authority (MTA)
Assembly Transportation Committee
November 20, 2001

MTA Overview
• State-Created Agency
• Responsible for:
• Bus & Rail Operations
• Transportation Finance and Planning for
Transit, Highways, etc .
• Allocation of Transportation Funds
• Including LA County Transportation Sales Tax

Broad Security Responsibility
• 2,000 weekday peak-hour buses
• 60 miles of Metro Rail Service
• Red Line - North Hollywood to downtown Los Angeles
• Blue Line- Long Beach to downtown Los Angeles
• Green Line - Norwalk to El Segundo

• 1.3 million daily boardings (bus & rail)
• 8,900 Employees

Broad Security Responsibility
(cont'd)
•
•
•
•
•
•

50 rail stations
11 Bus Divisions & 1 Rail Division
Support Facilities
Gateway Headquarters Building
16 Municipal Bus Operators
Other Operators, Government Entities &
Security Forces
• SAFE (Call Boxes) & Freeway Service Patrol

Security Overview
• System Incorporates Many Security Features.
• Significant experience preparing for and
responding to major events:
• Northridge Earthquake
• Civil Unrest
• 2000 Democratic National Convention

• Well-prepared

Existing Security Program (1)
(Prior to 9/11)
• People:
•
•
•
•

MTA Security
Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD)
Contract Security

• Hardware:
• Surveillance
• Silent Alarms & Available Cell Phones

Existing Security Program (2)
(Prior to 9/11)

• Operator Training
• Routine Division Visits

•
•
•
•

LAPD & LASD at MTA Headquarters
Monthly "Cops & Ops" Meeting
Routine Drills and Table-top Exercises
Frequent Special Joint Operations

Enhanced Security (1)
(Since 9/11)
MTA Initiated:
• Employee awareness information developed and
disseminated via MTA intranet and paycheck inserts
• Trained mail room staff on bio-hazards
• Staff maintaining frequent contact with DOT Office of
Intelligence and Security and disseminating
intelligence information
• Working with and supporting Municipal Operators on
regional security issues
• Relocating bicycle lockers from vulnerable sites

Enhanced Security (2)
(Since 9/11)
., Scheduled briefing by U.S. DOT technology .
experts on high tech security systems
• Requested APTA Peer Review on security for
the January/February time frame
Liaison with Feds:
• Participated in & Following-up from Transit
Operators Conference Call with Secretary
Min eta

Union Station Assessment
• Initiated By Los Angeles Mayor James Hahn
• Largest Passenger Rail Facility in Western U.S.
• MTA Rail, MTA & Other Bus, Metrolink Commuter Rail, &
Amtrak Service
• MTA & Metropolitan Water District HQ Buildings

• Multi-Agency Task Force Developing Assessment and
Plan
• To Be Presented to MTA Board on November 29th

MTA Security Assessment
• Initiated by MTA Board of Directors
• Assessing All MTA Services and Facilities
• Reviewing:
•
•
•
•

Deployment/distribution of resources
Technology issues
Physical security measures
Inter-Agency Coordination

Interim Assessment
• No areas of significant risk or vulnerability
requiring immediate response have been
identified
• However, the top to bottom assessment will
be very productive and valuable

Financial Impacts
• Experienced Increased Overtime Costs
Immediately After 9/11
• 11 °/o Dip in Rail Ridership
• Lost Filming Revenues
• Potential for Increased Insurance Premiums
• Drop in Sales Tax Revenues Severely Impacts
MTA Service and MTA-Funded Projects and
Services Countywide

Potential Improvements
• Physical Improvements
• Closed-Circuit TV
• Physical Barriers

• Additional Contract Security Officers
• Increase Visible Security Presence at Critical
Locations

• Security Needs of Municipal Operators

. STATE OF CALIFORNIA
ASSEMBLY TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE
INFORMATIONAL HEARING ON EFFORTS TO PREVENT/RESPOND TO
TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST CALIFORNIA'S TRANSPORTATION
INFRASTRUCTURE & ACTIVITIES
COMMENTS OF GREYHOUND LINES, INC.
PRESENTED BY ROBERT R. ISAACS, STATE GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
NOVEMBER 20,

2001

My name is Robert R. Isaacs, State Government Affairs Representative for Greyhound Lines. I
have been asked here today to discuss Greyhound security efforts. In addition to my prepared
remarks that have been distributed, I would like to draw your attention as well to the 3
attachments. The I 51 is an open letter to our customers from Craig Lentzsch, Greyhound's CEO,
and contained on the Greyhound website (at www.greyhound.com) detailing our current security
improvements. The 2nd is a copy of the remarks by Mr. Lentzsch at a national press conference
following the tragic events of October 3, 2001. The 3rd is a copy ofthe September-October issue
of Greyhound Today, containing articles about Greyhound's activities following events of
September I 1th and October 3rd_

INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND

Greyhound Lines, has been in operation nationwide & in California for over 87 years. Today we
serve North America with over 3,700 destinations and 21,000 daily departures. Greyhound's
products and services include scheduled inter-city bus service; package express service; charter
service; Flightlink© airport service; Quicklink© commuter service; Meet-and-Greet shore
services supporting cruise lines, vacation and sightseeing service, destination management, and

charter service for conventions; Lucky Streak© casino service; food service; trip planning and
fare and schedule information database management; and telephone information center
management.

According to National Highway Transportation Safety Administration, Greyhound - and it's
nationwide interline partners - represent the safest mode of transportation in the America. And
in order to ensure the safety of our employees and customers, Greyhound has long had security
measures in place that fully met the needs of a ground transportation mode.

Ground transportation

whether it is rail, public transit, automobiles or even pedestrians

by its

very nature, has always been a free-flowing, open system where people can travel on any given
mode and change between modes. This open, flexible ground system is very unlike our air
traffic system where planes fly in a highly-controlled fashion from fixed points at fixed times
with passengers in pre-assigned seats.

On September 11th, the world changed, however- and with it- our concept of what is acceptable
security for ground transportation in a crisis situation. Greyhound reacted quickly to the crisis
and enhanced security in a number of ways. In addition, we have continued exploring options
for tightening security even more.

WHAT HAPPENED ON -- AND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING- SEPTEMBER 11?

The terrorist acts of September 11th did more than shock and sadden people everywhere- they
tested our nation's transportation system as never before. Airline passengers were stranded for
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days. Express air carriers that deliver thousands of packages daily were grounded along with
passenger planes, delaying payrolls and other shipments important to our nation's ability to
conduct business. Rental car agencies, local and regional transit and rail systems and intercity
rail systems were swamped with added demands.

The nationwide transportation system

staggered a bit. The airline industry still hasn't recovered.

The impact on Greyhound was enormous. In the four days following the attacks, demand for
Greyhound services nationwide increased by 50 percent and more - in fact, over fourfold in
many locations. It created peak-level demand during a normally off-peak period.

Greyhound employees responded with the pride and commitment to serving America that is
deeply ingrained in the company's history and culture and we got the stranded airline passengers
home. Two factors contributed to the company's successful response:
•

The extraordinary efforts of our employees and

•

The unique ability to be capacity-flexible.

Greyhound's Crisis Management Team (CMT) quickly gathered in the Emergency Operations
Center (EOC) to determine how Greyhound might be affected by the attacks in New York City
and Washington, DC. In the hours that followed, terminals nationwide began to see a surge in
passengers. The team looked at how passengers could be rerouted or resources supplemented at
heavily impacted locations. Implementing their decisions quickly and effectively, we doubled
our capacity in less than 24 hours. That is what we mean when we say we are a capacity flexible
system.

3

WHAT HAPPENED ON- AND IMMEDIATELY- FOLLOWING 0CTOBER3?

On October 2, Craig Lentzsch flew to Washington, D.C. for a meeting with Secretary of
Transportation Norman Mineta and Congressional officials to share ideas for improved security
for the inter-city bus system. Early the next morning, he learned of a serious criminal attack on
one of our buses near Nashville, TN. As a precaution and until further information could be
gathered, Mr. Lentzsch made the decision to shut down the entire Greyhound system in the
United States. We completed the shutdown in less than two hours. After receiving assurances
from the FBI, U.S. DOT and Tennessee law enforcement officials that it was the senseless and
violent act of a single deranged man, Mr. Lentzsch - in consultation with our labor union decided to re-start the system on a "voluntary" basis. Virtually every driver chose to get back
behind the wheel. Because local enforcement authorities would not help, we asked our available
customer service and security people to search carry-on bags. And they did. We are extremely
proud of the manner in which Greyhound employees nationwide met the challenge and
continued to serve America's traveling public. We were operating again in 2 Y2 hours- the total
shutdown process lasted about six hours.

WHAT IS GREYHOUND DOING TO ENSURE THE CONTINUED SAFETY OF OUR CUSTOMERS?

The events of the last few weeks - and the stress it has created - seems to have redefined for
some what is normal and permissible in our society. There has been an increase in the number of
threats and copycat acts committed around the country, including dangerous and harmful acts
directed at Greyhound and its passengers. Incidents such as unruly passengers on buses and
airplanes or bomb threats in buildings have increased and served to increase public tensions.
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Greyhound has made significant changes in the way it conducts business and ensures the safety
of our customers and our employees. These measures include:
•

Additional security guards and cameras in major terminals

•

Use of electronic sensing wands at 33 locations

•

Expanded pre- and post-trip checks of vehicles

•

Temporary restriction of seating in the first row of seats and an increased buffer zone
separating the driver from the passengers to reinforce our policy against disturbing
drivers while the bus is in motion

•

Offering cell phones pre-programmed with emergency numbers to all drivers and
requiring all drivers to have a cell phone.

•

Requiring all passengers to provide a name with the purchase of a ticket.

•

Using our ticketing system to ensure passengers properly check baggage and remain with
their bags until they are loaded on the bus

•

Inspecting packages and requiring valid identification from unknown shippers who use
our GPX package delivery service

•

Cooperating fully with all branches oflaw enforcement

•

Temporarily closing lockers and parcel checks in some facilities

•

Requiring positive identification from all passengers in certain locations.
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HOW IS GREYHOUND LOOKING TO THE FUTURE WITH RESPECT TO SECURITY AND HOW CAN
CALIFORNIA HELP AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL?

Greyhound is a mode of ground transportation and the approach to security should be the same
as other ground transportation modes like train, public transit, subway, light rail, and even the
personal automobile. Ground transportation is fundamental to our freedom and mobility and is
not like air travel. In looking to the future of ground transportation security, we must recognize
that any security solution will only be effective if it is part of a cooperative effort across the
entire ground transportation system.

In addition, inter-city buses provide the only transportation available to many rural Americans.
Greyhound has thousands of rest stops and bus stops in small towns and villages across the
nation. Greyhound alone has five times more locations than Amtrak and the airlines combined.
We must not do anything that would jeopardize our ability to serve these customers as we move
forward. However, the stakes arc high for inter-city bus. Since October 3rd, Greyhound drivers
have been the target of assaults and 6 innocent passengers died in the October 3rd incident.
While public transit has historically experienced driver assaults, the recent Greyhound
experience is a marked increase.

And because inter-city bus facilities are in so many

communities and rural locations, making these facilities secure is a far greater task than that
facing any other transportation mode.

Greyhound has continued to do our part to improve security, but Congress must address critical
security upgrades beyond that which Greyhound can do alone. Inter-city bus must have federal
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assistance to establish new security systems on an expedited basis. We are engaging federal
officials to discuss and encourage legislation for inter-city bus security, like the bills being
considered for Amtrak and the airlines.

Senator Max Cleland of Georgia has introduced an amendment to the supplemental
appropriations bill currently under consideration in DC that calls for $400M in federal funding
over 2 years. The funds would be appropriated to the DOT, and inter-city bus operators, like
Greyhound, would then apply for the funds to improve security.

The funds would be used to

increase the safety of drivers, upgrade the emergency communication systems, improve
passenger and baggage screening and fully implement a ticket identification system nationwide.
There's also an equivalent bill being put together by the bipartisan leadership of the House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. California Senators Barbara Boxer and Dianne
Feinstein could be important allies in this Senate measure, and support from California's
congressional delegation will be important to the House measure.

You could help increase security on California's and the nation's inter-city bus system by:
•

passing an Assembly resolution supporting the Cleland amendment and House T&I measure;
and

•

encouragmg the support of California's Senate and House members for including bus
security funding m the supplemental appropriations bill that Congress is currently
considering.

I have copies of the Cleland amendment for your review and use.
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WHAT CAN THE LEGISLATURE AND THE STATE DO TO HELP AT HOME IN CALIFORNIA

California's transportation system was

like the rest of the nation's - seriously tested on

September 11th. How well it passed that test depended on whether you were at home with your
family watching television or trying to get there. Airline passengers were stranded in many
locations for days, due (in part) to the lack of seamless connections with intercity bus services.
Though the intercity bus network was also affected that day, there were no disruptions in
California and services elsewhere were reinstated in a matter of hours in most places.
Greyhound was able to double capacity in 24 hours to carry stranded air passengers home.

We have four (4) recommendations for the State of California:
1. Though California has been a leader in the support and development of interrnodalism, the
statewide network is still entirely too fragmented. California should step up its support for
long-term development of interrnodal facilities

requiring access for all modes - to provide

seamless linkages for the traveling public. These linkages could also include required access
to airports to ensure connections to and from all modes.

2. Create an improved communications interface between transportation providers and local and
state law enforcement agencies.

The purpose of such an interface would be to ensure

appropriate and rapid response by state and local law enforcement when requested by the
carriers. It should also ensure proper confidential communications to the carriers by local
and state law enforcement concerning such areas as plans for heightened security and risk
assessments, so that we can help.
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3. Greyhound is a resource in- and a resource to- the State of California. When you consider
interregional transportation, think of us. When you consider statewide transportation plans,
include us. When you consider statewide emergency response plans, call us.

4. The decrease in business following September 11th and the additional costs of security
measures are impacting Greyhound and other inter-city operators financially. We anticipate
passenger revenue declines to continue into the fourth quarter and through the first quarter of
2002. Greyhound is spending $5 million on enhanced security since September II th and we
expect security costs to continue to rise in 2002. If the State of California pursues financial
support for security measures, please do not forget to include intercity bus needs.

CONCLUSION

I would like to thank you, Chairman Dutra, and the Assembly Transportation Committee for
including Greyhound in this important hearing. I would be pleased to answer any questions you
may have at this time or following the hearing.
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Greyhound Lines, Inc.
Information about Greyhound Lines

October 31, 2001
Dear Valued Greyhound Customer:
Our company's mission is to provide transportation across North America with safety, dignity and
convenience. Safety is- and always has been- foremost in our mission.
Making bus travel even safer is a responsibility we take seriously. We have made some changes in our
security programs that began after the terrorist attacks in September. Here are some highlights of our
safety enhancements:
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

Additional security guards and cameras
Use of electronic sensing wands at more than 30 locations
Expanded pre- and post-trip checks of vehicles
Temporary restriction of seating in the first row of seats and an increased buffer zone separating
the driver from the passengers to reinforce our policy against disturbing drivers while the bus is
in motion
Cell phones pre-programmed with emergency numbers in the process of being distributed to all
drivers
Using our ticketing system to ensure passengers properly check baggage and remain with their
bags until they are loaded on the bus
Inspecting packages and requiring valid identification from unknown shippers who use our GPX
package delivery service
Cooperating fully with all branches of law enforcement
Temporary closure of some lockers and parcel checks
Requiring positive identification from all passengers in certain locations.

We are continually examining ways to make our customers and employees more secure. We are
working with the Department of Transportation and Congress to pursue additional security measures,
including better screening of bags and passengers, securing the driver compartment, and an improved
on-board emergency communication system.
Freedom to travel in search of a better job, education, medical care or way of life has always been
fundamental to our nation. Enabling that freedom for Americans is my goal as CEO of Greyhound.
Thank you for your patience with any inconvenience you may encounter as we continue to roll out new
security programs that provide you and our employees with a safe experience.
Sincerely,

Craig Lentzsch
Chief Executive Officer

Remarks by Craig Lentzsch, Greyhound president and CEO
National Press Conference
Washington, D.C.
Oct. 3, 2001
Earlier this morning, a Greyhound bus was involved in a tragic incident near
Manchester, TN. All 13,000 employees of Greyhound are shocked and saddened by this event. Our condolences go to the families and friends of the passengers that were hurt and injured and all of the people involved in the incident
and the driver as well.
We are doing all we can to provide assistance to the passengers and
their families. Greyhound staff is on the ground at the site and at hospitals
and have been there since early this morning. The bus originated in Chicago
on its way to Orlando, Florida. The schedule had 38 passengers and a driver
on board at the time of the incident. Immediately after the incident, we made
the decision to act with an abundance of caution and on the side of safety and
security and suspend service until we could identify more details and get more
information on the nature of the incident.
The Department of Transportation has been very supportive of us today.
This morning, I met with senior U.S. DOT officials, including Secretary Mineta
and Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson, as well as the chief of intelligence and
security for DOT and the acting administrator of the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration. I've also consulted with law enforcement officials in
Tennessee and with the FBI. The officials have assured me that they believe
this tragic accident was the result of an isolated act by a single deranged individual.
Given that information, I then consulted with the union leadership of our
company, and our crisis management team, and we concluded that it's safe to
resume service for our customers and necessary to resume service for our
country. As of 1 PM Eastern time, Greyhound operations across the United
States have resumed service. The system is safe, but we understand that in
the aftermath of this incident, that our employees and passengers may not
wish to return to the buses today.
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Nevertheless, to address the situation, in order to offer maximum choice
and convenience for our customers, today we will be offering a full refund to
any passenger who does not wish to travel to their destination. And we have
partnered with Amtrak to offer an alternative. Today only, Greyhound ticket
holders may exchange their ticket for an Amtrak ticket to be used for service
on any Northeast Corridor unreserved train and other trains in the Amtrak system on a space available basis.
Now, let me return to safety and security. At Greyhound, our passengers' and our employees' safety is our first priority. That is why I made the
decision early this morning to temporarily suspend our operations. Greyhound
and inter-city buses provide the safest mode of transportation.
We have long had security measures in place like security guards and cameras
in our terminals to make our environment safe for our employees and our customers, but the world has changed in recent weeks. Our concept of what is
acceptable security for ground transportation in a crisis situation has changed.
Greyhound, therefore, has taken steps to tighten security even more and will
continue to do so in the wake of this incident.
Yesterday, we began an experimental program wanding passengers and
their carryon luggage with electronic sensing devices in San Francisco and
Dallas and that program began today in Orlando, Florida. Prior to reboarding
passengers today, we're hand searching carryon luggage.
Coincidentally, I am in Washington, D.C., today to meet with Department
of Transportation and Congress officials to explore a number of joint actions
we can take to enhance bus safety and we have agreed that the company, and
the company's union, will coordinate on the development of and implementation of enhanced bus security program with the Department of Transportation.
Our operations are safe and are now up and running and our thoughts
and our prayers are with the families and friends of the passengers who were
injured or died in this unfortunate incident.
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AMENDl\1ENT NO.

CAL. NO.

[STAFF \¥ORKING DRAFT]
November 7, 2001
Purpose: To authorize grants to improve security on buses
used in interstate and interurban transportation.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES-107TH Cong., 1ST Sess.

S. 1214, 107TH Congress, 1ST Session
Ncr'\TEMBER - - , 2001
) Referred to the Committee on - - - - - - and
ordered to be printed

(

(

) Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

INTE_;\[DED to he proposed by Mr. CLELAND
Viz:
I
2

3
4

At the cud of the bill, add the follmving:

TITLE - -COMMERCIAL PASSENGER MOTOR CARRIER SECURITY GRANTS

5 SEC.
6
7

-01. EMERGENCY INTERURBAN BUS SECURITY AS-

SISTANCE.

(a) IN GEKERAL.-Subchapter I of chapter 311 of

8 title 49, United States Code, is amended by adding at the

9 end the following:

November 7, 2001 (10:27 a.m.)
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1 "§ 31109. Interurban bus security grant program

2

"(a) IN GENERAL.-

3

"(1) FUND ESTABLISHED.-The Secretary of

4

the Treasury shall establish an Interurban Bus Se-

5

curity Fund account in the Treasury into which the

6

Secretary

7

amounts appropriated under paragraph (2 }.

of the

Transportation

shall

deposit

8

"(2) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.-

9

There are authorized to be appropriated to the Sec-

10

retary of Transportation $200,000,000 for fiscal

11

year 2002, and $200,000,000 for fiscal year 2003,

12

for deposit into the account established under para-

13

graph (1). Amounts deposited into the account shall

14

remain available until expended.

15

"(b) GRA-1\.;'T PROGRAM.-"\Vithout further appropria-

16 tion, amounts in the Interurban Bus Security Fund ac17 count are available to the Secretary of Transportation for
18 grants to persons engaged in the business of pro·viding
19 interurban bus service for system-\vide security upgrades,
20 including the reimbursement of eA.'traordinary security-re21 lated costs determined by the Secretary to have been in22 curred by such operators since September 11, 2001,
23 including24

" ( 1) establishing an emergency communications

25

and notification system linked to la\v enforcement or

26

emergency response personnel;
S. 1214 Arndt.
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1

"(2) protecting or isolating the driver;

2

"(3) implementing and operating passenger

3

screemng program at terminals and on interurban

4

buses;

5

"( 4) acqmrmg, upgrading, installing, or oper-

6

ating equipment, softYvare, or accessorial services for

7

collection, storage, or exchange of passenger and

8

driver information through ticketing systems or oth-

9

ervvise, and information links \Vith government agencws;

10

11

"(5) constructing or modifying garages, facili-

12

ties, or interurban buses to assure their security;

13

" ( 6) training employees in recognizing and re-

14

sponding to terrorist threats, evacuation procedures,

15

passenger screening procedures, and baggage inspec-

16

tion;

17

"(7) hiring and training security officers;

18

" (8) installing cameras and video surveillance

19

equipment on interurban buses and at garages and

20

interurban bus facilities; and

21

" ( 9) creating a program for employee identifica-

22

tion and background investigation.

23

"(c) APPLICATIONS.-To receive a grant under sub-

24 section (b), an applicant shall submit an application, at
25 such time, in such manner, in such form, and containing

S. 1214 Arndt.
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1 such information, as the Secretary may require, and a
2 plan that meets the requirements of subsection (c) for the
3 project to be funded, in ·whole or in part, by the grant.
"(d) PLAN REQUIRED.-The Secretary may not

4

5 make a grant under subsection (b) for a system-\vide secu6 rity upgrade project until the applicant has submitted to
7 the Secretar:y, and the Secretary has approved, a plan for
8 the project, and the applicant has submitted to the Sec9 retary such additional information as the Secretary may
10 require in order to ensure full accountability for the obli11 gation or eA.'J)enditure of grant amounts. The Secretary
12 shall give priority to emergency communication system de13 velopment and protecting or isolating the dri,·er.
14

"(e) lNTERURBAt'J Bus.-For purposes of this sec-

15 tion, the term "interurban bus" means a self-propelled
16 commercial motor vehicle used on highv,,ays in intrastate
17 or interstate commerce to transport passengers for hire
18 that19

'' ( 1) has a gross vehicle \veight rating of at

20

least 10,001 pounds;

21

"(2) is designed to transport more than 15 passengers, including the driver; and

22
23

'' ( 3) has a baggage compartment under the

24

passenger deck.''

25

(b) CONFORMING MiENDMENTS.-

s.
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1

(1) The chapter analysis for chapter 311 of title

49, United States Code, is amended-

2
3

(A) by striking "STATE" in the heading for
subchapter I; and

4
5

(B) by inserting after the item relating to

6

section 31108 the follmving:

''31109. Interurban bus security grant program".

7

SEC. -02. BUS SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS.

8

The Secretary of Transportation may use from

9 $3,000,000 to $5,000,000 of the amounts deposited in the
10 Interurban Bus Security Fund account established under
11 section 31109 of title 49, United States Code, for research
12 and development of security recommendations for inter13 urban buses (as defined in section 31109(e) of that title),
14 including a revie11r of actions already taken to address
15 identified security issues by both public and private enti16 ties, and including research on engine shut-off mecha17 nisms and the feasibility of compartmentalization of the
18 driver, and compilation, review, and dissemination of in19 dustry best practices. In carrying out tllis subsection, the
20 Secretary shall consult Virith interurban bus management
21 and labor representatiYes, public safety and law enforce22 ment officials, and the National Academy of Sciences.
0

S. 1214 Arndt.
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Appendix D:
Seaports

Port of Los Angeles
What the Port Needs

1.

Port, Interstate and bridge access is not sufficient to support cargo throughout growth or
To sustain a terrorism attack even though the Alameda rail corridor will be operational
next April. Upcoming Federal assistance legislation such as ISTEA reauthorization in
2003 can provide a remedy.

2.

The Coast Guard and the US Customs Service need additional vessels, personnel
identification cards and background investigation capability.

3.

Ports need to significantly upgrade personnel identification cards and background
investigation capabilities.

4.

Local law enforcement, sworn officer, levels need to be upgraded.

5.

Additional personnel training.

6.

The proposed, Port of Long Beach, Intelligent Transportation System to manage
Interstate vehicle access and to provide port security surveillance are ready to construct
and need Federal cost sharing.

On October 10, Long Beach mayor O'Neill testified on the above Port Security factors before the
House, Transportation and Infrastructure, Water Resources Subcommittee along with the FBI
and other Federal security representatives.
It is recommended that the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors ensure that both aviation
and seaport security improvements are coordinated especially where Federal management
cooperation and assets may be needed.
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Port of Long Beach
Gus Hein, Director of Government Affairs
•

•

•
•

•
•

•

•

Since September 11th, transportation and infrastructure projects at the Port of Long Beach
that may have been viewed solely as transportation in nature must now be viewed within the
context of their security implications as well.
I had the opportunity several weeks ago to brief House Transportation and Infrastructure
Chairman, Don Young as well as staff from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's
Transportation, Logistics, and Infrastructure Committee. And I would like to share with you
some of the same information I communicated to them regarding the Port of Long Beach,
transportation, and security.
2001 marks the 90th anniversary ofthe Port of Long Beach. 90 years ago Long Beach was
visited by a lumber ship the SS Laqua. At that time Long Beach was just a small mudflat.
But over the past 90 years we have witnessed unprecedented changes in the Port's size and
configuration. The Port changed and grown through two world wars, a population explosion,
the rise and fall of a Navy base, and the age containerization.
a) In 1911 was a small mudflat. In 2001 the Port encompasses 7600 acres of wharves,
cargo containers, roadways, rail yards, and shipping channels handling approximately 5
millionteus.
b) In 1911 canning fishing and drilling oil were the top priorities, now it is moving
containers.
c) In 1911 cargo moving through Long Beach accounted for 11 million in cargo. In 2001 it
will be close to 100 billion.
d) In 1911 the Port was developed because a group of individuals wanted to bring trade,
jobs and economic propriety to the City of Long Beach. Today, we have a Board of
Harbor commissioners who still want to bring trade, jobs, and economic prosperity, but
now it is not just Long Beach that gains the entire state as well.
So much in fact that the trade has become the bloodline of California's economy, the Port of
Long Beach is the heart that pumps the blood.
Let's look at the trends that we are seeing at the Port and how we are adapting to them
a) Growth in containerized trade-242% since 1993
b) Ships are getting bigger
c) Terminals must accommodate growth
Mega-Terminal Development Plan. These projects are necessary to accommodate expected
growth in international trade. All of these container terminal projects include on-dock
intermodal rail yard facilities and all but Pier A include harbor dredging or filling.
Transportation and Infrastructure Needs. Because of the financial burden that these terminals
place upon the Port, public funding is desperately needed for off-terminal roadway and rail
projects submitted in a separate package.
A. Gerald Desmond Bridge
B. 710 Freeway
C. Intelligent Transportation Systems-Provides truckers, dispatchers, terminal operators, and
traffic engineers with seamless surveillance.
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PORT SECURITY
On September 11th Long Beach Police and Fire went on tactical alert and the Port Security
Committee immediately decided that the Coast Guard would begin doing a risk assessment
of ships outside the breakwater, inspecting them if necessary, and escorting the outbound
ships.
• Heightened security though out the Port
• High Visibility Patrols
• Restricted access to Port Buildings
• Liaison with customs, INS
• Increase man-hours for security force
• Individual Terminals brought in extra security
• LB Police Department conducted risk assessment
• High risk areas- Oil Terminals
Fuel Storage Areas
Interagency Security Task Force Met
• Coast Guard conducted - 96 hour notice before entering the Port-W/in 25 miles the vessel
checks with the VTS
• Tankers can only come in during daylight hours
•

What do we need?
Monetary support
Additional Personnel Training
Monitor video capability

Port of Los Angeles
What the Port Needs

1.

Port, Interstate and bridge access is not sufficient to support cargo throughout growth or
To sustain a terrorism attack even though the Alameda rail corridor will be operational
next April. Upcoming Federal assistance legislation such as ISTEA reauthorization in
2003 can provide a remedy.

2.

The Coast Guard and the US Customs Service need additional vessels, personnel
identification cards and background investigation capability.

3.

Ports need to significantly upgrade personnel identification cards and background
investigation capabilities.

4.

Local law enforcement, sworn officer, levels need to be upgraded.

5.

Additional personnel training.

6.

The proposed, Port of Long Beach, Intelligent Transportation System to manage
Interstate vehicle access and to provide port security surveillance are ready to construct
and need Federal cost sharing.

On October 10, Long Beach mayor O'Neill testified on the above Port Security factors before the
House, Transportation and Infrastructure, Water Resources Subcommittee along with the FBI
and other Federal security representatives.
It is recommended that the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors ensure that both aviation

and seaport security improvements are coordinated especially where Federal management
cooperation and assets may be needed.
10/18/01
Del Smith

CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE
ASSEMBLY COMMIITEE ON TRANSPORTATION
INFORMATIONAL HEARING REGARDING ACTIONS TAKEN TO PREVENT
AND OR RESPOND TO TERRORIST AITACKS
Good morning. I am Captain Scott Glover, Division Chief for the Eleventh Coast
Guard District's Marine Safety Division. I am responsible for marine safety and
security issues throughout California, Nevada and Arizona.
Thank you for this opportunity to outline the Coast Guard's Role and Actions in
addressing port security for California's commercial ports. This is a significant
topic as California is a leader in our nation's maritime trade. The port of LA/LB is
the nation's busiest port with almost 35% of all cargo coming into the U.S.
arriving at this port. The ports of San Francisco & Oakland are also among the
largest ports in the United States and San Diego is a key naval port.
I was asked to address three topics in my discussion this morning:
a. What is the Coast Guard doing to support Homeland Security?
b. What more can the Coast Guard do?
c. How can the State of California help?
WHAT IS THE COAST GUARD DOING TO SUPPORT HOMELAND
SECURITY?
Most Americans are much more familiar with the Coast Guard's safety role rather
than our port security role. In fact, our safety missions were in large part an
outgrowth of our security role. The U.S. Coast Guard has been responsible for
port security since enactment of the Espionage Act of 1917. We performed port
security duties throughout both world wars.
WHAT ACTIONS HAS THE COAST GUARD TAKEN SINCE SEPTEMBER 11,

2001
On September 11th the terrorist threat demonstrated global reach that requires a
higher maritime security posture and a "new normalcy" for Coast Guard mission
priorities and capabilities. The multi-mission nature of the Coast Guard allowed
us to increase maritime security in response to the September 11th attacks
immediately, using existing active duty, reserve, civilian, and auxiliary personnel,
and existing shore units, ships, boats, and aircraft. As the only federal service
with both national defense and law enforcement authority and capabilities, the
Coast Guard provided the Nation with an existing foundation upon which to build
its maritime homeland security efforts.
Our security actions focus on three areas - vessels transiting in and out of our
ports, waterside security of the ports and shores ide security of the port facilities.

The following are the cornerstones to 011 's Homeland Security (HLS) mission;
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Sea Marshall program,
Vessel escorts,
Harbor patrols,
Facility inspections, and
Maritime Domain Awareness

The Sea Marshal Program is very similar to the Air Marshal program in that we
place teams of armed personnel in the pilothouses of large commercial vessels.
The intend of the program is to prevent terrorists from gaining control of a large
commercial vessel and using it as a missile as the aircraft were at the World
Trade Center. The Sea Marshal program has gained such a level of local
interest that scarcely a day goes by without some accolade, or press clips about
this program. The positive control of high risk commercial vessels, including
cruise ships, entering California's ports provides visible assurance to the public
and remains one of the few security measures that actually improves the flow of
commerce as there are no delays to shipping schedules and increases the public
confidence in the cruise industry. While there has been a dramatic drop in the
cruise ship bookings since September 11, the knowledge that Sea Marshals
board each cruise ship, and Coast Guard patrol boats can be seen escorting the
cruise vessels directly supports the resurgence of this valuable industry.
Vessel escorts are employed for particularly important vessels to protect them
against USS COLE type attacks. Whereas the sea marshal program establishes
positive operational control over transiting ships, a vessel escort program will
enable us to protect the ship from an external hostile attack. The individual
escorts will entail Captains of the Port enacting a security zone around the laden
commercial or military ship and providing armed boat patrols to serve as
perimeter control.
Harbor patrols are used to protect waterfronts facilities from waterborne attack or
sabotage.
Historically we have conducted waterfront facility inspections for those facilities
that handle dangerous cargoes. We have refocused these inspections along
security lines ..
The new 96-hour notification requirements for inbound vessels have improved
our maritime domain awareness.
Finally, the Maritime Security Act (Hollings Bill) which was under development
well before the September 11 attacks, will, if enacted, further expand Coast
Guard authority and responsibilities. This Act will implement the
recommendations of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S.
Seaports.

WHAT MORE CAN THE COAST GUARD DO?
I don't think the question is "What more can the Coast Guard do", but rather, will
we be able to maintain our heightened security standard, our "new normalcy".
Up to this point, our response has been resourced by operating existing forces at
surge levels and cutting back on other Coast Guard missions. We cannot
operate at this pace indefinitely.
Our first action following the attacks of September 11 , was to surge our
personnel resources. The entire U.S. Coast Guard- Active Duty, Reserves, and
Auxiliary, was surged. The Active Duty members have put in extraordinary
hour. 2600 Reservists, the largest recall since WWII have been brought onto
Active Duty and even our volunteer Auxiliarists who normally conduct volunteer
recreational boating safety inspections are manning our active duty offices.
Our second approach to assigning more resources to our Port Security mission
was to cut back on our more traditional UE missions including counter drugs,
illegal immigration and fisheries. However, with most of our major cutters, patrol
boats, and aircraft protecting domestic ports and vital sea approaches, our
presence is minimal in other missions. There is a well-defined nexus between
terrorism and organized crime, drug and migrant smuggling. We must restore
our capability to return to these important mission areas as soon as possible,
while maintaining our increased maritime security posture.
In the long term, the Coast Guard's Homeland Security mission will require more
active duty and reserve personnel, and additional asserts, particularly patrol craft.
We will not be able to maintain our "new normalcy" without additional assets.
HOW CAN THE STATE LEGISLATURE ASSIST
The Coast Guard has not, and cannot, conduct the port security mission on our
own. We have actively partnered with the State and local governments and
industry. Some examples include:
a.

Shortly after the September 11 disaster, State Fish and Game
provided four of their most capable boats with crews to assist in
harbor patrols. For over a month two of these vessels patrolled
the San Francisco Bay while the other two patrolled LA/LB.
Unfortunately they have had to reduce their assistance but still
provide 1 boat for each port.

b.

The State Office of Emergency Services worked with us in
developing our list of key port assets. This list became the basis
for our patrol schedules. Admiral Riutta met personally with the

Director (Dallas Jones) and Deputy Director (Mark Ghilarducci) of
the OES to demonstrate his total support for the program.
c.

The Coast Guard is a member of the State Strategic Committee
on Terrorism. (SSCOTT).

d.

The Coast Guard Intel Community is an active member with the
State Threat Assessment Committee (STAC). (This committee
focuses on actual incidents. Its mission to provide the Governor
with real time threat assessments.)

e.

Mike Griffin (Coastal OES) and Henry Renteria (Oakland OES)
PARTICIPATED in the recent Maritime Homeland Security War
game conducted at the Center for Executive Education at the
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey. (Emphasized
PARTICIPATED- they were involved in highlighting State
capabilities.

f.

The State Lands Commission and the Coast Guard coordinate
their safety inspections of all oil facilities. Recently the State
Lands Commission has asked the Coast Guard to assist in
development of State regulations for security standards for oil
facilities.

g.

OSPR and the Coast Guard coordinate responses to oil spills.

h.

The Coast Guard and MARAD have worked with state, local and
industry representatives to establish two MTS subcommittees in
the State of California (north and south). The intent of these
committees is to improve coordination of MTS issues at all levels
by public and private stakeholders.
( 1) Both of these committees have established a port security subcommittee and are drafting recommended security standards for
port facilities.

1.

Mr. Norman Fassler-Katz, Senior Consultant, Select Committee
on California Ports, Office of Assemblymember Alan Lowenthal,
has developed the Gatifornia MITS Advisory Committee as a
coordinating body for lhe two regional bodies. This is the only
state with two MTS committees and a coordinating committee.
This is an indication m-the sheer size of the port community and
tt.e::state 's interest.

CONCLUSION
Our mission is about protecting lives and the economy, by providing both
physical security and reassuring the public with our visible presence in a manner
which sustains and re-stimulates economic activity. In the same way an
advertising dollar spent reaps a multiplied economic return in the privale sector
so can a security dollar reap a multiplied effect in the public sector if aur
presence reestablishes faith that our economic vitality will continue.
The Coast Guard has the unique position of being both a military armed force
and a Federal law enforcement agency. As we approach the third month of our
response to September's Terrorist attack and the initiation of our Homeland
Security Mission, it has become apparent that Coast Guard assets and
leadership are playing significant roles in protecting commerce and providing a
reassuring and viable presence to the American public.
It is also equally clear that, in the long term, the Coast Guard's Homeland
Security mission will require more active duty and reserve personnel, and
additional asserts, particularly patrol craft. We will not be able to maintain our
"new normalcy" without these additional assets.
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TESTIMONY BY TAY YOSHITANI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
PORT OF OAKLAND
ASSEMBLY TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE
NOVEMBER 20, 2001

Good morning Chairman Dutra and members of the
Committee. My name is Tay Yoshitani and I'm Executive Director
of the Port of Oakland. I wish first to applaud the Committee for
conducting this hearing and giving me the opportunity to address
the issue of seaport security.
California is home to three of our country's four largest ports.
Our ports are a vital asset to our state and the entire country. Since
95% of all international trade is sea born, our ports help drive our
state's economy by serving as California's entre to the global
economy and all the economic benefits that come with it. It is
critical that we keep our seaports safe, secure, and operating
efficiently and effectively.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, we at the Port of
Oakland have taken constructive steps to tighten security. We have
worked with our shippers and terminal operators as well as other

government agencies such as the U.S. Coast Guard. The Coast
Guard has been an especially important partner for us as we work
to ensure the security of shipments passing through the Port.
They have stepped up their efforts by adding additional patrols,
calling up reserves, and implementing a new sea marshall program.
We are also providing input to the U.S. Congress as they begin
to craft comprehensive seaport security legislation. One of the
greatest challenges in crafting such legislation is trying to define
what type of "threats" we need to protect against. We have had
countless meetings and phone calls to try to determine how to guard
against future terrorist attacks, but it is a difficult task. The
number of scenarios for terrorist activities is innumerable.
Therefore, it is critical that as we establish new security measures
and procedures as part of any legislation that we better define those
threats, which are of greatest concern and then direct our energies
and efforts to address ways in which to protect against them.
Because of the fact that California has 3 of the 4 largest ports
in the state and the fact that international trade is especially vital to
2

our state's economy, I believe the State of California has a definite
role to play in helping ensure that California seaports operate safely
and efficiently. The state can play a role in helping us define
potential threats. Also, as we do not expect significant federal
monies to help us improve security, the state can play a role here as
well. Operating seaports is an incredibly capital intensive business.
Protecting our assets will cost money in both new security
equipment and other operational expenses. We will need to find
new ways to protect against potential security threats while at the
same time making sure that we continue to operate our ports
efficiently and cost-effectively. We can not let security in and of
itself shutdown or severely disrupt the many efficiencies we have
achieved in the past few years that allow us to help drive the
California economy.
Although this has been a challenging year for the Port of
Oakland, due to the economic downturn throughout our country
and the world, we are continuing to move forward with our
expansion efforts. We are confident that this expansion will bring
3

greater economic vitality to the state, providing additional taxes and
jobs for our communities. As we progress with this project, it will
be important that we work closely with our policymakers and
community to ensure that our facilities maximize the security of our
workers and the public.
I look forward to answering the questions that the Committee
has posed and thank you for inviting the Port of Oakland to
participate in this important hearing.

QUESTIONS
1. What are we doing to enhance security?

In the federal maritime security legislation, they have indicated
that they will require the U.S. Coast Guard to perform a full Threat
and Vulnerability Assessment of the 50 most strategic ports. As a
national strategic port, the Port of Oakland will be one of the ports
that will receive this assessment.
But we are not waiting for this security legislation to pass. We
are already working diligently with our maritime tenants and the
4

local U.S. Coast Guard Captain of the Port to inventory the physical
condition of our facilities and identify existing security procedures
in place. We recently held a meeting with the Port's terminal
operators, and representatives from the US Coast Guard, U. S.
Customs and the Pacific Maritime Association. This meeting was
held to begin the process that will continue over the next several
months, of identifying the existing level of security and developing
recommendations to further enhance security within the Port.
A related effort is the Maritime Transportation System
initiative sponsored by the U.S. Department of Transportation
[DOT] and the U.S. Maritime Administration [MARAD]. The focus
of the Maritime Transportation System initiative is to develop a
system that is efficient, environmentally sound, and capable of
expanding to meet our nation's needs into the future. Included in
this initiative is the integration of shoreside infrastructure
requirements into the Maritime Transportation System. A number
of regional dialogues have been held across the country to solicit the
input of people with expertise and knowledge of the maritime
5

industry at the operational level. Furthermore, efforts are now in
progress to implement a San Francisco Bay Regional Maritime
Transportation System Steering Committee with 5 sub-committees
to address areas of action identified in the Maritime Transportation
System Report to Congress. These areas include competitiveness,
security, safety and environmental, dredging and shoreside
infrastructure. The Port of Oakland will serve as chair of the
Security Sub-committee. We hope that through these efforts we can
improve not only our state's, but our nation's maritime security.

2. What more needs to be done?
The requirements of the federal legislation, when finally passed
by Congress, will help determine what further actions are needed.
One of the next steps will be to address the question of identification
cards for Port workers and how best to implement a system in a
cooperative and pro-active manner with the labor force. In
addition, we will need to follow-up on recommendations developed
by a committee that the Port has formed with our tenants to address
6

security and review our current contingency and emergency action
plans to address possible terrorist attacks.
We also need to assure that the Threat Assessment for the Port
of Oakland is completed as soon as possible after the legislation
passes. Currently this legislation requires the U.S. Coast Guard to
conduct 10 Threat Assessments per year for 5 years. We will be
urging the authors of the legislation to have these assessments
conducted on an accelerated basis.

3. How can the State Legislature help?
The pending federal security legislation will create greater
financial and administrative demands upon the state's airport and
seaport facilities, and impact California's efforts to improve its
economy. Ports throughout the state will need financial assistance in
meeting federal requirements and in protecting and improving
critical infrastructure needs. For example, alternative routing plans
for cargo movement in the event of damage to critical highways will
need to be developed. The Port has proposed the California Inland
7

Regional Inter-modal Rail System that would greatly assist and
could act as a model in these efforts. This effort, which would utilize
our rail system for short hauls to inland areas, will help move cargo
without having to use our roadways.
In addition, providing additional funding for dredging
projects, such as our current -50 foot dredging project, would also
enhance our state and nation's security interests in two important
ways. First, since the Port of Oakland is designated one of the
Strategic Deployment Ports in the event of a national emergency, it
is essential we have adequate harbor depths at the Port in order to
accommodate large military vessels, which are often necessary when
responding to military threats quickly and efficiently with the same
type of vessels available in the commercial maritime sector.
Second, deeper harbor depths at California ports allow
California to be more competitive in the global marketplace because
they handle the modern deeper draft vessels that are utilized in
maritime commerce today and that are planned for the future.
Inability to handle these vessels at key California Ports could mean
8

this cargo will bypass California and move to the Pacific Northwest,
Canada, Mexico or by all-water service directly to the East Coast.
California ports are a key strategic economic asset to the nation's
global presence in the marketplace.
Finally, as I stated in my opening remarks, I urge California,
in conjunction with the federal government, help us better define the
threats that seaports are facing. With this knowledge, industry
experts will be able to craft plans that will protect us from such
threats. Our efforts would become focused and have a much greater
chance at success. I also urge you to work with us on identifying
ways the state can assist us financially with deploying better security
equipment and procedures while making sure we do not disrupt the
efficiencies that are vital to our success.
We appreciate your attention to this critical issue of security
and would be pleased to serve as a resource to you as you continue
to study these difficult issues.
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Assembly Transportation Committee
Interim Hearing
Transportation Security
November 20, 2001

Statement of Juan Acosta
Government Affairs Director
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad

Chairman Dutra and Vice-Chair Pacheco, on behalf of the Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Railroad ("BNSF"), thank you for the opportunity to
discuss the important issue of railroad security.

BNSF joins the rest of

our nation in extending our sympathy and condolences to the victims of
the terrorist attacks on September 11, to their families and to their
communities. We offer our thanks and support to those who worked so
diligently in search and rescue operations and to our nation's armed
forces. We also express our firm hope and confidence that all of the
perpetrators of the attacks will be found and punished.

I recognize the need to convince you that the railroad industry is
more secure today than it was on September 11. Let me assure you this
most certainly is the case. The industry is acting swiftly and prudently to
increase protection of critical facilities and operations. In this public
setting, I will share with you as much information as possible, without
compromising national security. Therefore, I will speak primarily of the
railroad industry as a whole and will decline to be too specific.

The rail industry reacted swiftly to the events of September 11. The
Association of American Railroads (AAR) coordinated the industry
response plan, in full cooperation with federal government authorities. In
the immediate aftermath of the attacks, railroads tightened security and
intensified inspections across their systems. Major railroads, which
maintain their own police forces to help assure the security of employees,
property and freight, put enhanced security plans in place. Access to
important rail facilities was restricted. Movement of freight to the New York
area was suspended completely until the immediate threat was over. The
entire rail industry- passenger and freight, front line employees and
management, customer and carrier- all reacted swiftly and with
resolution.

At the same time they were attending to security issues, though,
railroads realized they had a responsibility to keep our nation's vital railtransport link open. Full service resumed as quickly as the railroads, in
cooperation with the U.S. Department of Transportation, determined it
could be.

On October 7 when major U.S. military action was initiated against
foreign terrorists, the railroad industry, in coordination with our nation's
top transportation security officials, again instituted precautionary
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measures. The industry's 72-hour self-imposed "red alert" status included
the following immediate actions:
•

restricting and increasing security for some types of cargo

•

increasing patrols and security at critical facilities

•

restricting certain operations near major public events

•

working closely with the military to provide needed support for
the nation's ongoing military actions

•

working with rail customers and national security agencies to
balance our nation's economic needs and national security
requirements

•

tightening security on railroads' web-based information systems,
removing some data and severely restricting access to material
dealing with shipment of certain materials

•

continuing an industry-wide practice of conducting thorough
background checks on employees before hiring

Temporary restrictions on the movement of sensitive types of cargo
allowed time for an assessment of the specific level of threat following
military strikes in Afghanistan. Accordingly, on October 10 the nation's
freight railroads resumed accepting all shipments under continued
heightened security. However, the following security measures remain in
place, continuously evaluated for effectiveness and modified as necessary:
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•

Railroad police forces are employing heightened patrols,
inspections and surveillance as deemed appropriate for the
security of shipments and facilities.

•

Certain trains will have operations modified commensurate with
security requirements.

•

The Association of American Railroads continues to operate a 24hour command center linked to federal national security
personnel and the railroads' 24-hour operations centers.

•

The industry continues to restrict access to its information
systems.

•

The railroad industry's 200,000 employees maintain high
awareness and vigilance. Daily briefings to all operational
employees (e.g., Yard, Maintenance of Way, Engineering) and
other communications to all employees serve as constant
reminders of steps to be undertaken to ensure security.

The U.S. Justice Department has asked the nation's law enforcement
agencies, public utilities, airlines, railroads and other businesses to
maintain the highest possible degree of vigilance, while continuing
operations. Today, railroads remain in 24-hour/7-day-a-week
communication with U.S. Department of Transportation intelligence and
security personnel, the FBI, the National Security Council, and state and
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local law-enforcement officers, and have plans in place to respond
immediately to credible threats to our transportation network.

To further address security in light of the new environment, the AAR
Board of Directors has established five critical action teams, each led by a
senior railroad or AAR executive and each involving the full participation of
AAR members, including AAR's Canadian and Mexican members. The
overarching focuses of these critical action teams, which are outlined
below, are 1) to ensure the safety of our employees and the communities in
which we operate; 2) to protect the viability of national and regional
economic activity; and 3) to ensure that railroads can play their vital role in
the military mission of our nation. In addition, freight railroads will
cooperate fully with the critical action team dealing with rail passenger
security.
The five critical action teams established by the AAR are:
1.

Information Technology and Communications
This critical action team is examining the security of
communications, control systems, and information systems
for the industry, including redundancy, backup and data
confidentiality. An ongoing examination of issues related to
cyber security has been folded into this effort.

2.

Physical Infrastructure
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This critical action team is addressing the security of physical
assets such as bridges, buildings, dispatch centers, tunnels,
storage facilities, and other structures. The team is also
addressing cross-border and port "gateway" physical security
issues.
3.

Operational Security
This critical action team is addressing issues to minimize
exposure to unplanned occurrences while trains are in
operation. The team is analyzing potential types of
occurrences, their probability, and their consequences, as well
as addressing the issue of fuel supply.

4.

Hazardous Materials
This critical action team is working with the chemical industry
and tank car manufacturers to examine the transport of
hazardous materials by rail - including surveillance, routing,
re-manufacturing, and packaging - with emphasis on
materials that pose the greatest potential safety risk.

5.

Military Liaison
This critical action team is augmenting the already existing
close working relationship between railroads and the
Department of Defense to determine immediate and ongoing
military traffic requirements and to identify capacity, security,
and equipment needs of the industry to meet military demand.

6

Railroads are confident that, if called upon, they will be able to
match their performance during the Persian Gulf War, when
they and other transportation providers accomplished one of
the greatest mass movements in history in a way that was "so
smooth it is almost as if there isn't a war going on," according
to a spokesman from the Army's Military Traffic Management
Command at the time.

Each of the critical action teams described above is working quickly,
but carefully. They are assessing short-term and long-term vulnerabilities
in the areas of people, process, and technology and are developing an
array of additional countermeasures. Some of these new
countermeasures, designed to prevent, detect, and mitigate any terrorist
attack, have already been deployed. To assist in this comprehensive effort,
AAR has retained a group of former U.S. military and government security
experts who bring a valued perspective to the evaluation. The analyses
and action plans generated will form the basis for additional measures
deemed necessary to enhance the security of our nation's freight rail
network.

Notwithstanding all of our efforts, experts will tell you there is no 100
percent guarantee against terrorist assaults. Fortunately, railroads are
accustomed to operating in adverse conditions. In order to respond to,

7

mitigate, and minimize the impact of dangerous and unusual incidents,
railroads have established and practiced programs and procedures to
protect the communities we serve and our employees, and to sustain the
fluid flow of freight on which our economy depends. These programs and
procedures include the establishment of emergency response plans for
hazardous materials incidents and natural disasters, operational
administration redundancy, and the training of rail employees and public
emergency response personnel. These programs and procedures can and
will be invoked in the event of a terrorist attack involving railroads.

Finally, a terrorist action against railroads could have ruinous
consequences for the railroad industry itself, thereby jeopardizing the
critical role railroads play in our economy. AAR member freight railroads
have already been notified by their insurance companies following the
events of September 11 that the railroads' liability insurance premiums will
be increased substantially and some coverage may be eliminated when
renewals are due. As a result, the rail industry notes with interest the
insurance assistance and the limitations on liability afforded the airline
industry in the recently enacted "Air Transportation System Stabilization
Act." Railroads, as common carriers, should be afforded similar liabtlity
protections and insurance relief.

8

The people of BNSF are deeply saddened by the events that
precipitated this hearing, and we strive every day to make the railroad
industry more secure than it was the day before. We commend the Chair
and the members of this Committee for their leadership in addressing the
important issues before us.
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TIMOTHY L. SMITH, CHAIRMAN
610 Auburn Ravine Rd., Suite C Auburn, CA 95603
(530) 823-7510, FAX (530) 823-7215

November 23. 2001

Honorable John Dutra, Chairman
Assembly Committee on Transportation
State Capitol
P.O. Box942649
Sacramento, CA 94249-0116
Dear Sir,
I would again like to thank you and your committee for the oppo.ctunity to speak on beh.Uf
of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers of California to the issue of terrorism :md our
preparedness in California.
The following is a summary of the points I discussed with you and your committee at the
recent hearings held in Oakland, CA on November 20, 2001 at the Elihu Harris Bldg. This
format will not follow the reco.rded versi<>n of my discussion to you, but will hit on the
points I would like to emphasize.
After the attack on America on September 11th, 2001, I submitted to my constituency a
question regarding what things we needed to do, from a labor perspective, to help safeguard
the state of California from terrorist acts. All Locomotive Engineers in California were
apprised of our situation after the terrorist attacks, and were told to kcc.:p very "watchful
eyes!"
Jn rccdviog the comments from sC)tnC of those 1 represent, I had to discern between the
thoughts of issuing bazookas to all train crews to the other more manageable ideas.
Needless to say. I chose the latter although I have ro admit, I did give the former suggestion
some thought!
It seems we need to reveal while on railroad property, who we are and what we do. The
yards are large, and there arc tnatJy people who traverse the confines of the yards. In so
doing, we must have all yards "well lit". The transient ptobkms, especially since September
11'h, bring many disastrous scenarios to the forefront of consideration.
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Communication between the carriers and labor is critical to enable the provisions of any
security efforts to be spread to not only the employees and thek families. but the message
will spread to friends and neighbors as well that everything is being done to safeguard the
lives of this California society. Thus far, there is nothing bcing received by this office from
the catric:r:s.
Increases in staffing of railroad police. f1tA Inspectors and California Public Utilities
Commission/Rail Safety Division Inspectors would gready enhance the security of the
railroads. Today, they arc spread too lhin to be able to handle all ofth(: potential problems
that would currently e,Ost shocld an incident ever occur. The railroad police can more
readily respond to the complaints that they receive, especially regarding the presence of
!-:ttangcrs lurking around the railroad yards, with more staff. FRA and CPUC R.'lil Safety
Inspectors can more tcadily assist the carriers in inspection of rail..toad facilities and rolling
stock.
The I ncidG'llt Command System should be made to include the opct:at:ing crews in the
hierarchy at all incidents. They ar.e the true first responders with an awareness level of
training. They are a valuable source of information, and 11hould not be pushed to the
background during the planning of mitigating an incident involving the property and rolling
stock of the canic;r and the.: well-being of the population.
Insuring that there are accurate train profiles and car placement identification for hazardous
materials and nuclear waste transport.'ttion is critical to the above incident corrunand
situation. Thusly, if the paperwork is correct, it may be verified by a pre-departure rollout
inspection of the train by the Conductor. Currently, we are precluded from doing this
because of the need to expedite the train.
The most important aspect of security that we could consider would be to insist that there
ax:e al$ays two crew m<..'111bers consisting of a Locomotive Engineer and another operating
craft employee, jn the cab of freight trains, passenger trains, commuter trains, wotk trains
and locals or light engines. The e:x:tl:'a set of eyes is necessary, and to this point not a
problem in obtaining on other than Amtx:ak, but with the carrier's motto of "doing more
with less", we need to assure our:odves that all railroads stay with the minimum. of two
people in the cab for safety's safe.
The best way to achieve this goal is to re-open legislation such as the two-person crew bill
SB 200, which was narrowly dcfeat~-d in the Assembly last year. Short of this, the carriers
should voluntarily see the need for permanent extra vigilance, especially since the work load
for the Locomotive Engineer is great. 'They cannot always focus on things outside of
signals. orders. or radio communication with the dispatchers while safely handling the train
in his/her charge. The other set of eyes ar.e always watching for anything or anyone who
might be su$picious, based on possible hazard potential scenarios.
The rail..toads are currently running remote control power, usually found on the rear end of
the ttain. Thi."> is an unmanned remotely controlled locomotive consist which could become
a potential harbinger of problc.:ms due to the lack of first hand observation by a Locomotive
Engineer within. Anyone could gajn access and do all types of interesting things that would
impact the movement of a train through towns. Remotely conttollc:d equipment is
dangerous due to the fact that it is urunanncd and available as a source of a terrorist act.
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This is but a short compilation of some of the thing.:; that were submitted to chis office. I do
hope that the considctations given to any and all of these points do not become douded by
the usual thoughts of "nest·feathering" by this labor organization. The information
imparted above is only the reasonable and unbiased opinion of normal people who have
concerns for their safety and that of their families and friends. To this end I wish again to
express my appreciation to you and your committee for the chance to add some input to this
very serious threat to our great state! Until such time as I meet with you again~ I remain ...

othy L. ~ mith, Chairman
California State Legislative Board
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers

T
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Appendix E:
DMV Documents

Assembly Transportation Committee
Assembly Member Dutra, Chair

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY HEARING

Ill.

DMV DOCUMENTS
A.

Driver License
~ Anti-Fraud Reform Update
~ Anti-Fraud Initiatives Being Evaluated/Implemented
~ Anti-Fraud initiatives Being Evaluated for Feasibility
and Effectiveness
~ Biometric Efforts
~ What States are Doing

B.

Hazardous Materials Endorsements/Certificates
~ Existing Law
~ Current Policy/Practice
~ Recent Federal Mandate

DMV'S ANTI-FRAUD REFORMS
Over the past few years the department has implemented several anti-fraud
reforms to considerably strengthen its policies and procedures relative to
obtaining a driver license (OL) or identification card (10). The following are some
of the reforms:

?

Legal Presence Documents Verified

Beginning in 1994, the department began the electronic verification of all
legal presence documents issued by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) when submitted by an applicant for a OL/10. If documents
cannot be verified electronically, copies of INS documents are sent to the INS
for review. On-line verification was implemented in field offices in 1998.

?

New DUID System Implemented to Reduce Fraud

In June 1999, the latest photo contract was implemented. This contract
resulted in many enhancements, including drastically redesigning the
transaction flow for a OL/10 card application. This provides the department,
as well as law enforcement agencies, access to the applicant's image almost
immediately. In addition, this system provides all field offices with the
capability of retrieving the most recent photo on the image database. The
new system also uses the existing photo on file for processing a duplicate OL
transaction. At this time, enhanced security features were added to the OL/10
card making counterfeiting or tampering much more difficult.

?

Policies and Procedures Strengthened

Effective October 25, 2000, the policies and procedures regarding the
processing of duplicate or renewal OLand 10 cards were strengthened. This
includes retrieving the photo image of the applicant from the image database
if the customer does not provide the appropriate photo document.
Application processing and fraud detection training for field office employees
has been enhanced.

?

Additional Review of Documents

The department requires two persons review breeder or source documents.
Before any original OL/10 card transaction occurs, the customer must have
the appropriate legal presence/birth date document.

;;... True Full Name Required
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In June 1999, the department developed regulations and procedures that
require applicants to use their true full name for all DLIID card applications.
This requirement eliminated the use of nicknames or fictitious names (i.e.,
Santa Claus), which could facilitate fraud.
;;.. Social Security Numbers are Verified

The collection of the Social Security Number (SSN) for all commercial driver
license applicants began in 1989 when it was required pursuant to the
Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986. Subsequently, two legislative
measures required the collection of the number for all non-commercial driver
license applicants. On-going verification efforts, coupled with the
department's "zero tolerance" policies on fraud/identity theft, successfully put
into motion an SSN verification program with the Social Security
Administration on October 14, 2000.
;;.. Technology Upgrades

In order to accommodate the increase in retrievals, several technology
upgrades have been completed. This includes increasing the capacity of
data transmission lines in all field offices and between Polaroid and Teale
Data Center; installing additional photo capture stations in 35 high production
offices, providing two additional photo retrieval workstations in DMV
headquarters, and expanding the image database's capacity to handle an
increased retrieval volume. In an effort to further deter counterfeiters, DMV
enhanced the current DLIID card further to add additional security features,
effective July 1, 2001.

'ii- Fraud Point of Contact
DMV has created a central point of contact, the Driver License Fraud
Analysis Unit to track and resolve DLIID fraud. The department publishes a
Fast Facts brochure on identity fraud which provides a toll fee telephone
number and e-mail address.

'ii- Employee Training Developed
Field Office personnel were provided training to improve the quality of
thumbprints captured by field office employees.
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INITIATIVES BEING EVALUATED/IMPLEMENTED
The Department is currently evaluating several anti-fraud initiatives that will be
implemented within the next few months that include:
~

Providing law enforcement agencies with the capability of retrieving photos
directly from DMV's image database (CaiPhoto Project). In addition, provide
field office employees photo retrieval capability at all workstations.

~

Revising the Application for DUID Card (DL 44) to include additional
information for processing and/or prosecution.

~

Developing a History Questionnaire and a more comprehensive background
check for Occupational License applicants. Currently, a Department of
Justice (DOJ) background check is performed, but, with the new reform, an
FBI check will also be performed.

~

Changing the temporary and interim licenses to read "Not a Verified
Identification" to caution businesses and various entities to not accept these
documents as identification.

4

INITIATIVES BEING EVALUATED FOR
FEASIBILITY/EFFECTIVENESS
Several anti-fraud initiatives are currently being evaluated to determine the
feasibility and effectiveness. They include the following:

~

Provide the department the capability to flag a record with information related
to lost or stolen driver licenses and when duplicate or replacement DUID
cards are requested.
·

~

System development for detecting and reporting excessive numbers of
duplicate applications on specific driver license numbers.

~

Require submission of one primary approved identification document and one
secondary approved identification document of any person applying for a new
or duplicate driver license or identification card.

~

Changing the electronic verification of the Social Security Number from a
batch process to an on-line verification process.
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BIOMETRIC EFFORTS

The OMV is involved in several projects relative to the use of a biometrics
system.

~

Commercial Driver License Biometrics Demonstration Project

This project is sponsored by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA) which will demonstrate the feasibility of using an automated facial
and/or finger/thumbprint identification system to accurately identify
commercial driver license (COL) holders and certify the identity of the existing
COL holders. Along with Georgia and West Virginia, over 12,000 original
images and 1,000 duplicate images have been collected and will be
analyzed. The analysis will include determining whether using facial
recognition as a primary identifier, with finger or thumbprint as a secondary, is
more effective or vice versa. In addition, it will determine which finger (right
or left index) or thumb (right or left) is more reliable.
~

Department of Justice/Department of Motor Vehicles Thumbprint Pilot

The purpose of this pilot is to determine the quality of OMV's existing
thumprint images by using OOJ's automated fingerprint identification system
and determine how many fraud records are contained in OMV's database.
Approximately 300,000 driver license numbers containing over 1.3 million
thumbprint images were provided to OOJ. This random sample contains both
thumbprints taken from the old and new OL system and will be evaluated
seperately.
~

Automated Identification Verification Solution

As part of the Governor's 2001-2002 Budget, $7.7 million was proposed to
implement a one to one biometric system using both facial recognition and
thumbprint verification. However, it did not pass through the Legislature and
was subsequently removed. OMV is developing a business case that would
address in part, the need for the Legislature to establish a public policy on
biometrics, public/privacy issues, collecting more than one thumbprint or
fingerprint, accuracy rates, and false rejection/acceptance.
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Live Scan Fingerprinting

As a result of 1997 legislation, the Department of Justice (DOJ) accelerated
its plans to implement applicant live scan fingerprinting. Beginning January
1, 2000, with few exceptions, DOJ will no longer accept rolled ink fingerprints.
The fingerprints will be electronically captured and submitted to the DOJ for
their automated background check process. This impacts applicants for
occupational licenses, special driving certificates, and prospective employees
when a background check is required. On January 2, 2000, DMV began
sending applicants and prospective employees to live scan sites throughout
the state for live scan fingerprinting. Currently, the department has submitted
a Feasibility Study Report to the Department of Information Technology to
obtain live scan devices for some of its field offices. The funding for live scan
is through an Office of Traffic Safety grant.
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WHAT STATES ARE DOING

Electronic SSN Verification
~

11 states are electronically verifying the SSN on-line: Alabama,
Arizona, Idaho, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada,
South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wyoming).

~

California is the only state that is electronically verifying. the SSN via
batch process.

Legal Presence Verification
~

California and Wyoming are the only states that are electronically
verifying legal presence.

Finger or Thumbprint Capture
~

5 states are requiring thumbprints:
California captures right thumb
Colorado captures right index
Georgia captures both left and right index
Hawaii captures right thumb for DL and both left and right index for 10
Texas captures both thumbs

~

2 states capture thumbprints on a voluntary basis:
Arkansas and West Virginia capture right index

Facial Recognition
~

Illinois and West Virginia are using facial recognition software.

Electronic Verification of Finger or Thumbprint
~

Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, and West Virginia are electronically
verifying finger or thumbprints.
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HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ENDORSEMENTS
Existing Law

(§15210 CVC)- commercial driver's license is defined as a driver's license
issued by a state or other jurisdiction, in accordance with the standards
contained in Part 383 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which
authorizes the license holder to operate a class or type of commercial motor
vehicle.
(§15250 CVC) - provides that no person may be issued a commercial driver's
license until he or she has passed a written and driving test for the operation of a
commercial motor vehicle which complies with the minimum federal standards
established by the federal Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 and
Part 383 of Title 49 of the code of Federal Regulations, and has satisfied all
other requirements of that act as well any other requirements imposed by the
Vehicle Code.
(§15275(a) CVC)- provides that no person may operate a commercial motor
vehicle unless that person has in his or her possession a valid commercial
driver's license of the appropriate class, and an endorsement issued by the
department to permit the operation of the vehicle, unless exempt from the
requirement to obtain an endorsement, as specified.
(§15275(b) CVC)- provides that an endorsement to drive vehicles, as
specified, shall be issued only to applicants qualified by examinations prescribed
by the department and that meet the minimum standards established in Part 383
of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
(§15278(a)(4) CVC) - requires a driver to obtain an endorsement issued by the
department to operate any commercial motor vehicle that is a vehicle carrying
hazardous materials that is required to display placards or markings pursuant
to Section 27903 or that is hauling hazardous waste, as defined in Sections
25115 and 25117 of the Health and Safety Code, unless the driver is exempt.
This requirement does not apply to:
•

Any person operating an implement of husbandry who is no required to obtain
a driver's license under the eve.

•

Any person operating a vehicle transporting asphalt or coal tar pitch at a
temperature that requires the display of a marking on the vehicle pursuant to
Section 27903 and that is described and classified by the US Department of
Transportation as "elevated temperature liquid n.o.s. Division 9."
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This provision does not apply to any person exempted pursuant to Section
25163 of the Health and Safety Code, to any person operating a vehicle in an
emergency situation at the direction of a peace officer pursuant to Section 2800,
or to a driver issued a restricted firefighter's license and driving a vehicle
operated for the purpose of hauling compressed air tanks for breathing
apparatus that do not exceed 2,500 pounds.
(§15300 - 15320 CVC) - commercial driving privilege penalty sanctions begin
with Section 15300 CVC.
(§13369 CVC) - provides the department the authority to refuse to issue or
renew, suspend or revoke certain special certificates, the passenger transport
vehicle endorsement, and the hazardous materials endorsement when certain
causes exist.

Current Policy/Practice

Currently, a criminal background check is NOT an element of the commercial
driver license application process, even if the applicant is applying for a
hazardous materials endorsement.
Only when the commercial driver is also applying for a special certificate (i.e.,
Schoolbus, School Pupil Activity Bus (SPAB), Youth Bus, General Public
Paratransit Vehicle Certificate (GPPV), Vehicle to Transport Developmentally
Disabled Persons (VDDP), Ambulance Driver, or Tow Truck) which requires a
criminal history check, is a criminal background check administered with the
Department of Justice.
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RECENT FEDERAL MANDATE
On October 26, 2001, President Bush signed the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-56). The bill requires
changes in the issuance of driver licenses for the transportation of hazardous
materials. Specifically, Section 1012 of the act amends the Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act by prohibiting States from issuing or renewing a license to
operate a motor vehicle transporting hazardous material in commerce unless the
Department of Transportation (DOT) has first determined that the applicant does
not pose a security risk warranting denial of the license.
Section 1012 cannot be implemented without rulemaking by DOT. Until
regulations to implement Section 1012 are in place, all indications are that States
should continue to renew old, and issue new, commercial driver licenses under
their usual procedures.
See attached copy of the statute.
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DMV Media Release
Tel: (916) 657-6437
Fax: (916) 657-8282

2415 First Avenue, Sacramento, CA 95818
CONTACT: Bill Branch/Steve Haskins, Media Relations Office

JULY 3, 2001

STATE ISSUES NEW SUPER-SECURE CALIFORNIA DRIVER LICENSE

SACRAMENTO --The Davis Administration unveiled an all-new, super-secure
California driver license today. The license features several new technologies to deter
identity thieves and other criminals from duplicating or manufacturing fraudulent copies.

By Friday, the first of the new anti-fraud driver licenses will begin showing up in the
mailboxes of Californians who recently applied for or renewed their licenses. The new
license has a hologram that is difficult for thieves to reproduce. It also retains most of
the security features of the previous driver license, such as the secondary portrait and
the magnetic stripe.

"We want to be on the cutting-edge of protecting Californians from fraud and loss," said
Secretary Maria Contreras-Sweet of the Business, Transportation and Housing Agency,
which oversees the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). "This new license is one of
the most technologically advanced cards in the entire United States."

DMV worked with the Polaroid Corporation to develop the technology needed to make
the improvements, which include:

•

An ink that changes color when viewed from different angles. Copy machines and
other low-grade counterfeiting technologies simply

c~n't

do the same thing.

DMV Media Release
•

A process that allows for full-color printing of fluorescent images, which emerge
under ultraviolet light. The fluorescent inks also take copiers and laser printers out of
the picture.

•

A fine-line color-design printing technology similar to that used on new U.S.
currency, which also hampers photocopiers and scanners.

Previously issued licenses will be replaced with the new version when they expire.
Existing licenses will continue to be valid until expiration. It will take about five years
before all existing licenses will be completely replaced.

(NOTE TO PHOTO EDITORS: Color photographs of the old and new licenses will
be available after 12:00 p.m. Pacific Standard Time on the Business Wire website
at www.businesswire.com/cgi-binlphoto.cgi?pw.070301/bb2, or via e-mail file
attachment by calling the DMV Media Relations Office at

(916) 657-6437.)
####

California Trucking Association

Recommendations Hazardous Materials
1)

Evaluate ports of entry for targeted hazardous materials most likely to be used in terrorist
activity (petroleum, gases (chlorine), ammonia nitrate).

2)

Eliminate unusually or willing chatter between drivers at CA Ports. Wait for containers at
congested ports. Large security breech between drivers waiting at congested ports.

3)

Certified and trained permanent gate security at entrance to international marine
terminals. Protocols for security breeches.

4)

Uniform terminal destination system for drivers.

5)

Adequate funding for California Highway Patrol to continue highway safety enforcement
actions and address new activities to prevent harm at gate terrorism activities.

6)

Create a task force to evaluate those drivers not posing security risks warranting denial of
hazardous material license.
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CALIFORNIA NATION.AL GUARD
Briefing to AssemblY Transportation Committee

Questions:

What is the Guard doing?

Answen The California National Guard bas three missions - a federal mission, a state mission
and a local (conup.unity) mission. Our federal mission is to provide mission-ready forces to the
federal govemment as directed by the president. Our s~te mission is to provide military support
to civil authorities as directed by the ~ovemor. And our local- our community- mission is to
'provide support to the communities whore we ':V~~ and live.
Following the attacks mi the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September Il'h. the Governor
and the National Command Authority tasked us.to provide security forces across the state and to
be prepared to provide forces globaUy.
The National Commap.d Authorlty initially placed all US military forces at THREATCON
DELTA in the wake of September 11th. This action) placement of military forces at
THREATCON DELTA. requires milita;ry commanders to increase Force Protection Measures to
the highest level of secw.jty short of actual war. We have subsequently reduced our Force
Prote~tion posture due to a J;educed securitY threat to personnel and facilities.
·'
.
The Adjutant Gener.~··~ directed his corilm~d~i to institute Force Protection Measure Charlie
at all California NationarGuard facilities. Force Protection Measure Charlie requires us to

heighten our securlty:..pasture by blocking ~d r~sfricting access to California National Guard
facilities. In addition,. we've place annc:d :soldi~?,rs: j;lt key National Guard facilities and require
positive identification of all persons at our facilities throughout the state.
~

-

•

•

I

•

,

•

Governor Davis or.dered California Nationai Gu~p. troops to report to airports across the state.
Twenty-nine (29) airports were selected for deployment of military personnel because of the
vohz~e of passenge~·~d tl'An:!portation priority. Our mission at the ai.rpons is to provide a
trained, armed, professional military security presence to reinforce local law enforcement and
help restore confidence in public air transportation.
We implemented the Governor's directive in three phases. Phase one commenced on October 5,
2001 with the deployment of over 140 soldiers and airmen at the Los Angeles International and
San Francisco Intellllltional airports. Phase ll was commenced on October 12, 2001 with the
deployment of soldiers and a.innen to nino additional Northern and Southern California airports.
Phase
commenced on October 19, 2001 with the deployment of soldiers and airmen to 1&
additional medium to small airports by October 19m, 2001.

m

Federally Mobilized Units
over the course of the past .five weeks, we have mobilized California Army and Air National
Guard units for federal service in support of Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom, and
other such missions as directed by the National Con:lll\and Authority. We currently have over
3,800 personnel called to Federal Active Duty performing sccmity and suppon operations
domestically and abroad.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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It is possible we could see further deployments. We have not been informed of additional
requirements for glob& deployment of California National Guem:l personnel. We arc: prcparccl to

provide Military Support to Civil Authorities in the event of an emergency in the state.
Questions:

What still needs to be done?

Answer: We are fully prepared prepared to respond to the call of the Governor for any state
emergency. Our focus now is to ensure all applicable security measures are in place. We will
work with the Administration if we identify any resource shortfalls.

Question:

How can Legislature help?

Answer: We are working with the Administration to prepare legislation to support the needs of
the California National Guard and our soldiers. We are not prepared to discuss the nature of
those proposals, however, we will request your support after concurrence from the Governor.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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Richard Eisner, FAlA, Coastal Region Administrator
Governor's Office ofEmergency Services
Oakland, California

Chairman, Committee Members.
Good Afternoon. I am Richard Eisner, Coastal Region Administrator for the Governor's Office
of Emergency Services. The Governor's Office of Emergency Services has an overall
coordination and facilitation role when it comes to terrorism planning, response and recovery.
Note that I did not use the term "management." OES' primary role is to serve as the Governor's
representatives when it comes to emergencies, but more specifically - our role is to support and
coordinate state preparedness and response with our partners in state agencies and local
government.
As a result of this vulnerability of regional transportation system, OES has facilitated planning
efforts with state and regional transportation planning agencies.
At the State level, in the specific arena of terrorism, OES is partner with Cal Trans, California
National Guard and the California Highway Patrol. Each brings a unique, valued expertise and
resources to the table.
OES facilitates state planning to ensure that the result is a unified preparedness and response
effort, consistent with the overarching state emergency plan. This plan includes a State
Terrorism Annex, which is constantly updated. OES' coordination role also extends to federal
agencies that participate in Weapons of Mass Destruction/Terrorism preparedness and response.
OES has incorporated the federal concept of operations into the state's plans to ensure that our
planning efforts are compatible, and in several regions of the state, OES and the FBI co-chair
terrorism working groups ofhealth, law, fire HAZMAT, transportation emergency planning and
response agencies.
OES has also been working to ensure that throughout our terrorism planning we have addressed
transportation issues resulting from a terrorism event. Our plan has included our partners at
CalTrans, California National Guard and the CHP. As new information about the threat is
developed, we will update and refine our plans with these agencies, and we will continue to
update the state's overall plan.
At the regional level, as early as the mid 1980s, OES funded studies by the Metropolitan
Transportation Commission to assess the 'residual capacity' ofthe Bay Region's transportation
system- what capacity would remain after a major disaster and how that remaining capacity
could be used to move the region's population.
After the 1989 earthquake, OES again worked with the MTC, to ensure that transit operators
could communicate effectively after a regional disaster, by providing an OES assigned
emergency radio frequency to the operators. We have subsequently participated with MTC in
training and exercised in preparation for a disaster response.
Most recently, after the events of September 11th, OES and MTC convened a series of planning
meetings of bridge and public safety agencies, and transportation operators, to ensure
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coordination of response to a terrorist act. These Bay Area Bridge Closure Contingency
Planning Meetings are ongoing and will benefit our response, regardless of the threat or the
occurrence of an actual disaster.
We have adapted a version of the State's Terrorism Annex for use by local governments as they
develop their own terrorism response plans. This document is a template that even the smallest
community can use to guide their local planning efforts.
The State Strategic Committee on Terrorism (SSCOT), California's coordinating body for
terrorism planning, is chaired by the Director of OES. Transportation issues are addressed by a
number of subcommittees of the SSCOT. These subcommittees, at the request of the Governor,
have just completed drafting an initial report on State's terrorism response.
Our California Specialized Training Institute (CSTI), is the premier emergency management
training facility in the country, and has long included transportation issues in their disaster and
terrorism courses. They have offered a terrorism course since the 1970s, as well as hazardous
materials courses, that include response to hazmat released that impact transportation routes.
As I noted earlier, OES co-sponsors, with the FBI, regional Terrorism Working Groups. These
are planning forums that include all disciplines-including fire, law enforcement, emergency
management, transit and transportation, and public health agencies - to share information,
contacts, protocols and training. Successful TWGs exist in the bay area, Los Angeles, the Inland
Empire, San Diego, Fresno, and Sacramento.
When an event occurs or is suspected, OES convenes the State Threat Advisory Committee (ST AC). Within minutes of the receipt of a threat, S-T AC convenes secure conference call for a
few, specific, key players in federal and state government to discuss the incident or threat.

Participants include FBI, CHP, DOJ, DHS and EMSA. Based on what is discussed in the secure
call, a consensus threat assessment is presented to the Governor through the OES Director=
"what this threat or incident means for the State." S-TAC met frequently in the days following
September 11th and continues to meet on an 'as needed' basis.
S-T AC was first convened on the night the diesel truck and trailer crashed into California
Capitol in January of this year. On that occasion, having the right agencies on the call, we were
able to advise the Governor within a few hours that this was indeed the work of a lone individual
and that there were no lingering health issues involved.
After an event, should California suffer a tragic attack, OES will use a process similar to that
which we use in other disasters--earthquakes, fires, and floods - to look after the needs of the
victims and speed recovery. Again, our partnership with CHP, CalTrans and regional
transportation agencies is key. We have a lot of experience exercising with our partners. During
Lorna Prieta, Northridge, and the numerous fires, winter storms and flood disasters we've
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experienced- we were co-located with CalTrans and the CHP in the State Operations Center and
Regional EOCs.
When and if we have a terrorism incident in California- we will have to bring the full resources
of the state to bear in responding immediately. We continue to work with state agencies and
local governments to build a system that will serve the state.
In closing, I want to reiterate our support for our partners at CalTrans and the CHP, and for
regional and local transportation and transit agencies. The transportation systems of the state
were strained long before September's attacks. The impact of disruption is great and our
tolerance for congestion is low. However, I think we all agree that now, it is not only opportune,
but ESSENTIAL to ensure a fully coordinated state, regional and local planning and response
effort.
Thank you.

~
SANJOSE
CITYOF

Memorandum

CAPITAL OF SIUCON VALLEY

TO: DEL BORGSDORF
CITY MANAGER
SUBJECT:

RESPONSE TO NATIONAL
EVENTS

FROM: Public Safety CSA
DATE: October 3, 2001

BACKGROUND:
On September 11 the United. States experienced two terrorist attacks, one in Washington, D.C.,
and one in New York City. As a result of these events the Public Safety CSA met to consider
steps that should be taken to enhance the safety of the community of San Jose. These fell into
three categories: those actions that could be taken immediately within existing budgets, those
actions requiring some time or some funding, and those actions that would require significant
time or significant funding.
The CSA departments worked together to implement those strategies that were within our ability.
Copies of some documents that were created are attached. The City's website was also updated
by the addition of information for the public, including the attached FAQ, website list, and
disaster preparedness information.

IMMEDIATE RESPONSE ACTIONS:
1. CSA partners will hold intelligence briefings at regular intervals during the period of
heightened alert for potential terrorist activity. Information on the sires of acutely
hazardous materials was obtained and shared with the Police Intelligence Unit and the
Fire Department's Bureau of Field Operations. Note: Evaluation ofpotential target sites
should be conducted in confidential meeting environments. Staffshould consult with the
City Anorney to determine what steps can be taken to protect confidential work products
from Freedom of Information Act inquiries. Lists of "possible targets" should not be
distributed outside of those working directly on the facility evaluation. CSA department
members are well aware of potential terrorist targets and make an extra effort to avoid
open discussion ofthesefacilities.
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2. OES drafted a letter for local businesses with a hazardous materials permit. Fire and
Police reviewed this letter. The Bureau of Fire Prevention provided electronic version
labels, and OES staff coordinated the production and mailing of the 2500 letters. A copy
of the letter is attached. The letter encourages some increased security steps, and urges
hazardous materials users to strictly abide by existing regulations and guidelines.
3. The Fire Department's Hazardous Incident Team will review any facilities of special
concern, and notify the Hazardous Materials Program manager of any stepped up
enforcement actions that could be beneficial.
4. Fire companies reviewed their pre-plans for sites that have hazardous materials pennits.
5. Existing terrorist response plans and resources were reviewed and evaluated. Information
from New York City's Health Department was added to the resource materials.
6. OES is·the point of contact for media representatives desiring information on the
Metropolitan Medical Task Force and the City's participation in the Domestic
Preparedness Program.
7. OES developed FAQ and website fliers in conjunction with Outreach staff for
distribution in the City Hall lobby and on the website.
8. OES worked with partner agencies to review terrorism response capacity and security
issues. Meetings were held with the staff of the County Health Department ro complete
Standard Operating Procedures for bioterrorism response. A meeting with the Santa Clara
Valley Water District included information regarding the high level of security of the
potable water supply, and the inability to guarantee against a denial of service attack due
to the long supply lines, including the aqueduct. Heightened security precautions include
increased surveillance through cameras and personneL
9. OES developed a packet of informational materials for the City staff meetings with the
staff of Senator Barbara Boxer and Congressmember Zoe Lofgren.

INTERMEDIATE STEPS:
1. The CSA members recommend that the City establish a policy that all employees will
wear their badges while at work and in City facilities. This will require that the City
provide a photo identification badge to every City employee. Although badges are
currently being issued to employees, there was period of about t1ve years in which such
badges were not available. These current employees will need to have badges, as well as
all new employees. Due to changes in appearance over time, badges should be re-issued
every 10 years, or when the person's appearance no longer matches the badge closely
· enough for security purposes.
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2. The daily operation of City Hall should be altered immediately. All exterior doors should
be locked, with panic hardware installed where it is needed, except for the two sets of
doors into the lobby area: those from the C Lot and those from the Mission Street side.
The City should consider employing uniformed security personnel as the lobby greeters.
3. Every City department should establish a reception area, and all visitors should be
admitted only through that point. All other doors to the department should be locked,
with appropriate panic hardware installed where needed.

4. The City should review the City Hall security plans and proposals that were developed in
the mid-1990's. These plans were developed over a period of months with involvement

by many City departments. The plans were not implemented due to the relatively high
cost of some of the steps and the short time in which the City expected to occupy the
building. A re-evaluation should be made now in light of future plans for the existing
City Hall structures. and current employee concerns. Also, other city facilities should
evaluate their security plans and proposals using the same criteria established for City
HalL All City Departments should re-evaluate their Emergency Plans to assure that they
are current and include specific direction on:
• how employees are notified there is an emergency,
• what action to take (evacuate building, etc.),
• where to relocate, how accountability for employees will be maintained, and
• who will make the decision on building re-entry or relocation for continuation of
work.
Guidance on these decisions may be found in the Department's existing Power Outage
SOP's.

5. Human Resources should prepare a new flier on services provided by the Employee
Assistance Program, highlighting the availability of critical incident stress management.
A cover memo should encourage City employees to seek assistance in dealing with their
normal reactions to the abnormal events of the past few weeks. They might want to
include a reference to the "After a Traumatic Event" and "Helping Chi ld.ren Cope With
Trauma" information that is linked from the City's homepage.
6. The City should establish a citywide policy regarding the admission of delivery personnel
into City workspaces. The receiving party or representative should meet such persons at
the department's public entrance. If delivery personnel need to be admitted to workspaces
to make their deliveries a City staff member should accompany them. Parcels for
unknown people, or people no longer working for the City, should not be accepted unless
prior arrangements have been made by a departing employee. All such parcels should be
returned to the sender for a better address. In genera), material intended for official City
use should be addressed to the appropriate department position rather than a person, such
as "OES Purchasing Representative."
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7. All visitors into the workspaces of City Hall should be required to sign in with the
appropriate deparunent receptionist and wear a visitor badge. The visitor should be
escorted by the appropriate City staff member.
8. Food preparation areas should have tighter security. Food service employees should wear
a badge. Others should not be admitted. Supervising food preparation staff should
carefully monitor deliveries. An extra emphasis on the prevention of food borne illness is
also important.
9. All intakes for the HV AC system should be secured with tamper proof wire mesh cages.
Locks for these cages should be in the possession of a limited number of specified City
personnel. All maintenance work on these facilities should be closely monitored by City
employees.
10. The City should develop a written policy on the reporting and disposition of
unaccompanied packages or other our of place items. This policy should include
notification of the supervisor for evaluation of the item, and of the Police for further
management. This policy should be distributed to all employees as soon as possible and
implemented immediately thereafter.
11. The City should distribute the phone threat checklist to all employees every six months
with their paychecks.
12. Department heads should be encouraged to have the "Terrorism Awareness for Public
Employees" class offered at times and locations that are convenient for their employees,
especially those who are in critical facilities. OES currently offers this class monthly
through the City's training catalog in the Civic Center. Additional classes at off-site
locations could be added.
13. All City departments, especially those whose facilities use hazardous materials, should
evaluate their facilities and take appropriate steps to protect their facilities and materials,
including developing or updating their disaster standard operating procedures. Personnel
from this CSA are available to assist departments with all phases of such an evaluation.
14. The City should develop a citywide security procedures handbook, and distribute it to all
personnel. All staff members should be required to sign a statement that they have read
and understood the contents. Human Resources should provide translations into
appropriate languages, as needed, and assistance in reading and understanding the
material for employees with limited literacy or limiting physical conditions.
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LONGER TERM/RESOURCE INTENSIVE ACTIVITIES:
I. The City should obtain an adequate community notification system. OES staff members
have researched available options and systems in operation in Bay Area communities. A
memo is being submitted with recommendations for research and selection of an
appropriate type of community alerting and warning system.

2. The GIS system should be developed to include layers needed for disaster response,
including the location of all hazardous waste and hazardous materials permit holders,
facilities using radiological material, and facilities using biological materials. Once this
information is available it should become accessible to Police and Fire Dispatchers. A
protocol should then be developed for the immediate reporting of any theft, burglary or
break-ins that occur in these occupancies.
3. IT should re-establish the redundant server in 855 N. San Pedro. As a protection against
virus attack this server should only be part of the citywide network for a specified period
each week to allow for the download of archival material. The use of this server should
be enlarged to include all of the evolving vital records for the City. These would include
at a minimum personnel/payroll records, EOC/OES plans and documents, Fire plans and
critical response documents, Police plans and critical response documents, and other
items deemed by the City Manager to be ''Vital Records" of the City. Each section of the
vital records should be separately password protected, with access only for authorized
users.
4. The Employee Emergency Response Team should receive training on a regular basis.
Their written plan should be reviewed and exercised at least annually, preferably in
conjJ.ITICtion with the annual Civic Center evacuation drill. Each department head should
be responsible to recruit the appropriate number of employees to staff the team needed in
department controlled spaces, whether in City-owned or leased space. The City's Safety
Officer should support this team.
5. The design team for the new City Hall should re-evaluate the security features built into
the new building. Access to non-public areas, security of food handling areas, security of
the HVAC system components, and crime prevention through design features should be
reviewed and strengthened where necessary. Members of this CSA are available to
consult with the City architects and the security-consulting finn.
6. The potential for cyber-terrorism needs to be considered in the design of all future IT
projects. Redundancy and immediate access to protected data storage are critical in
maintaining functionality during natural and technological disasters, as well as malicious
interference events. Technologies such as removable hard drives and cloned data
collections should be fully explored.
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CONCLUSION:
While it is impossible to guarantee perfect security in any location, or to protect against all
possible emergency and disaster events, the CSA partner departments believe that these steps
would lead to better protection for City employees, facilities and equipment against malicious
interference, accident, or natural disaster.

~~

.. J

Manuel Alarcon
Fire Chief
Attachments: FAQ
Website list
Hazardous materials users' letters
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CAPITAL OF S!UCON VALLEY

TO: HONORABLE MAYOR AND

FROM: Frances Edwards-Winslow

CITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Approved

DATE: 10-9-01
Date

RECOMMENDATION
BACKGROUND
The City of San Jose has an emergency preparedness program based on the all-hazards model. In
the early 1990's a risk analysis of San Jose showed that possible events included earthquakes and
other natural disasters, hazardous materials accidents and other technological events, and
multiple casualty incidents such as multiple vehicle accidents. Planning for rapid response to
such events was begun. The City's Emergency Operations Plan was developed to comply with
the State's Standardized Emergency Management System, and to provide a framework for
responding to any type of disaster. At the countywide level a Multiple Casualty Incident Plan
was developed that guided the evaluation and care of patients from the scene of an accident
through their emergency medical transport to the receiving hospital. In addition, the County
Health Department developed a Health and Medical Disaster Plan that focused on the delivery of
medical care during any disaster event. This plan covers medical, mental health and
environmental health issues. These plans were written, staff members were trained on the plans,
and full-scale exercises were held to verify the functionality of the plans.
In April1997 the City of San Jose was notified of its inclusion in the Federal government's
Domestic Preparedness Program. The twenty-seven largest cities in the United States were
provided with training by the Department of Defense and planning guidance by the Department
of Health and Human Services. These two departments provided funding for the development of
a cache of equipment and pharmaceuticals to support the care of victims of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) for the ftrst 12 hours after an attack. (Federal resources would begin to be
delivered at that time.) Over 500 public safety personnel from San Jose and its mutual aid
partners completed train-the-trainer courses on responding to a terrorist attack and caring for the
victims of such an attack. San Jose's Metropolitan Medical Task Force (MMTF), made up of onduty City staff trained to respond to a terrorist event, completed its development phase in
December 2000. The Department of Justice awarded two competitive grants to the San Jose
MMTF for additional equipment. The City has received a total of $1.38 million from Federal
sources for the planning, equipping and exercising of the MMTF. Exercises of the MMTF and its
larger Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) are held regularly. The MMRS consists
of medical care beyond the scene and partners with the County Health Department (medical and
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mental health), the Medical Examiner/Coroner, the private emergency medical transportation
service and the medical community, including hospitals, laboratories and private practitioners.

ANALYSIS
1. Although no community can be fully prepared for every possible expression of disaster,
the City of San Jose has taken appropriate steps to evaluate the risks to the community,
and to prepare to manage community needs growing from them.
2. Mitigation is an important part of emergency preparedness. The City had an aggressive
program in the early 1990's to eliminate unreinforced masonry buildings from the
community because they are an earthquake hazard. Under the leadership of the Building
Division this program is coming to a successful conclusion. More recently, the Office of
Emergency Services and the Housing Department have partnered to develop a series of
publications to assist multiple-family building owners to evaluate the safety of their
buildings, and guidance to increase the safety of those buildings.
3. San Jose has a variety of land use regulations and ordinances to prevent the construction
of new buildings in t1ood plains or on steep slopes. Strict enforcement of the Uniform
Building Code results in a building stock that has resistance to seismic forces and wind
damage, and that has acceptable functionality in all plumbing, mechanical and electrical
systems.
4. Strict enforcement of the Fire Code results in buildings that are Jess likely to catch fire.
Inclusion of smoke detectors provides the chance for escape if a fire should start
accidentally. The use of proper buildings materials and appropriate setbacks minimizes
the likelihood of conflagration. The County Fire Marshal's Office enforces weed
abatement regulations to lessen the chance of the spread of wHdland fires. Street design
and construction ensures access for emergency vehicles throughout the community.
5. The maintenance .of storm drains minimizes the likelihood of localized t1ooding in the
community. The Santa Clara Valley Water District, the county's flood control agency,
develops waterway improvement projects to mitigate the potential for flooding. Land use
regulations require that new developments plan for the appropriate management of mnoff. The conscientious application of mitigation steps to flood control has earned the City
of San Jose a 7 rating in the National Flood Insurance Program, resulting in savings for
flood insurance holders, as well as lessening the likelihood of flooding in the community.
6. There are many industries in our community that use hazardous materials. These facilities
are governed by local, Stare and Federal laws that are designed to protect both the
residents and the environment from an accident or spill. Annual inspections by various
governmental agencies ensure that laws relating to both use and storage of hazardous
materials are enforced. Hazardous materials transportation and hazardous waste
transportation are governed by similar laws, which are enforced by the Federal
Department of Transportation.
7. Disease control is the responsibility of the County and State Public Health Departments.
Disease survemance and disease reporting systems provide earJy warnings of a disease
outbreak in a community. The Public Health Officer can begin aggressive treatment of
infectious diseases immediately based on these systems. The California Public Health
Department Laboratory in Berkeley, California is the only laboratory outside of the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta that can diagnose a variety of
infectious diseases, including weaponized diseases that might be used by terrorists. The
proximity of this lab to San Jose would enable our community to receive rapid response
to a need for diagnostic lab work.
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8. Public safety personnel in the City have received training in responding to a potential
Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) event. Regular exercises and refresher training help
them to maintain their skills, which can all be applied to accidental or naturally occurring
disaster events.
9. Members of the Radio Amateurs in Civil Emergency Service (RACES) have received
training in supporting San Jose's first responders in the field during WMD events. They
regularly participate in field exercises of the MMTF.
10. Skills and equipment acquired as part of the Domestic Preparedness Program have
proven useful in non-terrorist event~. The robot has been used for scene surveillance at
two suicides and at several events where explosives may have been present. The triage
tarps speeded patient care at the accident between the Coca Cola truck and the Amtrak
train several years ago. The skills for scene management and patient care developed
through the Domestic Preparedness Program aided in the effective management of the
pepper spray incident at K-Mart, Montgomery Wards and Walgreen's in December,
2000.

PUBLIC OUTREACH
Information on emergency preparedness is available on the City's website, with links from the
homepage and materials on the Office of Emergency Services page. Talks on ''Terrotism
Awareness for the Public" are provided by Office of Emergency Services staff to community
groups on request. Presentations on San Jose Prepared! are offered regularly at community,
school and religious groups. Public educations materials on all phases of emergency
preparedness are distributed through the library branches and community centers in languages
appropriate to each neighborhood, and at Council District events and other public events. The
Public Safety CSA departments partner to distribute educational materials on public safety at a
variety of events, including Fire Prevention Week and community fairs.

COORDINATION
This memo was coordinated with the Police Department and the Fire Department.

Frances Edwards-Winslow
Director, Office of Emergency Services
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wasn1ngton:

City of San Jose Office of Emergency Services

What You Need to Know About the Threat of Terrorism
Frequently Asked Questions
Introduction
At this time, authorities are not aware of any credible terrorism threat to the Bay Area. Residents and
businesses should try to maintain normal activities and lessen their anxiety through obtaining
accurate information. Many questions are currently being asked by San Jose residents. Here are the
answers to the most commonly asked questions.

Q. What should I do about terrorism?
Heightened awareness of your surroundings is your best behavior change. In the work place, parcels,
boxes, or other items that are out of place should be reported to a supervisor immediately, who should
then evaluate and report to Security or the Police. People who don't belong should be challenged, and
Security should be called to have them either properly identified or removed. Badging should be
taken seriously. Food preparation and HV AC areas should be closely monirored. General building
security should be heightened- keep doors locked, pay attention to people's ID when they sign in,
badge everyone!
At home, maintain the same kind of heightened awareness of people and packages in your
neighborhood. Call the Police if you see a person, parcel or event that does not seem right to you.
Maintain your emergency preparedness plan for your family. Have an· out of state contact number so
family members can exchange information after a disaster when the local phones may not be able to
receive calls. Have a family reunification point in addition to your home. If there were a natural
disaster such as a flood or wildland fire you might not be able to go home right away. Select a
location with a parking lot and some landmarks and establish a spot where your family will meet.
Develop an emergency response kit for each family member. A downloadable flier is available at
www.ci.san-jose.ca...usloes/oes.hlJP.. Develop a shelter-in-place kit, in case there is a chemical release or
smoky fire in your area. A downloadable brochure on sheltering in place is available at the link listed
above.

Q. Should I buy a gas mask for each of

my family members?

No. "Gas masks" filter air through canisters that are generally designed to neutralize one chemical.
Therefore, without knowing what chemical could be involved, you would have no idea which filter to
purchase. Second, gas masks require extra respiratory effort. When this equipment is assigned to
emergency response personnel they are first given a respiratory rest to ensure that they are able to use
them safely. Third, to be effective the mask must have a tight seal around the face. To ensure this
correct fit, you must be fitted by someone skilled in this.
Finally, masks have to be used properly to be sate. During the Gulf War the government issued gas
masks to residents in areas of Israel where SCUD missles were landing. People who did not follow

http://www .ci.san-jose.ca.us/oes/terror_faq.htm
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the mask directions died from improper use of the masks, even though no gas was ever deployed. The
Israeli experience suggests that more people get hurt using the gas mask improperly than would be
hurt in an attack.

a. What medications should I stockpile for myself and my children?
None. Medications cannot be safely stockpiled. They have to be prescribed for a specific disease to be
effective. Overuse of antibiotics leads to the mutation of pathogenic organisms, and they become
resistant to antobiotic therapy. The dosage of any medication musr be selected for the individual
patient. Age and physical size are important considerations for physicians when they select a
medication and dosage for a patient.
Physicians must also consider pre-existing medical conditions in the patient, and possible drug
interactions that would be harmful to the patient. Finally, all medications have to be properly stored
to maintain potency. Most medications can only be safely stored in home conditionsoffluctuating
temperatures and humidity for short periods of time. This is one reason why medications are
prescribed in the exact amount required to cure a specific disease.
Furthermore, the Federal government has developed stockpiles of the medications that might be
needed in the event of a terrorist attack on a community. These stockpiles are stored at locations
throughout the United States. They can be delivered to an affected community within 12 hours to
reinforce the existing local supplies available under nonnal circumstances in pharmacies and
hospitals. A larger supply chain is also in place to enable appropriate dosages to be provided to
victims.

a. Should I store iodine tablets for my family?
No. Some European countries with old-style nuclear reactors have issued potassium iodine (Kl)
tablets to residents who are downwind of their facilities. This was done in reaction to the Chemobyl
nuclear accident, where there was a known potential source for radioactive release under accidental
conditions. Such conditions do not exist in our community. There is no need to store KI at home. In
the unlikely evenr it were needed, supplies would be made available rapidly enough to protect the
thyroid.
Still have questions? Visit some of the disaster infonnation links available on our Disaster_and
Emergency Management Information web page or call the City of San Jose Office of Emergency
Services at 408~277-4595 from 8 am through 5 pm Monday through Friday, excluding holidays.
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Statement by Washington Hospital at the Transportation Committee Hearing
November 20, 2001
Presented by Kris LaVoy, Chief of Professional Resources.

Washington Hospital is 308 bed District Hospital located in Fremont.
Hospitals have 2 goals related to disaster:
Protect our facilities and staff.
Be prepared to accept potential victims .
Washington Hospital is preparing on both fronts:
SECURITY
• Have a comprehensive security program.
• Controlled access, camera surveillance of all entrances.
• Completed securing critical systems- water, air handlers, medical gases.
• Process of installing stanchions and bollards both permanent and removable (approx. cost
$180,000.00 to protect buildings and control access.
• Considering upgrade of air handling systems in other buildings on campus to allow use of
these buildings to care for victims -expensive! (approx cost $750,000- $1,000,000).
PREPAREDNESS
• Washington Hospital has an effective Emergency Operations Plan.
• Hospitals maintain a system of redundancies- generators, food and H20, supplies (AHA
recently recommended, self sufficiency for 24-48 hours).
• Washington Hospital has an outdoor shower facility- 4 victims with mechanism to
contain H20.
• Completed preparation for Anthrax- supplies, equipment and pharmaceuticals (cost
$70,000).
• In process of upgrading staff protective equipment for variety of agents - both biological
and chemical (approx. cost $1 0,000).
• In process of working through the implications of other agents- that includes diagnosis,
treatment, including drug therapy.
For example- victims of botulism may require 6-8 weeks of ventilatory support- a
ventilator costs $75,000.
• Both a challenge and an ongoing cost- education of staff and physicians. Many MD's
currently practicing have never seen these conditions!
• Recently had discussions regarding function vs location. For example: can the "ED"
function be provided in other physical locations if our dedicated ED were unavailable due
to contamination or disaster?
Who do we collaborate with:
• Participate in several County EMS Committees.
• Communicate with and "drill" with cities within our District, Fremont, Union
City, Newark.

What we need:
• Funding to support security and preparedness expenses that are clearly earmarked
for Hospitals.
• A system of equipment and supplies to back-up local hospitals- if we could
depend on this - we might prevent over-reaction, over-preparation.
• Enhancement of our public health system.
• Public education that is clear and consistent.
• Finally, as you consider funding and legislation- remember that if there is
another terrorist attack- hospitals are one of the places that the public will go, for
information, for comfort and for care.
In response to the comments made by Vic Valdes ofthe Fremont Fire Department:
Washington Hospital is equipped to decontaminate patients. On the day of the specific
situation discussed during the hearing, Washington Hospital was ready and waiting to
accept victims. The decision not to bring victims to Washington Hospital was made by
the EMS system not by Washington Hospital.
Fire Departments have years of experience in hazardous materials, protective equipment
and decontamination. Washington Hospital would hope to get additional support and
ongoing training from the Fremont Fire Department. My hope would be that we could
work together in a collegial environment for the betterment of the community
Respectfully Submitted

Kristine LaVoy, R.N.,
Chief of Professional Resources
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